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A B STR A C T
This is a study about the nature of nursing practice. It emanates from the debate about the 
disparity between theory and practice, and analyses the nature of practice in juxtaposition to  
that of theory.
The central contention is that theory and practice essentially bespeak quite different spheres. 
The substantiation of this is derived from an eclectic, qualitative study, using both 
theoretical and empirical approaches. Senior student nurses participating in clinical 
practice [and therefore directly engaged with the theory-practice question] were 
interviewed, and these data, together with theoretical deliberations and reflections on actual 
practice were used to generate concepts of the nature of practice. The conceptual framework 
constructed from these concepts provides an analysis which allows the nature of practice to  
be seen as distinct from theory.
The articulation of this distinction leads to the conclusions that practice is essentially 
inarticulable, that it can only be learned through participation, and that theory relates to  
practice in a variety of ways. From these, implications are drawn which are pertinent to  
practice, to the education of nurses, and to the management of nursing practice.
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PREFACE
'The following notes are by no means intended as a rule of 
thought by which nurses can teach themselves to  nurse, 
still less as a manual to teach nurses to nurse. They are
meant simply to give hints for thought to women who have
personal charge of the health of others ......  I do not
pretend to teach her how, I ask her to teach herself, and 
for this purpose I venture to  give her some hints."
Florence Nightingale (1970:3)
These comments from Nightingale's Notes on Nursing are an early indication of a 
variance between theory and practice. Why can nursing theory not teach nurses 
how to nurse? Is it the result of a misconception of the relation of theory to
practice, or of the nature and role of theory, or of the nature of nursing practice
itself?
This problem has been referred to in the literature as the theory-practice gap, and 
is one of the longest running debates in nursing, impacting on all areas of the 
practice and the academic study of nursing, with practitioners being encouraged to 
demonstrate the theoretical basis of their practice and theoreticians being exhorted 
to demonstrate the practical significance and impact of their work. It is the 
incentive for this study, which has arisen from a concern that theoretically well-
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prepared and capable students do not necessarily translate into good practitioners - 
and vice versa.
This concern arose during the researcher's own professional experience both as a 
practising nurse and as a lecturer in Nursing Studies. The specific trigger 
stemmed from an Examination Board's dilemma when confronted with an 
academically high-achieving nursing student who persistently failed assessments of 
practice.
It is possible that some reasons for this could lie in the discrepant natures of theory 
and practice, and this could become clearer if the nature of practice could be 
articulated against that of theory.
This study, therefore, examines the nature of practice in relation to theory, 
contending that the nature of practice and theory are discrete, and bespeak quite 
different spheres, so that there can be no direct relationship between them: theory 
contributes to a 'melting pot' along with much else which practitioners use as a 
resource in determining their practice. To substantiate this contention, this study 
aims to provide an articulation of the nature of practice so as to demonstrate its 
distinction from theory [the nature of which has already received much attention.] 
From this implications can be drawn pertinent to the education of nurses and the 
management of nursing practice.
- 1 1 -
SECTION 1
CONTEXT
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CHAPTER 1
THE THEORY-PRACTICE GAP IN NURSING
1.1 . INTRODUCTION
To locate this study within the theory-practice debate it is necessary to examine the 
literature on the discrepancy between these two. Since Nightingale's formulation of 
the problem, the discrepancy has been a pervasive issue in the nursing literature. 
Lathlean (1994) identifies three approaches to the literature on the topic: issues 
relating to identifying the problem with solutions from within the same system 
being offered, solutions offered which change the whole system and issues related to 
the nature of nursing theory and practice and professionalism - some of the latter 
offering radical critiques of the nature of knowledge in nursing.
While Lathlean has taken an historical approach to the literature, this study offers 
an analysis from three angles - those of organisation, of socialisation and of 
philosophy, so as to examine the nature of the discrepancy between theory and 
practice, and to conclude that an articulation of a framework for practice is needed.
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1.2 . ORIGINS OF THE PROBLEM
It seems obvious that historically, as Lathlean (1994) claims, these concerns 
should have been the domain of nurse education - even Nightingale's comment is 
formulated in this context - since this is the initial encounter with the theoretical 
world. Hunt's (1974) research on the discrepancy between the teaching and 
practice of surgical dressings procedures is an early example of this, and many 
other educationally-oriented studies showing various aspects of the difference 
between theory and practice followed (Bendall, 1975; Wong, 1979; Powell, 
1982; Fretwell, 1982; Alexander, 1983). French (1989 ) lists more than 
thirty such reports which he arranges along lines of dichotomy [e.g. theory- 
practice; college-hospital; teacher-practitioner; school-ward, etc.] all of which 
indicate an educational concern.
More recently, however, the theory-practice gap is being cited in the writings of 
nurse researchers and managers. This has come about by moves within nursing 
towards professionalism and thus towards becoming more scientific and research- 
based, aided by a top-down drive to articulate a unique focus and body of knowledge 
for nursing, all of which tend to emphasise a juxtaposition between theory and 
practice. Collins (1992) articulates this discrepancy in the role of expert 
practitioners - the Clinical Nurse Specialists - whose role is reputedly that of both 
researcher and practitioner, while Hicks (1994) examines the discrepancy in 
terms of professional pressure and lack of training in the midwifery context. Closs 
& Cheater (1994), in their analysis of the utilisation of research findings by 
practising nurses, recognise the discrepancy with regard to research, and suggest 
that knowledge derived from experience, rather than knowledge derived 
theoretically from empirically-based studies, is more highly valued amongst 
British practitioners - hence the discrepancy and the non-utilisation of research 
findings.
The existence of a theory-practice discrepancy, no matter what the origin, is 
undisputed. Once this has been recognised, debate arises as to the causes and 
possible solutions.
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1 .3 . REASONS FOR THE THEORY-PRACTICE DISCREPANCY
1.3.1 . ISSUES OF ORGANISATION AND STRUCTURE
Most of the literature citing organisational or structural reasons for the gap 
originate from nurse education, and concern curriculum issues. These are raised 
on various levels from local modifications of syllabi and the study of clinical 
learning areas, to major reconstructions of curricula and of the system of nurse 
education (Ferguson & Jinks, 1994).
For example, Jacka & Lewin (1986a) suggest that a lack of harmony between 
classroom teaching and the ward experience is problematic, while McCaugherty 
(1991b) suggests that the organisation of the curriculum is to blame, with the poor 
sequencing between the blocks of theoretical content of the syllabus and the practical 
content of the clinical experience. Wong (1979) discusses teaching strategies and 
curriculum design, along with Nelson (1994 ), and Chiarella (1990 ) looks at 
bringing training programmes for clinical staff in line with that of the students.
Implicit in the studies on clinical learning environments (Pembrey, 1980; Orton,
1981 ; Fretwell, 1982; Ogier, 1982) is the notion of a theory-practice gap caused 
by the organisational structure of the wards, although this is more commonly 
articulated as the ineffectiveness of clinical learning (Lathlean, 1994). Fretwell, 
for instance, contrasts what she terms job 'how' teaching with job 'why' teaching - 
i.e. practice and theory - and suggests the former is the major component of clinical 
learning and is dependent on the structural issues of staffing ratios and workload of 
the ward. This theme is renewed many years later by Porter & Ryan (1996) who 
demonstrate , rather interestingly, that the gap results primarily from practising 
nurses having insufficient resources to practice in accordance with the theory to 
which they subscribe. Orton (1981) uses the theory-practice gap as the basis for 
demonstrating the importance of ward-based learning which is largely determined 
by the work ethos and atmosphere of the ward.
Major redesigning of nurse education has had the narrowing of the divide between 
theory and practice as the subscript. As the service needs of the hospitals 
dominated the location of the students' placements, there was little relation between 
the topics taught and the type of clinical experience the students received. To 
overcome this the modular scheme of training was introduced in the 1970s
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(Ferguson & Jinks, 1994) where clinical experience was immediately preceded by 
pertinent theoretical teaching. Alexander's (1983) research went even further 
than this, offering a closer fit between theory and supervised practice together with 
innovative teaching strategies. Although this particular experiment was rated a 
success by the students, the modular system alone was not sufficient to integrate 
theory and practice.
The latest major redesigning of nurse education has been the implementation of 
Project 2000, with the aims of taking nurse education into the higher education 
sector, and giving student nurses supernumerary status during their clinical 
experience. Elkan's & Robinson's (1993) evaluation of Project 2000 states that 
while it was set up to raise educational standards and bring theory and practice 
closer together, they found little evidence of this and maintain that the theory- 
practice gap is still very much in existence.
1.3 .2 . ISSUES OF SOCIALISATION
While structural/organisational issues provided the most prolific and sustained 
focus for the discrepancy, issues concerning the socialisation process began to be 
articulated in the 1960s. The main argument of these studies was that the 
discrepancy arose from a conflict between the values students were taught in the 
pre-work socialisation period and the way things were actually done in the 
workplace. Kramer's (1974) seminal study, aptly titled "Reality Shock", provided 
an analysis of the situation in the USA, and Melia's (1987) work demonstrated that 
same phenomenon existed in the UK. Melia's themes of 'learning the rules', 'getting 
the work done', 'nursing in the dark', 'just passing through', 'doing nursing and 
being professional' give a flavour of this conflict. Greenwood (1993a) also 
identifies this phenomenon, but derives her analysis from a cognitive perspective 
on learning, where she suggests that socialisation processes provide different 
schemata from those acquired during theoretical modules, creating two inconsistent 
sets of beliefs. Menzies's (1970) analysis of anxiety in hospitals implies a gap 
caused by socialisation processes: student nurses are socialised into working 
practices which exist to minimise stress and anxiety, and these conflict with the 
espoused working practices which exist for the benefit of patients and in the 
interests of hospital efficiency.
Many smaller studies have indicated that the socialisation processes highlight a 
theory-practice gap, such as Brereton's (1995 ) analysis of the teaching of
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communication skills, and Yassin's (1994) examination of the use of staff in this 
process. Other works alluding to socialisation processes look at the relationship 
between clinical staff and students or teachers and researchers as a factor in 
creating [or reducing] the divide (e.g. Armitage & Champney-Smith, 1990; 
Wilson-Barnett et al, 1990; Bassett, 1993 ; Castledine, 1993).
The clinical learning environment studies mentioned above have implicit reference 
to differences in socialisation processes as a cause of a theory-practice discrepancy 
[e.g. Pembrey's (1980) reference to role modelling as a means of learning the work 
of the ward sister as opposed to formal management training].
1 .3 .3 . PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES
The third reason for a theory-practice gap concerns philosophical issues. Ingram 
(1991:352), in discussing the nature and purpose of theory, suggests that lack of 
theoretical clarity could cause a theory-practice discrepancy - as theories may 
simply be considered "too esoteric for clinicians" who would be unable to a apply 
them in practice. A similar point is made by Scott (1994).
Draper's (1990 & 1991) analysis is along slightly different lines, suggesting that 
almost all current nursing theory is generated in the USA and is culturally 
unacceptable to UK nurses - hence the discrepancy.
Other writers (Miller, 1985) suggest that the idealistic nature of theory creates 
discrepancies in the realism of the clinical areas, and propose that issues of 
communication and vocabulary are to blame for this. Hewison & Wildman (1996) 
argue that the theory-practice gap is compounded by divergent values: nursing 
theory is based on the values of humanism and holism, whereas the delivery of 
health care is based on market values and concerned with throughput, numerical 
targets and financial constraints.
Nursing's recent interest in Schon's (1983 & 1987) ideas has created a flurry of 
writing on reflective and experiential learning and its value in nursing. Dale 
(1994) suggests that the theory-practice gap is in fact a theory-theory gap - the 
gap being the lack of experiential knowledge. Practitioners can integrate theory 
and practice via reflection which would produce experiential knowledge - what Dale 
refers to as the third perspective on knowledge. Tolley (1995 :188) advocates 
reflection as a means of developing tacit knowledge and of bringing "the lowlands of
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practice towards the high grounds of research". Greenwood (1993b), however, 
sounds a note of warning against what she sees as the current dominant approaches 
to reflective practice in nurse education. Arguing from a cognitive psychological 
perspective and emphasising the feedback loop in learning, she suggests that 
reflection-in-action by students does not always allow the conceptual underpinnings 
of the action to be examined, and unless this is done, inappropriate conceptual 
underpinnings will be articulated [i.e. those useful for passing assessments, rather 
than for effective practice], and this will merely consolidate the theory-practice 
gap.
In related vein, Carr (1980) suggests that the gap arises not between the practice 
and the theories which are used to guide that practice, but rather when theories 
other than these are presumed to be guiding practice. These ideas will be discussed 
in depth later.
1.4 . RESOLUTIONS
Resolutions to the theory-practice gap are suggested by writers who see the 
discrepancy as problematic. The literature on solutions for 'bridging the gap' is 
directly related to the individual author's ideas on what caused the gap, and is 
consequently discussed in terms of those issues.
1.4.1. ISSUES OF ORGANISATION AND STRUCTURE
By far the most literature revolves around curriculum issues and the structure of 
students' learning.
Alexander's (1983) successful experiment reorganised the teaching programme and 
introduced greater teacher-student contact in the clinical areas. Wong (1979) has 
similar ideas, suggesting active student involvement as well as changes in teaching 
strategies and curriculum design. McCaugherty (1991b) suggests structuring an 
'exact match' between taught content and immediate subsequent clinical experience, 
while Jacka & Lewin (1986b) go so far as to introduce numerical measures which 
match hours of teaching on diagnostic topics with the amount of experience of the
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same diagnostic category available to the student during the clinical experience 
immediate following the teaching.
Restructuring on a grander scale as a solution to the problem has already been 
mentioned (Elkan & Robinson, 1993). Along similar lines, Benoit's (1989 ) 
historical analysis of forms of midwifery training [traditional grannies, 
apprenticeship schemes, vocational schooling and university training] favours 
vocational training as the only effective measure for bridging the theory-practice 
divide. At a more modest level. Nelson (1994) describes a particular curriculum 
model used in a specific clinical area [Accident & Emergency] which purports to 
narrow the theory-practice gap, and McCaugherty (1991a) proposes a ward-based 
teaching model as a solution.
The role of clinical teaching staff has always been pertinent to discussions of the 
theory-practice discrepancy. As early as the 1950s clinical teachers were 
appointed as mediators between teaching and clinical staff (Ferguson & Jinks, 
1994) and as a means of linking the students' theoretical and practical learning. 
Dissatisfaction with the role lead to its abandonment, and joint appointments 
between universities and clinical areas became fashionable (Ashworth & Castledine, 
1980). These appointees had teaching responsibilities in universities and either 
management or clinical responsibilities in hospitals. Currently the concept has 
developed to that of lecturer practitioner appointments (Lathlean, 1995). 
Castledine's (1993) brief résumé of these various academic/clinical appointments 
suggests that all have the basic purpose of closing the gap, and although the situation 
remains unresolved, he argues strongly for some type of such appointment. 
Chiarella's (1990) alternative solution is to improve the continuing education of 
clinical staff to equate with that which students currently receive.
With the move of nurse education into higher education and many of the topics on the 
nursing curriculum being taught by subject specialists. Cave (1994) argues that 
the nurse teacher has a unique role in integrating academic knowledge and practice, 
and assisting the learner in applying theory to practice. Armitage & Burnard 
(1991), however, see the role of the clinical preceptor [or sometimes the mentor] 
as solving this problem.
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1 .4 .2 . ISSUES OF SOCIALISATION
Although those who see the socialisation process as being responsible for the divide 
have similar structural solutions to offer, the emphasis is slightly different. Wong 
& Wong (1987) also recommend some form of clinical teaching as a strategy, but 
emphasise the role modelling and socialisation aspect of this function.
Kramer (1974) tested structural solutions on a larger scale by developing a new 
programme. The Anticipatory Socialisation Program was undertaken by students 
prior to clinical experience, and aimed to socialise the students into the attitudes 
and role-specific behaviours of the work place. Her results showed the Program to 
be effective.
For others the solution lies not with structure but in the formation of good 
relationships (Bassett, 1993). An often quoted example of this is the research 
undertaken by Wilson-Barnett et al (1990), who claim that their success was due 
to the attention paid to forming good relations with clinical staff.
1 .4 .3 . PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES
The most popular solution for those who ascribe the discrepancies to philosophical 
issues, is to suggest reflective practice (Coutts-Jarman, 1993; Conway, 1994; 
Dale, 1994; Graham, 1995; Tolley, 1995). Conway includes with this the notion 
of artistry based on Schon's (1983) theory of knowing-in-action. Dale suggests 
that experiential knowledge, articulated through reflection, narrows the gap. 
Graham extends the idea to the formation of Action Learning Groups - groups of 
colleagues who meet to share learning and development gained by personal reflection 
and the use of reflective journals.
Nolan & Grant (1992) look at the types of theory in their attempt to find a solution. 
They suggest that mid-range theories, which they describe as being less abstract 
and having less scope and thus having reduced generalisability and predictive 
powers than grand theories, would be more applicable to nursing and would narrow 
the theory-practice gap.
Clarke (1986) also looks for solutions in different types of theories in suggesting 
Shotter's (1975) psychology of personal action as particularly suitable to nursing. 
Because this theory gives primacy to practice activity [where actions are
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deliberately chosen and have explanations and goals], with theory arising from 
practice and then modifying it, Clarke claims that theory and practice are thus 
united in action and therefore cannot be sensibly discussed separately.
A more exciting idea is that of Carr (1980 & 1986) and Tolley (1995 ), who 
suggest practice theory as the solution - this will now be discussed more fully.
1 .5 . RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE
All the above have taken a somewhat simplistic approach to the issue, assuming that 
certain abstracted statements have a direct one-to-one relationship with practice, 
and that validated theory can be templated onto practice. If this proves 
unsuccessful, the fit is not exact and gaps appear, then manoeuvres are undertaken 
to attempt to rectify the problem or close the gap. Although this is the predominant 
view in the nursing literature, it represents only one way of looking at the 
relationship between theory and practice. Other writers have put forward 
different views.
Rather than suggesting that theory maps out practice, Ryle (1990) argues that 
effective practice precedes the theory of it - or, as Ellison's (1965:289) Brother 
Jack recommends when giving advice on political speech-making:
Remember too, that theory always comes after practice. Act first, theorise 
later; that's also a formula, a devastatingly effective one!
Ryle gives the example: rules of correct reasoning were first extracted by
Aristotle, but men knew how to avoid and detect fallacies before learning Aristotle's 
rules. It was because Aristotle found himself reasoning intelligently sometimes and 
stupidly at other times that he was able to derive the maxims and prescriptions of 
his art. Dalmiya & Alcoff (1993) support this notion by demonstrating that the 
practice of midwifery had existed for centuries without any reference to  
propositions instructing midwives in their practice before modern obstetrics 
arrived to extract formulae and rules - the practice was prior to the process of 
codification.
Quite the opposite view is expressed by Moore (1982), who distinguishes between 
theories about a certain activity [e.g. education or nursing] which have a social 
science basis, general theories recommending what ought to be practised in these
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activities [e.g. educational theory given in Rousseau's Emile, or Plato's Republic ] 
and practical theories which involve commitments to some end worth 
accomplishing. Practical theories are about the intentions and goals which ensure 
that practitioners act in one way rather than another. If this was not so, practice 
would be mere random behaviour. In this sense, argues Moore, all practice is 
theory-laden, and thus theory logically precedes practice.
The discrepancy between Ryle's and Moore's ordering of priority may be ascribed to 
the scale of the theory: Ryle's on the grand scale and of the 'ought' variety, and 
Moore's of the personal intentional type.
The notion of intentionality as the link between theory and practice has been used by 
many writers. Chisholm (1988:53) argues that
theory and practice come together when a person's intentional attitudes determine 
the way he acts upon the world. Our 'theory' is constituted by the beliefs that 
we have, and our 'practice' by our endeavours.
This echoes Moore's (1982) notion that practice is theory-laden, and is in line 
with Carr's (1986 ) argument that practice is not unthinking, mechanical 
behaviour, but rather consciously performed activity. Pring (1970 ) similarly 
used the notion of intentionality to unite theory and practice, claiming that any 
action is linked to the conceptual framework of the agent by intention, and therefore 
any attempt to think of practice apart from theory creates an unnecessary dualism.
This leads to the discussion on informal theories, a term used by Usher & Bryant 
(1989) when discussing theory as that which renders activity meaningful, and 
therefore anything that is consciously and intentionally performed implies a theory 
or conceptual framework. They link this idea to Schon's (1983 ) model of 
'reflection-in-action'. Were these informal theories to be taken as what is 
understood as 'theory', then there can be no gap between theory and practice - as 
Carr (1980) argues when he maintains that the gap arises when theories other than 
those used by practitioners to guide their practice are referred to as 'theory' [i.e. 
formal theory is regarded as the guiding force of practice as opposed to the informal 
theories that practitioners actually use]. Moore's (1981) criticism of Carr's 
point is that formal and informal theories cannot be separated in the theory of 
practice as the formal is already present in the informal.
This indivisibility of theory and practice is arrived at by Cervero (1988 ) by a 
slightly different route. Looking at how professionals acquire expertise, he argues 
that this develops through using, not analysing, knowledge, and thereby developing
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new knowledge structures through everyday experience. He argues (Cervero, 
1991) that the relationship between theory and practice is not a naturally 
occurring one, but one constructed through human intervention, and thus existing in 
the social reality from which it arises, to serve the purpose determined by those 
constructing it. This situates theory and practice in a single socially constructed 
reality - hence the indivisibility of theory and practice.
Within the nursing context specifically, the indivisibility of theory and practice is 
argued from three angles. Ashworth & Longmate (1993 ), arguing from a 
hermeneutic perspective, suggest, following Heidegger, that many implicit theories 
are lived, rather than known, and form part of the interpretive resource used in 
dealing with complex situations. Theory is thus intrinsic to practice. Lauder 
(1994) is critical of reflective theorists, claiming that this doctrine has not only 
failed to explain the connection between theory and practice or to transcend the 
dualism, but some theorists, in separating thought from action, have actually 
perpetuated the gap. He argues in favour of 'practical syllogism' which he bases on 
Aristotle's ideas of practical wisdom - a form of knowledge which is concerned with 
producing universal good via action - as opposed to propositional knowledge 
producing intellectual conclusions. Practical syllogism thus explains theory and 
practice as being mutually constitutive. Clarke's (1986) contention for the 
indivisibility of theory and practice is based on Shotter's psychology of personal 
action, the keystone of which is the intentionality of actions through which personal 
responsibility is derived. As active choosing is intrinsic to performance of human 
actions, and choosing presupposes a theoretical base from which the selection is 
made, it makes no sense to speak of the theory and practice as separate issues.
In a related approach, which accords with the understanding of Usher & Bryant 
(1989) as well as of Schon (1983) to some extent, the relationship between theory 
and practice is regarded as interactive, rather than passive and reflective. Theory 
both generates and is generated by practice. Sayer (1992:13) argues that
knowledge is primarily gained both in attempting to change our environment ... and 
through interaction with other people, using shared resources, in particular a 
common language.
The contexts of work [i.e. human activity intended to transform nature] and 
communication are the main contexts for the development of knowledge, since 
neither propositional nor practical knowledge can be acquired without using the 
cognitive and conceptual frameworks of a particular community. Concepts are 
developed through practice, and practice needs concepts with which to develop. 
Thus:
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through the ideas of 'reciprocal confirmation', the interdependence of knowledge 
and practice has been stressed. Knowledge - whether adequate or not - never 
develops in a vacuum but is always embedded on social practices and we can more 
fully understand the former if we know the latter. (Sayer, 1992:43).
A similar argument is put by Nelson (1993) who stresses this interdependence by 
arguing that knowledge is not context-independent and disembodied, residing in the 
individual 'knower', as developed by Descartes and Hume. Rather, it is radically 
interdependent with other knowledge and undertakings and developed on a consensus 
basis, since communities, not individuals, construct and acquire knowledge. Maeve 
(1994) suggests this interdependence of theory and practice particularly in the 
nursing context by suggesting a "carrier bag" theory of practice, where theory is 
generated by the everyday practices of working nurses and articulated through 
reflection on practice via the media of narratives. Nursing scholarship developed 
independently of practice is, she claims, meaningless to practising nurses.
Argyris & Schon (1974) do not subscribe to this indivisibility of theory and 
practice, arguing that basic theory is not clearly related to practice as it soon 
becomes obsolete in practice. They distinguish between basic theory and theory of 
practice, and the relationship they suggest is that basic theory comes to bear on 
action only through the light it throws on the assumptions underlying theory of 
practice.
Jarvis (1992c) combines elements of both of the above arguments by maintaining 
that theory and practice both contribute to the growth of each other, but that there 
is never perfect integration as both are constantly changing and do so at different 
speeds. Since it is impossible to keep up with all changes in both areas, and since 
practitioners can never control all variables which would allow them to predict the 
outcomes of their practice, practice is therefore based on a degree of probability 
derived from theory - probability being taking action based on 'sufficient grounds'. 
Elsewhere Jarvis (1995) develops this argument by suggesting that if theory did in 
fact determine practice, actions would be predetermined and practitioners would be 
practising in a mindless way, oblivious to the changing demands of a changing world. 
He suggests, rather, an underdeterministic relationship between theory and 
practice, similar to that suggested by Lukes (1981 ), where, because of the 
complexity and changeability of society and humankind, theory does not determine 
practice, but neither does practice totally determine theory.
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1.6 . THE UNRESOLVED DIVIDE
Finally there are those who contend that theory and practice cannot be integrated 
because they belong to different frames of reference. Clark's (1987 & 1991) 
argument is that theory systematically describes and explains, whereas practice 
requires a constantly changing model for action which tells practitioners what to do. 
Therefore the two belong to different realms, and cannot be logically integrated.
Dreyfus (1980) makes a similar point, drawing on the hermeneutic philosophy of 
Heidegger. He distinguishes between the theoretical [the Vorsicht], which can be 
made explicit and is external to the background of the science, and the practical [the 
Vorhabe], which is implicit and exists at a level beneath theoretical assumptions 
and presuppositions. As these are essentially different, integration between them 
is meaningless.
Castell's (1989 ) reasoning is derived from the ideas of Habermas, Ricoeur, 
Oakeshott and Foucault. She argues for the recognition of institutionally-bound 
speech acts used by theory when discussing practice which might not be appropriate 
in the practice domain, and for the unfeasibility of considering practical knowledge 
in terms of propositional knowledge. Given this, and the role power plays in 
determining what counts as knowledge and that theoretical knowledge is thus 
privileged, she suggests that theory cannot speak for the practice of practitioners - 
each must speak for itself.
In the nursing context Cook (1991) maintains that the gap cannot be closed because 
of the inherent conflict between the explicit curriculum [education towards 
liberation and self-realisation of the individual's potential which is potentially 
socially disruptive] and the hidden curriculum [which promotes social order and 
conformity] - the latter being the dominant ethos of clinical practice. The 
argument put forward by Rolfe (1993) is that the gap is based on a misconception 
about the nature of nursing theory which is construed as predicting what will 
happen in practice and as such refers to an idealised clinical situation. As no theory 
can actually account for the imperfections of the clinical area, he maintains that the 
gap cannot be closed. He goes on to suggest that the possible use of informal theories 
as part of a nursing praxis might provide a solution, or that the use of action 
research could be a means of bringing about improvements in practice without the 
mediation of theory (Rolfe, 1996).
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Rafferty et al (1996) argue against attempting to close the gap on the basis that the 
gap in not only healthy, but necessary for change in nursing, since it is only when 
theory and practice are held in dynamic tension that anomalies are generated (after 
Kuhn, 1962), through which progress is made and knowledge is generated.
An interesting aside is offered by Lister (1994). He distinguishes between training 
[learning a skill] and education [engendering a questioning attitude], and suggests 
that in training there should be no gap between theory and practice, whereas in 
education the gap is a healthy sign.
One of the most interesting and persuasive arguments is put forward by Factor & 
Turner (1979). Their analysis begins with classical philosophy, where theory 
and practice were fully integrated teleologically - both theory and practice were 
inextricably bound in and adapted to the pursuit of a common end. For Aristotle this 
end was noble deeds and for Plato it was justice. Social theory and practice thus 
took the form of allowing practical implications to be drawn from theoretical 
explanations. The introduction of the notion of Laws governing actions - first 
suggested by St Thomas Aquinas and fully developed in the scientific revolution by 
Newton - meant that explanations were no longer teleological but rather causal. 
This causal form, when applied to people and institutions, severed the connection 
between theory and practice. Factor & Turner (1979:174) argue that, while the 
strategies of classical philosophy cannot simply be revived, theory and practice
.... will not be bound again until an alternative account of the explanation of human 
action and social life is formulated.
1.7. CONCLUSION
Much of the discussion on whether or not the gap can be closed is predicated on the 
writers' conceptions of the nature of theory. If theory is thought to exist on the 
grand scale, consisting of well-formulated and empirically tested theoretical 
statements and explanations at a sophisticated level of abstraction, allowing for 
generalisations and predictions to be made, then it is often difficult to link these 
theories to practical reality - as Clark (1991) maintains, in this form theory and 
practice belong to different realms, and cannot be easily integrated.
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The extent to which integration/non-integration is perceived corresponds with the 
perceived nature of the theory. There is more suggestion of integration by those 
who conceive of theory in the mid-range scale, such as Nolan & Grant (1992). 
Mid-range theories are considered to have a narrower scope and less abstraction, 
address a limited number of variables in particular situations, are empirically 
grounded and focus on particular problems. Their generalisability and predictive 
powers are reduced. Nolan & Grant suggest that such theories appeal to 
practitioners as they have greater accessibility both conceptually and linguistically. 
They cite a care study which uses such a theory in practice, suggesting thereby an 
integration of theory and practice at this given level.
Micro theories exist as sets of theoretical statements dealing with narrowly defined 
phenomena. These are most akin to rules of thumb, and are useful in certain 
practical situations as a guide to performing a specified action. In this instance 
there is generalisability and predictability but within a very narrow range - a 
single phenomenon in most cases - and high levels of integration since the theory 
directly determines the practice.
Then on a personal level there are informal or practice theories, which are the 
implicit guides to an individual practitioner's practice. These relate to the totality 
of the practice - not just to single phenomena - but are not generalisable and have 
little predictive power, save only that suggested by the previous experience of the 
individual practitioner. In these cases there is total integration between practice 
and theory, since both are determined in a 'gestalt' manner by the practitioner. 
This is the level on which Carr (1986), Cervero (1988), Usher & Bryant (1989) 
and Ashworth & Longmate (1993)  can claim integration between theory and 
practice.
It can be argued that at this level theory becomes so personal, private and tacit as to 
be of little public use to other practitioners. If there is to be public recognition of 
a theory it must exist at some level of abstraction and therefore - by definition - it 
cannot be totally integrated with practice.
The important point to note is that in almost all these cases it is the nature of theory 
which is dissected and discussed and the discrepancy is examined from the 
perspective of theory. It is possible to do this as frameworks of theory already 
exist within which to conduct the debate. It is the nature of practice within this 
debate which is either ignored or there is an implicit assumption that the reader has 
an understanding of practice.
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The contention of this study is that for there to be meaningful discussion of the 
relationship between theory and practice, it is the nature of practice which must be 
understood. Such an assertion necessarily envisages practice as distinct from 
theory. It is proposed to suggest a framework of the nature of practice - drawing 
on the literature and the actual experience of practitioners - which, being 
juxtaposed with theory, will illustrate some essential differences between theory 
and practice, and provide some concepts with which the discussion of the 
relationship between theory and practice can be conducted.
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SECTION 2
INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURES
- 29 -
CHAPTER 2
METHODOLOGY
2.1 . INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter discussed the various relationships between theory and 
practice as they have been portrayed in the literature, from the position of there 
being no significant difference - no theory-practice gap - to the position of an 
irresolvable difference between the two. It is the central contention of this study 
that theory and practice are fundamentally different in nature, and this will be 
illustrated by an analysis of the nature of practice, juxtaposed with that of theory.
The selection of a methodology for this study has been driven by the need to find 
some method of investigating this complex and indeterminate phenomenon of the 
nature of practice. It necessitated a creative and flexible approach which would 
accommodate the incorporation of pertinent data wherever these were to be found. 
Hence, it is an eclectic study, comprising interrelated empirical and theoretical 
work.
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This chapter deals with these research processes and the ensuing issues. The 
centrality of the aim in determining the eclectic strategy of the study is considered, 
and the consequences of adopting such a strategy are discussed. The design which 
emerged from this strategy is responsive to the aim. There are several issues 
concomitant with this, and these are examined. The processes of conducting the 
study are described to show the interrelation between the theoretical and the 
empirical work. The final outcomes are mentioned, but are dealt with in depth and 
detail in Section 3. The purpose of this chapter is to indicate how the concepts of 
nature of nursing practice were derived, and to provide a rationale for this process.
2.2 . AIM
In Chapter 1 the case was put that theories which are explicit, and therefore exist 
at some level of abstraction, are not able to be integrated fully with practice 
because, by reason of this abstraction, they bespeak a different realm to that of 
practice. For this to be more clearly understood, the nature of practice needs to be 
articulated in demonstration of its distinction from theory. By so doing, the 
contrasts between the attributes of theory and practice should become more 
apparent, illustrating fundamental differences between the two, the inevitability of 
the theory-practice gap and the problems related to the templating of theory onto 
practice. This has implications concerning the use of theory in practice, and 
consequently for the education of student practitioners and the management of 
practice settings.
The aim of this study, therefore, is an analysis of the nature of practice which will 
support the contention that theory and practice essentially address different 
domains. The central question of the study is thus:
In which respects does the nature of practice differ from that of theory, in
the context of nursing?
In order to answer this research question, an analysis of the nature of practice was 
envisaged by means of generating concepts concerning the nature of practice. These 
could then form a conceptual framework within which practice can be understood, 
and which could be used in articulating the essential qualities of practice, thereby 
creating a visibility for normally implicit aspects of practice. Making these
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aspects explicit not only indicates the essential differences between the natures of 
theory and practice, but also begins to create a language which practitioners can use 
to valorise their practice, with all the political and economic implications 
concomitant with that.
2 .3 . STRATEGY
2 .3 .1 . THE ECLECTIC APPROACH
The focus of this study is the examination of the nature of practice through the 
generation of concepts which would illuminate the nature of practice. The 
generation of concepts can be viewed primarily as a theoretical exercise, since 
concepts are fundamentally theoretical products. They are developed by mental 
effort, using whatever source material and procedures prove the most productive. 
While this would suggest a theoretical approach, such an approach would preclude 
direct access to practice itself - which was regarded a significant consideration, 
given the topic of the inquiry. Therefore, methodological procedures which enabled 
access to both theoretical and experiential aspects of practice were sought, and an 
eclectic strategy was decided upon: a theoretical approach via various forms of 
literature, and an empirical approach via engaging in nursing practice, and drawing 
on the practice of other nurses. The combination was seen as particularly 
important as the empirical approach led directly to experiences concerning the 
nature of practice, while the theoretical approach allowed innovative articulation of 
these experiences.
This, however, was not the only form of eclecticism considered appropriate for this 
study. Eclecticism can exist on various levels: (i) methodological, to include 
several strategies and approaches; (ii) theoretical, to encompass a variety of 
theoretical underpinnings or systems of thought, and (iii) on a more basic 
conceptual level, to utilise ideas from across a number of disciplines and other 
sources. Since practice is broadly based, being concerned with all aspects of 
everyday life, this study required a comprehensive stance in an attempt to emerge 
with a unique analysis of the nature of practice. Therefore, it incorporates all 
these levels of eclecticism. Methodologically, it uses both theoretical and empirical 
approaches. Theoretically, feminist theory, theories from the philosophy of 
education - particularly that dealing with practice theory - and some
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epistemological theory inform the ideas developed in this study. Conceptually, 
notions are taken from psychology, sociology, women's studies and of course nursing 
itself.
2 .3 .2 . PROBLEMS OF ECLECTICISM
In adopting this stance several issues need to be addressed, not least of these the 
problems associated with eclecticism itself.
Adopting an eclectic approach leaves the researcher in the first instance without an 
established symbolic system within which to communicate. Ideas derived 
eclectically lack the richness of the associated meanings which accompany notions 
used within a given framework, and therefore need careful development. While 
there are some advantages to this (see 2.3.3), there are also some problems. As 
Sanderson (1987) points out, eclectic ideas do not necessarily link up with 
established theories, and are thus antithetical to what he sees as the basic 
mechanism of rationality and progress in science - that of theory testing and 
evaluation. Equally, he maintains that eclecticism leads to self-contradictory 
arguments that generate more confusion than insight, and that it runs counter to the 
widely accepted scientific aim of simplicity (Chater & Oaksford, 1993). It could 
also, as Barrett & Phillips (1992) suggest, leave the researcher with nothing 
general to say - since eclectic studies are essentially local to the particular 
problem they address - thus representing only a
soggy eclecticism, an opportunism that laps up any and every kind of theoretical 
approach. (Foucault 1980:81)
Foucault (1980), however, counters this as a rather restrictive attitude, claiming 
that local, non-centralised theoretical productions are autonomous and not 
dependent on the approval of established regimes of thought for their validity. 
While these criticisms of eclecticism are valid within certain contexts - 
particularly the scientific community to which Sanderson refers - this may not be 
the case when less well researched areas are being explored, or when new meanings 
and insights are needed. As Feyerabend (1970) points out, progress is often made 
by breaking methodological rules and violating accepted principles.
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2 .3 .3 .  RATIONALE FOR CHOOSING AN ECLECTIC APPROACH
There are substantial advantages in an eclectic stance, one of the most important of 
which is that it enables the world to be seen as complex. This is particularly 
important in a study aimed at understanding something as elaborate and intricate as 
practice. This stance is diametrically opposed to that held by Sanderson 
(1987:325), who decries the interpretation of the world as complex, and the 
eclecticism which embraces this, maintaining that this flies in the face of the 
simple and unified ideas of the world which inspired the "greatest of scientists like 
Einstein and Darwin". However, it resonates with common sense understandings of 
those acquainted with and participating in practice.
Another advantage of this approach is that it frees the researcher to take notions 
from wherever they are to be found - empirically or theoretically - and to use 
these in different ways. As Foucault (1980) points out, this facilitates discoveries 
which are initially unforeseen because of the inhibiting effect of global, totalitarian 
theories. Therefore the scope of possible data sources is broadened, enabling a 
more accurate reflection of the diverse nature of practice itself, and thereby 
generating more adequate and extensive explanations of this complicated 
phenomenon.
Related to this is the notion that a study of practice, which is essentially pragmatic, 
necessitates a pragmatic approach which would allow the use of whatever strategies 
would be most appropriate to produce the desired data, while maintaining a 
flexibility in order to respond to ideas as they arise. Rossman & Wilson (1985 & 
1994) suggest that this pragmatism can be found in an eclectic strategy.
Another advantage of eclecticism is that a wide variety of possible solutions and 
interpretations is admitted. Adhering to a particular methodology obligates the 
exclusion of other possible forms of explanation which are not encompassed within 
the symbolic structure of that methodology (Glynn, 1993). Eclectic strategies 
liberate the researcher from the impediments of established configurations of 
interpretation. Bourdieu (1977) illustrates this from his anthropological study, 
where he demonstrates that natives can only express their ideas and responses to 
questions in terms of the researcher's vocabulary and stance, which represents a 
learned reconstruction of the natives' world which might differ from the natives' 
actual experience of that world.
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2 .3 .4 .  CONSEQUENCES OF ADOPTING THIS STRATEGY
Having established the usefulness of an eclectic strategy in this study, two further 
points concerning strategy need to be taken into consideration. Firstly, in a study 
concerned with conceptualisation, the mental processes (the specific and individual 
insights and thoughts derived through reflection and mental inquiry) of the 
researcher play a particularly important part. The researcher thus directly 
influences the study, thereby creating a perspective unique to that study (see 
2.4.3.4). In related vein, the researcher includes the self as a resource, thus 
extending the data sources and acknowledging the valuable contribution of this 
resource - a point commonly ignored, but keenly argued for by researchers in the 
co-operative inquiry, action research and critical research paradigms (Douglas, 
1971:31; Collin, 1981; Adler & Adler, 1994; Fine, 1994). This will be 
discussed in greater depth later (2.4.3.4). The involvement of the self in these 
ways relates to the issue of generalisability/ transferability of a study, and this is 
discussed in more detail later (2.4.3.2).
Secondly, in determining in advance what is sought from the study, there is an 
inevitability to what is subsequently generated - a modelling of the 'seek and ye 
shall find' dictum. Davies (1990:73) describes this as a "theoretical sensitivity" 
which follows researchers into their research, as part of their baggage, and 
influences the questions that interest them and consequently the directions of the 
analysis - a matter of the researcher's stance determining the method (Douglas, 
1971), and the interpretation being possible only within the cultural codes of the 
individual researcher (Codd, 1990). The unavoidability of this position is 
described by Hanson (1965): although laypeople see exactly what the physicist 
sees, they cannot interpret it in the same way until they have learned some physics, 
so that there is a sense of all understanding and insight being shaped by prior 
knowledge. Once the stance has been articulated, the broad outcome is inescapable.
This phenomenon is acknowledged in this study. The stance of the study is located 
not in a particular ideological position, but in the aim of the study - to valorise 
practice by creating a visibility for it in theoretical terms, using whatever means 
seem most appropriate.
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2.4 . DESIGN
2.4 .1 . PROCESS
The study was designed as an iterative process, moving pragmatically between 
theoretically derived notions and the empirical substantiation and development of 
these ideas.
The starting point for originating ideas concerning the nature of practice 
commenced by a brainstorming of cognitions associated with practice (Appendix 1). 
This was conducted amongst colleagues who suggested words germane to their notions 
of the nature practice. These words were grouped around central ideas. This 
provided an entrée into the literature, through which theoretical conceptions were 
elicited from a broad base of literature, incorporating a variety of philosophical 
stances, and writings from many practice based disciplines. From these, broad and 
rudimentary notions emerged concerning practice. These were refined by two 
concurrent processes: empirically, by testing them against practice, using the 
researcher's own involvement in practice and the experiences and ideas of other 
practitioners gleaned in interviews, and theoretically, by further exploration of the 
literature (see 2.5). This process of refinement and clarification continued until a 
coherent framework comprising elaborate concepts about the nature of practice had 
been established. While this describes the outward procedures of the study, it was 
the mental processes of the researcher in forming the conceptualisations which 
were fundamental to the research process of the study.
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In describing this process, acknowledgement must be made of the influence of 
Grounded Theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) in the conception of the process. There 
are, however, substantial differences which distinguish this study from Grounded 
Theory. The central feature of Grounded Theory methodology is the generation of 
concepts by the constant comparative analysis of data derived from whatever source 
is most applicable (Strauss & Corbin, 1994). This results in conceptual density 
- as opposed to the descriptive density of other qualitative research methods. This 
resonates with the generation of concepts in this study, and is clearly the 
inspiration for the methodological process. The point of departure, however, is in 
the aim of the methodologies. The distinguishing feature of the Grounded Theory is 
its explicit aim to generate substantive theory through statements of relationship 
between the concepts. Verification of these statements of relationship is achieved 
by means of constant comparative analysis, so that verification is intrinsic to the 
study, and the theory which is developed is embedded in the data (Strauss & Corbin, 
1994). Rather than producing or evaluating theory on any scale, this study aims 
to formulate a framework of concepts within which an alternative understanding of 
a particular phenomenon - the nature of practice - is possible. The common 
element in the two methodologies is the processes of iteration and constant 
comparison of data in the production of concepts. The process of iteration in this 
study involved continuous cycles of reflection on the literature, on practice and on 
the discussions with the student participants, with new insights from all these 
sources becoming part of the next cycle of reflection, and insights from these 
reflections feeding into further discussions with the participants, as well as 
providing a focus with which to analyse practice.
2 .4 .2 . DATA SOURCES
Several data sources were used, and, as mentioned previously, these were 
determined pragmatically: whatever source furthered the purpose of the study was 
incorporated. Thus, the literature was used as a source of ideas relating to 
practice, and as a means of extending and refining these ideas as the study 
progressed. Narratives written by practitioners about practical experiences 
served to substantiate the ideas as they developed. Using the clinical experience of 
both practitioners and the researcher was conceived as the empirical strand of the 
study to authenticate and extend the conceptualisation of the nature of practice by 
direct involvement with practice. Therefore fieldnotes kept during practice and 
interviews with practitioners concerning practice became further sources of data. 
The relationship between these sources was iterative: continuous movement
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between these sources enabled ideas generated from one source to be corroborated 
and developed by other sources.
2 .4 .2 .1 . Literature
The literature on practice - in its broadest sense - was the initial source. This 
included primarily the literature on clinical education in nursing, but extended to 
other forms of practical education, notably to medical and educational practice and 
some of the literature concerning the training of craftspeople and apprentices, as 
these are closely allied to the education of nurses, both in current and historical 
terms. The philosophical notions relating to these were incorporated, thus 
extending the literature sources to include psychology, sociology, epistemology and 
women's studies - these having a substantial bearing on the development of the 
concepts.
2 .4 .2 .2 . Narratives
Narratives about nursing practice published in the nursing press, which were 
specifically called for by a nursing publisher as examples of excellence in nursing 
practice, provided another rich data source of practitioners' perceptions of nursing 
practice.
The use of narratives as a source of data has been discussed extensively recently, 
and is widely accepted as efficacious, providing direct access to actual experiences, 
data on cultural and personal values and contextual background, unique access to the 
emotional and intimate aspects of data and varied understandings of situations, 
communities and societies (Viney & Bousfield, 1991; Astedt-Kurki & Heikkinen, 
1994; Hunt, 1994; Stevens, 1995). The central issues in the debate on 
narratives concern the factual status, or truthfulness, of such narratives, their 
form and content, the relationship of the narrator to the narrative and how this 
affects the narrative, the function the narrative serves for the narrator, as well as 
the extent to which narratives should be included as research (Denzin & Lincoln, 
1994b; Smith, 1994; Clandinin & Connelly, 1994). The consensus seems to be 
that the richness of the data thus provided is invaluable, particularly in offering 
contextual detail and alternative perspective.
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It is for these reasons of contextual richness and variety of outlook that the 
published narratives were used in this study. Since they had been published on the 
basis of offering examples of excellence in nursing practice, they provided a 
different perspective to that given by the student nurse practitioners at the 
beginning of their nursing career. Additionally, by virtue of their narrative form, 
a premeditated, complete and detailed incident is related in each narrative, 
providing substantial contextual information which the students' spontaneous 
discussions lacked at times. Narratives thus complement the data furnished by the 
students, and resonance between these data and that derived from the experiences of 
practitioners and the literature, serves to substantiate the developing 
conceptualisations. The factual accuracy of the narratives was accepted at face 
value.
2 .4 .2 .3 . Fieldnotes
Throughout the course of the study two diaries were kept by the researcher. One 
formed part of the empirical data source, recording significant clinical events 
drawn from the researcher's active involvement in clinical practice. Any event 
which prompted reflection on any of the developing ideas of the study was recorded, 
together with any relevant cognitions related to the event. Keeping this diary 
enabled developing themes to be tested against practice, as notes were made on 
specific clinical events which had a bearing on the developing themes. This enabled 
the themes to be modified or expanded, and gave further direction to the exploration 
of the literature. The second diary contributed to the theoretical data of the study, 
recording any pertinent thoughts or the development of ideas as they were 
stimulated by various writings or experiences as researcher, interviewer or as 
clinical practitioner. This provided an indication of the progress of the 
conceptualisations, as well as a data source for stimulating further development of 
the notions. Both of these diaries therefore also formed part of the on-going 
analysis by recording how new insights, drawn from experience, from the ideas of 
the students and from the literature, were modified and developed by testing and re­
testing them both in practice, and in further discussions with students.
2 .4 .2 .4 . Student nurse practitioners
Another important source of empirical data was the interaction with student nurse 
practitioners. The original plan was to observe the student nurses in their 
practice and then to elicit their perceptions of practice subsequently by discussing 
various pertinent aspects of their observed practice with them. After several of
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these observation-discussion sessions it became obvious that, in order to access the 
complex phenomena concerned with the nature of practice, the discussions were not 
confined to the activities and practices which had been observed, but were far more 
wide-ranging both in place and time. Frequently, discussion concerned incidents 
which the students related from their experience rather than anything which had 
been observed. The observation sessions thus came to be viewed by both the 
students and the researcher as superfluous, particularly as the researcher shared a 
professional background with the practitioners, and thus had an insight into and a 
common understanding of the topics being discussed and the context in which they 
were embedded. This, combined with the intrusive nature of the observations, led 
to the abandonment of the observation periods, and the interaction with the students 
continued on the basis of discussion sessions alone, which the students found more 
comfortable. This change in strategy as a result of the discomfort felt by both the 
researcher and the students gives an indication of how the self is used in the 
research process. (For further discussion of this see 2.4.3.4.)
The decision was made to select student nurses encountering practical placements, 
rather than experienced clinical practitioners, on the basis that students, coming 
from an academic background, were newly confronting practice and were thus 
particularly sensitive to the nature of practice as it contrasted with their 
theoretical learning. This proved a successful approach for the above reason, and 
also because the students were accustomed to moving between conceptual and 
practical modes of working, and, while not finding articulation of these particular 
complex phenomena at all easy, they were nevertheless more comfortable in 
engaging in the discussions than the experienced practitioners with whom they were 
practising on the wards [a case in point for the central contention of the study].
2 .4 .3 . ISSUES RELATING TO CREDIBILITY IN DESIGN
Various issues pertinent to this type of research need to be made transparent in 
order to establish the credibility of the research.
2 .4 .3 .1 . Truth
If research is about checking ideas against 'reality' and thus getting nearer some 
notion of truth, as Reason & Rowan (1981) claim, it is important to have an 
understanding of what constitutes truth.
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Reason & Rowan (1981) suggest that an important criterion of truth is that it is 
coherent with the experience of reality, and in this respect it is unhelpful to see 
reality in terms of the subject-object dichotomy - reality is either out there, 
objective and therefore discoverable, or all in the mind, subjective and ineffable. 
Rather, reality is somewhere between these - a dialectic process emerging through 
self-contradictory development. Therefore the concept of truth changes, and must 
concern itself with both the knower and what is to be known. Heron (1981), 
building on the idea that research is a co-operative inquiry between researcher and 
respondent and is never value-free, supports this notion, suggesting that the truth 
of a proposition depends on the shared values of researcher and respondent.
Reason & Rowan (1981) suggest moving away from the idea of a single truth and the 
simple continuum between 'error' and 'truth' to a multidimensional version of the 
world which admits many ways of being right and wrong.
Another version of the many aspects of truth is discussed by Lincoln & Cuba 
(1985:14). Using an analysis by Julienne Ford, distinctions are made between 
empirical truth, logical truth, ethical truth and metaphysical truth. The nature of 
the claim indicates which of these truths is being called upon. In the case of 
research paradigms, claims are being made to metaphysical truth, which
cannot be tested for truthfulness against some external norm such as 
correspondence with nature, logical deductibility, or professional standards of 
conduct.
Metaphysical truth must be accepted at face value, as opposed to the empirical truth 
of the positivist paradigm which only accepts as truth that which can be tested and 
proved or disproved against 'nature', or logical truth where claims must be 
logically or mathematically consistent with some other claim known to be true, or 
ethical truth which is true if the person asserting the claim is acting in conformity 
with moral or professional standards of conduct.
Rubin (1983) offers another perspective on this by referring to layered truth. 
Multiple interpretations of a given phenomenon can all be true. For Rubin this 
poses the problem of whose truth should prevail - a particularly important point 
for the researcher in interpreting and analysing the data. Rubin suggests that it is 
usually the truth of those who have the authority and means to enforce it whose 
truth prevails.
This position is developed by Smith (1987 :91 ) arguing within a fem inist/ 
sociological perspective. Her argument suggests that western society is governed
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by means of concepts and symbols which are transposed into their abstract mode 
from the research of, amongst others, sociologists who observe and systematically 
recover these from the activities of what people do and say. However, these 
'activities' are largely those of men, or of men's construction and interpretation of 
women. The frames of reference which
order the terms upon which enquiry and discussion are conducted originate with 
men.
This androcentric perspective thus pervades and governs our entire society. Thus 
in this case, what is universally accepted as truth is the truth as perceived by men, 
as they have the authority and means to enforce it as The Truth, while the women's 
perspective, or women's truth, is ignored.
Patton's (1990) approach is to reject the idea of a single material reality and 
therefore propositions which are ultimately either true or false. He thus removes 
the burden of having to generate 'truth' from the shoulders of the researcher, in 
favour of making the analysis transparent and allowing readers to use the 
information generated according to their own understandings and perspectives.
It is possible to argue that there emerges from these perceptions the idea that truth 
is socially constructed, and can take on whatever form is expedient at a given 
moment (Codd, 1990). One possible conclusion from this assertion is that this 
stance embraces a form of nihilism which holds that all values have the same value 
and everything is equal, or at least there are no meaningful difference (Dreyfus, 
1980). This then creates an ethical responsibility for the researcher to honesty 
and sensitivity in dealing with the research data, and to a transparency in 
presenting the material which would facilitate the reader's own construction of the 
truth.
The approach taken in this study is largely influenced by Patton's position. No one 
truth can necessarily be regarded as the definitive statement on the nature of 
practice, particularly given the changing nature of the everyday world within 
which practice exists and to which it adapts. Consequently, the conceptualisations 
presented in this study represent a particular account of practice - albeit one 
resonating with the experience of other practitioners, since the conceptualisations 
stem, in part, from the perceptions these practitioners shared with the researcher. 
The ideas, sources and process have been made as clear as possible, but the final 
judge of the veracity of the study must be the cognizant reader.
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2.4 .3 .2 . Validity and generalisability
Closely related to conceptions of truth is the idea of the validity of research, and 
following on from that, the extent to which the research outcomes are generalisable 
- or transferable - to other contexts.
Positivistically-influenced approaches to validity discriminate between different 
sorts of validity [external, internal, face, convergent, construct, contextual, 
discriminant, ecological and many others (LoBiondo-Wood & Haber, 1990; Cuba & 
Lincoln, 1994; Lincoln & Denzin, 1994)] and demand that these be satisfied, 
usually by some methodological process or technique. In data analysis Patton 
(1990) suggests techniques such as testing rival explanations and using negative 
cases, and in design he suggests various methods of triangulation [reconciling 
qualitative and quantitative data, triangulating qualitative data sources and 
triangulation through using multiple analysts]. In this study it is possible to argue 
that using various sources in the data collection is some attempt at triangulation, 
but this is not a specific aim of that activity. Rather, the use of multiple sources 
was intended to enrich and illuminate the data. Thus no claim for validity is made 
through this strategy.
These comments could suggest the impression that qualitative researchers are 
attempting to imitate quantitative research in proving validity, albeit by different 
structures, comparable with the strictest quantitative tests, rather than 
questioning the basis on which assumptions about validity are made.
Hammersley & Atkinson (1983) go some way towards this challenge with their 
notion of reflexivity as an important element in ethnographic research. They argue 
that social research cannot ignore the fact that the researcher is also part of the 
world being researched. This puts a different slant on the idea of validity, which 
any of the above methodological issues would have to address in order to maintain 
their claims to establishing validity.
It is left to Reason & Rowan (1981), however, to question these structural 
attempts at validity by offering an alternative perspective. They argue that while 
validity is an important and interesting issue to address, the positivistically- 
influenced views are about method, and not about people, and as inquiry is a 
particularly human process this must be acknowledged in the research, as method 
alone does not lead to knowledge. As with truth, validity must concern itself with 
both the knower and what is to be known.
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For Reason & Rowan the questions concerning the validity of research are not about 
methodological strategies to establish validity, but rather about whether it is 
possible to discriminate what is actually there, or whether the phenomena 
experienced can be mapped; whether the claims to having brought about changes are 
the result of intentional interactions, and whether the research, rather than being 
solely concerned with the rightness of the intersubjective interpretation and 
understanding of the phenomena, is useful and illuminating.
For Reason & Rowan, the validity of research is threatened through unaware 
projection [of the researcher's internal problems onto the world supposedly being 
studied] and through consensus collusion, where the group of co-researchers band 
together to do likewise. Therefore, for Reason & Rowan, the validity of the 
research lies in the sensitivity and skills of researchers and how they use 
themselves as knowers and inquirers. While they do not offer methodological 
processes for establishing validity, they offer some guides, such as high quality 
awareness on the part of the co-researchers produced through interpersonal 
development, and multiple viewpoints used on the same data.
It is Reason's & Rowan's conception of validity which is most helpful in this study, 
particularly the last point, for the validity will be established by the practitioners 
or other users should they find the outcomes of the study resonating with their 
experience, and thus illuminating and useful for practice in whatever way and at 
whatever level they choose to use it.
Heron's (1981) position is very close to that of Reason & Rowan, since his stance is 
also that of research as a matter of co-operative inquiry. Therefore the norms and 
values of the researcher must be acceptable to the co-researchers for there to be 
any validity. In this respect, the validity is rooted in the experiential knowledge of 
those actually involved. In this study this is largely established by the common 
professionalisation of the researcher and the co-researchers [particularly the 
commitment to the ethic of the primacy of care], even when the researcher and the 
co-researcher have not met, as in the use of the published narratives. (For 
discussion on co-researchers, see 2.4.3.5.)
Further support for this approach to validity comes from Usher & Bryant (1989). 
Their position is that in research any given mode of engagement will result in one of 
many possible forms of knowledge, with no particular form being epistemologically 
privileged. Therefore no one form of knowledge can stand as a test of validity for
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another. Validity is thus a matter of the authenticity of the shared knowledge among 
the community for whom the knowledge makes sense, and the knowledge-claims 
must resonate with their experience.
For interpretive researchers validity derives from the coherency of their accounts 
within the critical community of their fellow scientists (Carr & Kemmis, 1986). 
Such coherency includes comprehensibility and sincerity, and whether what is 
produced is right for the community for whom it is produced.
These approaches to validity are linked to a position regarding generalisability 
which suggests, similarly, that generalisability is established by comprehensive 
and detailed description of a given situation, so that others may determine whether 
the conclusions reached are useful for them (Janesick, 1994). Schofield 
(1993:221) develops this position further by suggesting that
generalisability is best thought of as a matter of the 'fit' between the situation 
studied and others to which one might be interested in applying the concepts and 
conclusions of that study.
She suggests that it is therefore crucial to give "thick" descriptions which would 
provide the information necessary for judgements to be made concerning such a fit. 
She goes on to suggests techniques for increasing the ability of studies to fit with 
other situations, by studying common or typical situations, or situations which 
could prove to be trend leaders, or situations which provide expert or ideal 
examples.
Concordant with such arguments, in this study objectivity and its pursuit of 
replicability are eschewed in favour of detailed descriptions which value 
subjectivity - including the perspective of the researcher (see 2.4.3.4) - in order 
to obtained as 'thick' a conceptualisation as possible concerning the nature of 
practice. Practitioners in fields other than nursing will themselves establish the 
generalisability by using the research outcomes in their fields of practice if they 
find this beneficial.
Such criteria form the basis of the claims for validity and hence generalisability in 
this study: the coherence of the interpretation of the nature of practice to the 
community for practitioners and those concerned with practice, and the usefulness 
of the outcomes. With this approach to validity and generalisability there is an 
even greater need to address the concern of rigour in research.
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2.4 .3 .3 . Rigour and reliability
There are various approaches to rigour and consequently to reliability in research. 
In positivistically-influenced research rigour is seen as the researcher exerting 
the tightest possible unilateral control over the research setting. Rigorous 
research adheres to strict sets of objective procedures that necessarily separate the 
researcher from the researched, with all controls being in the hands of the 
researcher. Rigour is a commitment to established rules for conducting inquiry. 
Such rigorous research then confirms the reliability of the study (Torbert, 1981; 
Kincheleo & McLaren, 1994; Reason, 1994).
Ways of ensuring rigour are similar to validity tests; checks on the adequacy and 
appropriateness of the data; careful documentation to enable audit trails; 
verification of the study by secondary informers; use of multiple raters (Morse,
1994). All this accords with the canons of good science where rigour is necessary 
to ensure the replicability of the research. Rigour is the benchmark of 
positivistically-influenced research and without it, it is difficult to ensure validity 
or guarantee scientific knowledge (Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Reason 1981 a).
This positivistically-influenced approach has been challenged by those who see 
research as a collaborative inquiry. The major critique is that rigour is gained at 
the expense of relevancy (Usher & Bryant, 1989). Consequently alternative 
approaches to rigour are suggested.
Reason (1981b) argues that the logic of rigour in holistic research - or soft rigour 
- differs from that of positivistically-influenced research in that the rigour is 
derived from a respect for the human dignity of the co-researchers and from 
working with them, rather than on them. Rigour is determined by high quality 
awareness in both the researcher and the co-researchers, and through checking and 
re-checking the interpretations of the data. This occurs through multiple cycles, 
and each cycle is made fully rigorous in its own terms to achieve a "recursive 
validity of a cumulative nature" (Rowan, 1981:105). This is a rigour of clarity, 
precision and accuracy (Reason & Rowan, 1981).
In a similar vein, the feminist approach to rigour rejects positivist-empiricist 
criteria in favour of achieving adequacy in research - adequacy implying that 
research processes and outcomes are well-grounded, cogent, justifiable, relevant 
and meaningful (Hall & Stevens, 1991). In order to achieve this, questions are 
asked about the reflexivity of the research - echoes of Hammersley’s & Atkinson's
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(1983) ideas in ethnography - and the degree to which it reflects the complexities 
of reality. Because reduction of power inequalities between researcher and co­
researcher are important in feminist research, issues of honesty, mutuality and 
rapport between researcher and co-researcher are considered significant for 
rigour. In interpreting data, consensus between the parties is aimed at, which 
should be coherent with and relevant to women's concerns. Through all this rigour 
is maintained by high degrees of relationality through collaborative work between 
researcher, co-researchers and other scholars.
While this approach to rigour stems directly from the fundamental tenets of 
feminist ideology, it nevertheless has considerable common ground with others who 
support collaborative inquiry.
Foucault (1980) has a more radical approach in his questioning of the aim of 
establishing rigour. Fie calls the attempts of researchers in straining to establish 
rigour, "scientism", and suggests that this merely reinforces the position of well 
established knowledges, and disqualifies other knowledges from the hierarchy of 
knowledges, and thereby subjugates these. Fie sees the aim of rigour as simply to 
gain power.
In as far as notions of rigour and reliability apply in this study which relies upon 
mental effort to produce the outcomes, the position taken is closest to the feminist 
stance, where the criterion of adequacy has primacy. The reliability of the study is 
established if the outcomes are cogent, relevant and meaningful to those engaged in 
practice. The submission is that rigour and reliability are achieved through 
transparency of methodology, with the practitioner and cognizant reader as final 
arbiter.
2 .4 .3 .4 . Use of self in research
Closely related to the issues of rigour and reliability is the discussion surrounding 
the use of self in research. Clearly positivistically-influenced research seeks to  
minimise or even eradicate the influence of the researcher, while feminist and 
collaborative approaches recognise the part this plays and seek to incorporate it, to 
a greater or lesser extent.
In this respect one of the biggest challenges to the rigour of positivistically- 
influenced research comes from Argyris (1980) who suggests that it is precisely 
because researchers are people that there are inner contradictions in the rigour of
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their research. His argument is developed from his ideas of the theories-in-use 
that guide human actions. Researchers will bring to the research setting their own 
[Model 1 ] theories-in-use - their predisposition to see and create contexts that 
are congruent with their own governing values - which will be consistent with 
achieving their purpose as they define it. These theories-in-use are tacit to the 
researcher and concerned with maintaining the status quo of the value system to 
which the researcher subscribes. It is precisely because theories-in-use are tacit 
that 'error' and distortions are incorporated into the research [echoes, here, of 
Reason's & Rowan's (1981) call for the need for high quality self-awareness on the 
part of all those involved in the research]. This affects design, data collection and 
interpretation, as well as possible collaborator collusion when the collaborators 
accept the role of being reactive in the process. In this context it is therefore 
impossible to leave the self out of the research, and equally impossible to maintain 
that positivistically-influenced criteria for ensuring rigour can be achieved.
Another argument for the incorporation of self is that of coherency. Marshall 
(1981) maintains that far from apologising for the effect of self on the research, it 
should be incorporated into the research as the researcher's particular 
contribution, as it is precisely through this that the research becomes coherent. 
Mangena (1994), reasoning from the feminist perspective, extends this argument 
to both researcher and co-researchers, suggesting that for the research to produce 
knowledge that is useful to those involved, all parties must be able to find 
themselves in the end results. Also within the feminist perspective Scott (1985) 
describes how locating herself outside the research process led to reification of the 
interviewing process. She suggests that the interview became the most important 
part of the research, to the detriment of insights derived from the interviewing 
process. The researcher became simply the receptacle for the experiences of 
others and ignored as data her own experiences of the process. She asserts that 
these experiences need to be incorporated into the research from the beginning, and 
included as data, with the researcher recognised as the main instrument in the 
research. A further example is given by Collin (1981), who describes how her 
research arose from and was inextricably entwined in her personal life, and using 
her experiences increased the insight she was able to bring to the research.
This position is acknowledged in this study. As mentioned earlier (2 .3 .4), the 
stance of the study is to valorise practice by creating a visibility for it in 
theoretical terms, and this stance derives as much from the interests and 
professional concerns of the researcher (see Preface) as from the problems 
identified in the literature in Chapter 1.
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If, then, it is to be accepted that the self cannot reasonably be excluded from the 
research, and the sensitivity of the researcher determines to large extent what is 
selected and used from the literature and the data, it is difficult to reject the notion 
of research as a systematically determined self-fulfilling prophecy, or as Morgan 
(1983:370) suggests:
It is fallacious to conclude that the propositions of a system of thought can be 
proved, disproved or evaluated on the basis of axioms within that system, since 
the process becomes self-justifying.
Against this Feyerabend's (1970) anarchic notion that anything goes, seems the 
only logical conclusion.
In this study, concerned as it is with the mental processes of conceptualisation, the 
self of the researcher is necessarily involved, not only in the ultimate formulation 
of the concepts, but also in the selection of data sources and the interpretation 
constructed upon the perceptions of those involved in the study. The strength of 
this position is that through this use of self, uniqueness becomes a feature of the 
study.
2 .4 .3 .5 . Use of co-researchers
While the importance of co-researchers in determining validity and rigour has 
already been discussed, another issue which needs to be made transparent is the use 
of power and the potential abuse of co-researchers during the research process. 
Because social research is necessarily intercourse between social beings, research 
can be regarded as a co-operative inquiry (Fleron 1981). This implies equal 
power distribution between researcher and co-researchers. That this is most often 
not the case has been discussed by many writers (Oakley, 1981; Platt, 1981; 
Finch, 1984), usually to the detriment of the co-researcher. Power is usually 
retained by the researchers [except in some instances of female interviewers 
interviewing male respondents (Scott, 1985)], principally because they are 
identified with theory [as opposed to practice] and rational knowledge [as opposed to 
practical/technical knowledge] - both of which are accorded greater power within 
the academic culture (Oakeshott, 1962; Castell, 1989).
This is particularly pertinent in this study where the articulation of ideas sought 
from the students put great demands on their relatively limited practical and 
academic experience vis-à-vis that of the researcher. An awareness of the 
pressure simply to agree with propositions rather than volunteer their own
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necessarily less mature ideas was a constant factor in the interviewing process. 
Attempts to equalise the power distribution inherent in the study were made in the 
respectful treatment of their contributions.
While the initial stance of the researcher was to regard the inquiry as a co­
operative venture between the students and the researcher, the impracticality of 
this soon became apparent: the initial agenda was specified by the researcher, and 
the interpretations were those of the researcher - necessarily so, given the 
students' limited experience and engagement with the subject matter in relation to 
that of the researcher. Thus, while the students were enthusiastic, co-operative 
and invaluable participants, their contributions form only one aspect of the 
research. Genuine collaboration on a basis of equality was not possible, and 
ultimately the ownership of the project must rest with the researcher.
Another issue is that of shared backgrounds and values between researcher and co­
researcher. In some cases this will enhance rapport, sensitivity and awareness 
and increase the quality of the data and the process of inquiry itself (Reason & 
Rowan, 1981), and in others assumptions and shortcuts will be made for which 
explanations will not seem necessary, causing incomplete data (Platt, 1981). In 
this study this shared background enriched the understanding and exchange of ideas 
between the researcher and the students, and enabled insights to be checked easily 
and cognizantly.
2.5 . CONDUCTING THE STUDY
2.5 .1 . CHOICE OF PARTICIPANTS AND NEGOTIATION OF ACCESS
Volunteers were solicited from students undertaking a degree programme in 
nursing. These students, rather than students undertaking other forms of nursing 
training, were deliberately chosen in the expectation of good levels of articulation 
which would be useful in a study involving concepts. The year group of thirty two 
students in the third year [the clinical year] of a four year programme was 
approached. As this clinical year is entirely practice-based, the students would be 
immersed in the practice being discussed, enabling them to have direct access to 
current examples and scenarios of practice on to which draw in their deliberations.
- 50  -
All the students were undertaking the same academic course, but were placed at 
various local hospitals for their clinical experience.
The study was described to them, the extent of their possible involvement in the 
study was made clear, and confidentially was emphasised. Students were asked to 
volunteer on the basis of an interest in the study and a willingness to discuss their 
ideas and experiences of practice with the researcher. As in-depth interviews and 
discussions were envisaged, a small sample was decided upon, and the notion of 
randomness was abandoned on the basis of inappropriateness - it being impossible 
to claim that this group was necessarily representative of nursing practitioners as 
a whole, and, in any case, the generalisability of the study does not rely upon the 
principle of random selection of participants, as discussed above (2 .4 .3 .2 ). 
Twenty two students volunteered, and all participated in the study, although some to 
a greater extent than others, depending on their sustained interest and their ability 
to articulate and extend their ideas as the study progressed.
Access to the students was negotiated through the academic staff as well as the 
clinical managers in the hospitals where the students were practising. The 
research proposal was also submitted to the local Ethics Committee on the grounds 
that patients might be involved obliquely since the study concerned practice. 
Approval was granted for the study to proceed. (See Appendix 2 for relevant 
documentation.)
2 .5 .2 . DATA COLLECTION
2 .5 .2 .1 . Using the literature
There were two objectives to the literature review that was undertaken. Firstly, 
to provide a background to the study and a rationale for the necessity to explore the 
nature of practice, a systematic review of the literature on the theory-practice gap 
in nursing was conducted. This is discussed in chapter 1.
Secondly, as mentioned previously (2.4.2), the literature was used as a source of 
data for the stimulation and development of ideas and, in the form of narratives, for 
the furnishing of examples of these ideas from clinical practice. In this review, 
emerging ideas were pursued through the literature to the extent that they 
contributed to this development. No bounds were placed on the literature reviewed, 
either in terms of time or discipline. The ideas emanating from the literature were
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used on the basis of their ability to progress the notions on the nature of nursing 
practice, and the criterion for incorporation in the study was the usefulness of the 
literature in terms of the aim of the study. Consequently, no critique or 
assessment of the literature was intended - this being inappropriate as the eclectic 
use of the literature meant that ideas were often used outwith their symbolic frames 
of reference. Rather, ideas from the literature are presented as they contribute to 
the advancement of the formulation of the nature of nursing practice.
2 .5 .2 .2 .  In te rv ie w in g
Data not derived from the literature were collected by interviewing, a highly 
efficient and rich data source, which has been used effectively to get at inaccessible, 
unarticulated areas of clinical practice (Scholes & Freeman, 1994).
Several pertinent points about interviewing have been made in the literature. The 
first is about interviewing women, who were in the majority in this study. While 
Oakley (1981) and Platt (1981) found rapport easily established and therefore 
gathering of information facilitated when all co-researchers were women, 
Scott(1985) found that women were inclined to make connections with other parts 
of their lives during the interview, creating a non-linear interview with a 
different perspective on data collection and analysis. Both these points held in this 
study, but the problems of the latter were insignificant, as the iterative process 
was non-linear, and interconnections added to the richness of the data.
A specific ethical problem occurs when working within a feminist framework: that 
data uncovered during research should not be detrimental to the position of women 
in society - a factor created by the social structure rather than by the women 
themselves (Scott, 1985; Oakley, 1981). For example, this concern 
temporarily immobilised Finch's (1984:83) work with working class mothers in a 
play group setting when her research showed the character of the group as "wildly 
divergent from bourgeois standards of child care and pre-school development 
practice", and the quandary was that this evidence could be used to reinforce the 
view that working-class women are inadequate and incompetent child rearers. 
While this study is not located within a feminist framework - although some ideas 
from feminist theory have been useful - an awareness of this issue was pertinent 
because of the traditional relation of nursing to medicine and the power structures 
implicit within this, as well as traditional values associated with theory and 
practice in the academic establishment.
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The issue of interviewing peers is potentially problematic in that tacit social, 
ethical and technical assumptions are commonly made (Platt, 1981), which could 
produce gaps in the data, but this is less significant in a study of this kind where no 
claim is made to a definitive statement on the nature of practice. In sharing a 
common professional background with the participants, the interviewer had easy 
access to the language used, and to the meanings which are given to events. This 
allowed easier access to the meanings and understanding which the participants 
attached to nursing practice. The disadvantage of this is that the interviewer may 
be looking at it with an accustomed eye, and will fail to pick up meanings which will 
be obvious to a fresh eye.
In addressing the question of what needs to be discussed in the interview, Patton's 
(1990) suggestion of using sensitising concepts to help orientate the fieldwork, 
were particularly helpful in the planning of the interviews. Patton suggests 
deriving these concepts from the literature, and using them as a guide in a 
structured or semi-structured sense. In this study the sensitising concepts, or 
initial ideas were derived from the literature, and used as focus points during the 
interviews.
With all these issues in mind, the interviews were conducted more along the lines of 
a discussion than an interview, with the specific aim of developing the concepts 
which were emerging from the literature, the researcher's own practice and 
experience [indicating the use of self in the research - see 2.4.3.4.] and the initial 
interviews. Several opening strategies were used to initiate the discussions:
1. The student was asked to describe an episode in her practice that day in
which she had put into practice something that she had learned.
This frequently elicited a general and literal response [e.g. 'I was looking after a 
six-bedded bay of patients'], and follow-up questions were aimed at distinguishing 
any difference between what she had been taught and what she had actually effected 
in practice [e.g. questions were focused on a specific activity she had actually 
carried out with the patients. If her execution of that activity differed from the 
procedure she had been taught, her interpretations of this difference were 
explored].
2. The student was asked what she had learned in practice that day, and in
which respects that differed from what she had learned from her academic
studies.
This usually proved a more fruitful opening and led to concrete examples which 
served as a basis for further discussion from which notions of the nature of practice 
were drawn. (See Appendix 3)
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3. Further into the study students were asked in what way the concepts 
generated so far (Appendix 4) were germane to their practice.
This third approach, understandably, was the most productive, not least because it 
occurred when the concepts appeared in a recognisable form and could be responded 
to and developed, as opposed to being generated, as was the case in the early stages of 
the discussions.
An interesting point to emerge was that the students found it particularly difficult 
to articulate abstract, theoretical notions of their practice while functioning as 
practitioners. Some insight into this can now be offered in the light of the total 
analysis of the study. The students, being immersed in practice at the time, were 
operating in practice mode - precisely what the study sought to elicit - and found 
working in theoretical mode with concepts to be extremely difficult: again, a case in 
point for the central contention of the study. They found it easier to respond to 
prompts than to volunteer ideas themselves, and the more detailed the explanation of 
the concept, the more expansive and illuminating the response from the student. 
Consequently they were more helpful in the development of the concepts than in 
originating notions. This became apparent after the initial tranche of interviews, 
and consequently a résumé of the analysis of the ideas to date was posted to each 
student for their consideration prior to the next meeting (see Appendix 4). 
Subsequent interviews were more fruitful, as the students had something to which 
they could respond, rather than having to generate the material themselves.
2.5 .3 . STAGES OF THE STUDY
While it is possible, with hindsight, to identify stages in the study, these would be 
artificially created as the iterative process was cyclic and non-linear, and 
determined by the demands of the development of the emerging concepts.
The main episodes can be construed as:
wide reading of broad-based literature 
several rounds of interviews
directed literature search, including nursing narratives 
interviews using rudimentary concepts as pointers 
tightly focused literature search
Interviewing started in the spring of 1995, prior to the students' commencement of 
their third year, intensified in the autumn of 1995 and continued until spring
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1996. The frequency depended on the ongoing analysis, and the need to clarify 
perspectives and expositions as these arose during the analysis. In the latter stages 
it sometimes amounted to no more than a phone call to check on an interpretation or 
use of word.
2 .5 .4 . DATA ANALYSIS
The original conception was to base the analysis loosely on the constant comparative 
method suggested by the Grounded Theory approach (Glaser & Strauss 1967). 
Using this method, data would be examined closely for all meanings of the 
phenomenon that seem sufficiently similar to be collected together as a category. 
As analysis proceeds, categories become conceptually denser, or new categories are 
created until each category is "saturated" - no further new insight is being added to 
the category (Field & Morse, 1985). This technique was adopted as a basis for the 
analysis of the data, but subsequent forms of analysis, pertinent to the explicit aims 
of Grounded Theory to develop theory by means of determining linkages between the 
categories, were clearly inappropriate, as a decision was taken in the early stages 
of the study not to attempt to develop theory, principally since the eclectic stance 
decided upon would preclude this. Nevertheless, some linkages can be made 
between the concepts in the form of overlaps between the attributes of some of the 
concepts [e.g. the attribute of subjectivity forms part of the concepts of 
Temporality, Knowledge and Judgements]. Other links will be discussed later 
(section 4). These links, however, serve to elucidate the nature of practice, 
rather than to constitute a theory.
The analysis, therefore, proceeded on the basis of categorising and subcategorising 
all data as they were generated from all sources, and of using these ideas and 
subideas to probe for further possibilities. This process occurred continuously 
from the beginning of the study . [An example of this in relation to one of the 
concepts is given in Appendix 5].
This type of analysis is essentially the product of the mental processes of an 
individual researcher at a particular point in time [again highlighting the use of 
self in the research - see 2.4.3.4.], and therefore the notion of replicability is 
inappropriate. While the rudimentary ideas were checked with the students for 
validity, this would not suggest reproducibility at a later stage, and while 
generalisation to other fields of practice would be possible by the practitioners 
within those fields - should they find a resonance (discussed in 2.4.3.2) - the
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analytic strategies of checking interpretations with the students were aimed 
primarily at increasing the richness and density of the concepts and attributes, 
rather than strengthening the power of generalisability or replicability of the 
study.
2 .6 . OUTCOMES
From the analysis several central ideas emerged as the primary notions around 
which an understanding of the nature of nursing practice could be constructed: the 
concepts of Awareness, Temporality, Contextuality, Modality, Intentionality, 
Knowledge, Nature, Scale, Reasoning and Power. These became richer as the 
analysis proceeded by the inclusion of attributes pertaining to each concept, derived 
from the literature, the interviews, the nursing narratives and the researcher's 
own involvement in practice, and refined by continuous referencing between the 
literature, the students' insights and the researcher's own reflections.
These primary concepts and their attributes which resulted from this continuous 
analysis are presented in section 3. They are illustrated by quotes from some of 
the interviews with the students, and some of the nursing narratives which are 
particularly enlightening are also presented.
When considered together, these primary concepts suggest the central structures of 
a framework within which the nature of practice, as distinguished from theory, can 
be articulated. The framework is linked together to form a cohesive entity by the 
overlapping between the attributes of these concepts. These links and the issues 
around them are discussed in section 4.
Consequent upon the presentation of this framework, it is possible to articulate the 
difference between theory and practice. This suggests considerations for 
practitioners, managers of practice as well as theoreticians of nursing. These 
implications are discussed in section 5.
- 56  -
2.7 . CONCLUSION
In locating this study in a research context some points need to be taken into 
consideration:
Firstly there is the acceptance of the notion that there is no one truth. This study 
does not seek to ratify findings against other studies in order to increase veracity or 
improve generalisability. Consequently whatever has been generated by this study 
will be offered to professional colleagues on the basis of its usefulness to them - at 
whatever level and in whatever context - some possibilities of which will be 
discussed in section 5.
Secondly, the study is not directly concerned with studying human behaviour, but 
rather in generating a framework for understanding practice. Therefore, issues of 
validity and rigour apply more in the sense of whether later users find whatever is 
generated by the study useful, rather than in checking and rechecking 
interpretations with co-researchers as the study develops - particularly given that 
the students' interpretations form only one data source, albeit an important one: 
the other data sources [the literature and the nursing narratives] cannot be 
subjected to the same system of checking as they are presented as the stated opinions 
and experiences of their authors. Perhaps it is also worth noting here Adler's & 
Adler's (1994) notion that rigour and validity originate from a post-positivist 
paradigm and lose their salience in a postmodern framework, some ideas from 
which underpin some of the assumptions suggested here.
Thirdly, the study relies largely on the sensitivity of the researcher to generate and 
develop concepts from all the data sources - a notion already widely used in 
research, as discussed (2.4.3.4). For this the integrity of the researcher has to be 
relied upon to prevent the study simply degenerating into self indulgence. Beyond 
making thought processes and data sources as transparent as possible, this stance 
requires an act of faith on the part of the reader in the integrity of the researcher.
It is in this context, then, that this study is offered as a research project, with some 
support, perhaps, from the Nobel prize-winning physicist Percy Bridgman [quoted 
in Patton (1990:477)]:
There is no scientific method as such, but the vital feature of a scientist's 
procedure has been merely to do his utmost with his mind.
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SECTION 3
ANALYSIS
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CHAPTER 3
PROLOGUE
Like Midas, the Rationalist is always in the unfortunate 
position of not being able to touch anything, without 
transforming it into an abstraction; he can never get a 
square meal of experience. (Oakeshott, 1962:26)
3 .1 . INTRODUCTION
The central contention of this study is that theory and practice essentially bespeak 
different realms, and that for there to be meaningful discussion of this, the nature of 
practice needs to be more clearly understood. To this end an examination of the 
nature of practice was undertaken, using both theoretical and empirical approaches, 
the details of which are given in Chapter 2. From this analysis a framework of the 
nature of practice was constructed as the substantiation of this contention.
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The central structures of the framework comprise the primary concepts: 
Awareness, Temporality, Contextuality, Knowledge, Modality, Nature, Scale, 
Reasoning and Power - which represent some of the dimensions of the nature of 
practice. Various attributes concerning these concepts emerged, and these are 
linked through the interplay and overlap which occurs between them. From these 
central structures and links a pattern of practice is formed. By looking closely at 
these concepts in terms of their pertinence to practice, and juxtaposing this with 
their relevance to theory, it is possible to articulate the difference in the spheres of 
practice and theory.
The concepts of this study will be clarified and illustrated in this section. The 
interchange between these concepts, which forms the patterning of practice within 
the framework, will then be discussed in section 4, followed by the implications of 
this for nursing in section 5.
3 .2 . PURPOSE AND PARAMETERS OF SECTION 3
The aim of Section 3 is to present an articulation of the nature of practice in terms 
of a discussion of the concepts comprising the framework of practice. A 
comprehensive overview of the elements of each the concepts which make up the 
dimensions of the framework is given: these are described, and their manifestations 
and importance in the real world of nursing are illustrated from the discussion of 
the students and the nursing narratives.
The notion of using concepts to make practice visible is not new. A precedent has 
been set by Bourdieu (Mahar et al, 1990), who uses concepts of Relative Autonomy, 
Personal and Class Trajectories and the Nature of Strategies and Struggle for 
Positions in the Field, as the primary attributes of the practice he seeks to describe. 
While it would have been possible to develop these in terms of nursing practice, a 
decision was made at the commencement of the study to originate concepts from the 
experiences of practitioners and the literature on practice, which would then have 
pertinence for practitioners.
Throughout the examination of the concepts, a dichotomy is drawn between theory 
and practice. Each concept is discussed in terms of this dichotomy. This approach 
is taken for purposes of clarity alone, since such a juxtaposition creates a more
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conspicuous visibility for practice. There is no suggestion that the dichotomy is 
absolute, as elements of the concepts can at times be found in both theory and 
practice.
Practice itself is complex and indistinct, and cannot be described completely by the 
discrete concepts which are presented. Thus, while this study seeks to elucidate the 
nature of practice, it is accepted that even this is an abstraction and only a partial 
view of the whole.
In order to tease apart at least some aspects of the extensive and complex world of 
practice a broad, eclectic approach was adopted (as discussed in Chapter 2). 
Concepts from a variety of theoretical frames of reference are used. Thus, while 
each concept represents a vast area of study in its own right, the purpose of this 
section is not to undertake an exhaustive analysis of each concept, but rather to 
examine each one only as it pertains to practice.
3 .3 . DEFINITION OF TERMS
The discussion of the concepts proceeds in one of two ways. Some of the discussions 
have a generalist approach, and could have significance for practices other than 
nursing practice, although the illustrations are based on nursing practice. The 
discussions on Awareness, Time, Context and Knowledge are examples of this. 
Others discussions refer much more specifically to nursing practice, as the concepts 
themselves are so intricately connected to the particularity of especial practices 
that it makes greater sense to discuss them in relation to a specific practice. These 
include Modality, Intentionality, and the Nature and Scale of Activity. The 
discussions on Judgement and Power have a foot in both camps.
The terms used in this study generally follow the common understanding of the 
words, but their use in relation to practice may be slightly unusual. Thus, for 
greater clarity, the main ideas will be defined and the central contention stated.
P rac tice
By practice is meant any coherent and complex form of skilled co-operative activity 
arranged around a shared understanding of the intention of the practice, rather than 
the carrying out of a specific task. In this study this refers mainly to the
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professional practice of nursing, but some ideas could refer to other non­
professional practices - such as lay caring, housework etc. - as well as other 
professional practices, such as teaching. As already stated, the position of this 
study is that practice is substantially different from the theory which informs it.
Awareness
Awareness refers to the consciousness, cognisance and perception employed in 
relation to practice. It indicates the attitude of mind utilised when engaged in 
practice. It is the totality of the impressions, thought and feeling which make up 
the mentality applied in the accomplishment of practice. The argument put forward 
is that in practice a diffuse awareness is employed in contrast to the sharp focus of 
theory.
T em p o ra lity
The various ways in which time can be conceived is referred to as temporality. 
This is a broader interpretation of time than that which can be measured, and refers 
to the ways in which time can be experienced, interpreted, constructed and used, and 
to the significance it has for those engaged in practice. It is contended that the 
temporality used in practice is relational, as opposed to the linearity of the 
temporality of theory.
C o ntextuality
This refers to the milieu, in the broadest sense, in which practice occurs. It 
includes the situations, circumstances and environments of practice - the total 
cultural context of practice. It is suggested that practice is contextually embedded, 
in contrast to abstracted, decontextualised theory.
Knowledge
Knowledge refers to that which is used by practitioners to inform their practice, 
and may present in various forms and be acquired in a variety of ways. The debate 
as to whether these forms of knowledge actually count as knowledge belong to a 
different discussion, and are only alluded to in this discussion of knowledge, which is 
not an attempt to give an overview of epistemology, but to look at the various forms 
of knowledge that are used in practice. These various aspects of practical knowledge 
are contrasted with the prepositional knowledge of theory.
Reasoning
This refers to the manner in which judgements are arrived at in practice, and how 
decisions are made - the structure of reasoning processes. The assertion is that in
62
practice, judgements are not always based on rules and formulae, which tend to be 
more characteristic of theory.
Pow er
This refers to the various forms of domination which are found in practice and the 
effect this has on practice. The levels on which power operates, and the ability of 
power relations to shape practice, is discussed. This direct involvement of power 
with practice is contrasted with the detached relation between power and theory.
M odality
Modality refers to the manner or way in which practice is carried out - the style in 
which it operates. It refers to its form, rather than its substance. The argument 
put forward is that the modality used in practice is flexible, fluid and 
undifferentiated as opposed to the firmly delineated form of theory.
In te n tio n a lity
By intentionality is meant that which guides and determines outcomes. It is 
concerned with purposes, ends and intentions. The main thrust of this chapter deals 
with the difficulty found in practice of determining in advance what the outcomes 
will be. Some broad aim or general indication of purpose can be known, but 
anything more specific than that can usually not be established beforehand. The 
notion suggested is that in practice the end point cannot always be defined in advance, 
and this contrasts with the pro-active aims of theory.
Nature of activity
This refers to the essential qualities or innate character of activities - the 
fundamental attributes of activity. The suggestion is that while the inherent 
character of practice activities is its diversity as a response to local need, theory is 
essentially convergent upon particular objectives.
Scale of activity
This refers to the relative dimension of the activities of practice - the level at 
which things are carried out, the scope, extent range or degree of the activities. 
The contention put forward is that practice operates on the scale of the ordinary and 
the everyday, as opposed to the universal scale of theory.
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3 .4 . CONCLUSION
A framework for practice is thus drawn from the concepts of diffuse awareness, 
relational temporality, embedded contextuality, practical knowledge, flexible 
modality, responsive intentionality, diverse nature, everyday scale, pragmatic 
reasoning and instrumental power. Each of these give some idea of how theory and 
practice essentially bespeak different spheres.
What follows in the section is the expansion of these ideas, and the demonstration of 
their derivation from the real world of nursing, as an illustration of some 
fundamental aspects of the nature of practice.
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CHAPTER 4
AWARENESS
4 .1 . INTRODUCTION
There are a variety of approaches to the concept of awareness in the literature 
which are useful in the examination of the way in which the awareness, or the 
mental stance, employed during practice differs from that used in theory. In 
addition to the notions from the literature, there has been considerable agreement 
among the research participants that practical awareness differs from theoretical 
awareness. Whereas theory has a sharply focused consciousness, an exactness in 
expression, an attending to the defined particularities and component parts of 
things, the awareness of practice is more diffuse.
Schütz (1970 ) refers to the different states of awareness as "tensions of 
consciousness", and suggests that these vary according to the realm of the experience 
being entered upon, from full wakefulness to the sleep-like consciousness of 
dreams. Polanyi (1958 & 1966) has described two kinds of awareness: focal and 
subsidiary awareness. He describes them thus:
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When we use a hammer to drive in a nail, we attend to both nail and hammer, but in 
a different way. We watch the effect of our strokes on the nail and try to wield 
the hammer so as to hit the nail most effectively. When we bring down the 
hammer we do not feel that its handle has struck our palm but that its head has 
struck the nail. Yet in a sense we are certainly alert to the feelings in our palm 
and the fingers that hold the hammer. They guide us in handling it effectively, and 
the degree of attention that we give to the nail is given to the same extent but in a
different way to these feelings ........ They are not watched in themselves; we
watch something else while keeping intensely aware of them. I have a subsidiary 
awareness of the feeling in the palm of my hand which is merged into my focal 
awareness of my driving in the nail. Polanyi (1 958:55 ) [Italics in the original] 
Polanyi suggests that subsidiary awareness operates over all degrees of 
consciousness, but focal awareness is necessarily conscious. This distinction is 
useful in understanding the awareness that characterises practice.
Without negating the use of focal awareness in practice, it is the importance of this 
subsidiary or diffuse awareness to practice which forms part of the distinguishing 
framework of practice. From the literature and the research participants it is 
possible to distinguish various attributes of this diffuse awareness. As a general 
illustration of this diffuse awareness, nursing narrative documents provide the 
following example:
•  Mrs Long, aged 64, was on her sixth post-operative day following formation of 
an ileostomy for cancer of the colon. She was apparently making great progress 
and everyone in the ward was impressed by her attitude and physical recovery
 When I asked her how she was coping, she said she was fine  I smiled and
congratulated her on this news, yet as I did this a warning bell rang in my head, 
for some reason I could not identify exactly. I made a mental note to observe her 
further. As the ward began to settle and the lights went down, I saw Mrs Long 
leave her bed, as I was busy checking the IV drugs. She smiled and waved, 
saying she was just going to empty her bag, she hoped for the last time before 
she went to sleep. I smiled back, but decided to act on my intuition and stopped
what I was doing to follow her into the bathroom I asked her if she would like
me to help her in any way. Her face just crumpled and the tears began to roll
down She said she hated the cancer and the stoma. She was being strong for
her family as she had always been able to cope with problems before But she
hated the stoma - she hated emptying it and looking at it and smelling it. I let
her vent her feelings I then emptied her bag and tried to reassure her about
the normality of her feelings, and told her about some of the foods which would 
not exacerbate the smell, and generally talked about the stoma. I had used my
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perception  to provide a deeper type of care  and focus on the whole
person. (Gillan, 1992:45)
While this provides a general demonstration of the diffuse awareness which the 
nurse had used in her approach to the patient, an awareness which enabled her to 
detect problems beyond the obvious, a more detailed analysis of awareness shows the 
variety of approaches to this concept. Several attributes of the awareness employed 
during practice have been identified, which provide a more extensive understanding 
of this diffuse awareness of practice. These are now discussed.
4 .2 . HOLISTIC
This attribute of subsidiary awareness points up the sense of the general wholeness 
of things. It is not a formless chaos, or an unconsciousness, but rather an 
awareness which perceives things as a gestalt. It is this diffuse awareness which 
allows input from a variety of disparate sources to be included in the activity of 
practice.
The idea of diffuse awareness can be traced back to the work of Jung (1991) and 
Neumann (1991). Although their work is related to the defining of archetypes and 
in particular in the case of Neumann to the exploration of the matriarchal 
archetype, the ideas that are put forward suggest the existence of a different type of 
consciousness. This consciousness is associated with wholeness, unity, totality and 
with a type of relativism which does not separate or juxtapose opposites but rather 
relates them to each other as a total entity (Neumann, 1991). Dreyfus (1980) has 
similar ideas in his discussion of practical skills. He suggests that all such skills 
are learned against a cultural background - one so pervasive that it cannot be 
spelled out in theory or made an object of analysis - and practitioners are not aware 
of this in any specific way, but rather with an holistic awareness. Toulmin's 
(1976 ) term for this is an inclusive awareness, and he suggests that any 
understanding of people demands this type of awareness, which he contrasts with the 
selective attention needed for the understanding of particular aspects of knowledge.
There is evidence of this holistic approach in awareness specifically in nursing 
practice. Cervero (1988), in analysing how professionals acquire practical 
expertise, suggests that in nursing the process involves developing just such an 
holistic awareness, i.e. seeing practice situations more and more as a complete
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whole and less and less as a compilation of equally relevant bits of information. The 
study of Grypdonck et al (1979), which looked specifically at the delivery of 
nursing care, found that this was precisely what was occurring - nursing practice 
involved the total care of the patient. The focus was not on technical care or 
medically derived needs only, but on the experience of the patient as being ill, as 
patient, as being hospitalised. Connell (1985) describes the case of a particular 
patient whose progress after a cerebrovascular accident was dependent on the 
nurses' holistic awareness of him. Whereas the physicians focused on the 
pathophysiology and treatment, the nurses, although knowledgeable about the 
pathophysiology and treatment, were aware of the patient as a whole human being, 
and were able to adapt his therapy accordingly [which resulted in midnight exercise 
sessions.]
In this study the research participants were emphatic in their agreement that an 
awareness of the wholeness of the situation was crucial to their practice. While 
articulation was problematic for the students - probably for the reasons Dreyfus 
( 1980) suggests - some examples were cited. Lara described this awareness thus:
•  When you're doing something, you take into account a lot of other things going on
at the same tim e  you don't consciously go through everything in your head
each time, but you are aware of it and you're picking up signals all the time and 
that brings other thoughts to the fore.
Emma:
•  When I am doing a dressing, I have to be aware of other patients around, and 
about infection, and Just silly things like drawing the curtains round, and extra 
things - keeping [the patient] covered, maintaining their dignity, maintaining a 
sterile field and thinking about others on the ward and all that sort of stuff.
Ben:
•  You're not Just doing a procedure. You have to think how they're feeling about 
having it done and whether it's hurting or not or if they're comfortable while 
you're doing it.
4 .3 . INDEFINITELY BOUNDED
This approach to diffuse awareness perceives boundaries as being fuzzy or 
undetermined - a drawing together of all particularities in such a way that the 
boundaries become blurred, or a relaxing of boundaries around perceptions so as to
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permit other factors to contribute to the situation. Castillejo (1973 ) has 
described this as a diffuse awareness of being linked to everything else, where there 
is no breakage into parts. Zerubavel (1991), in an interesting analysis of the 
distinctions made in everyday life, has argued that in the practice of daily life a 
flexible approach is used. The boundaries of theoretical concepts become fuzzy and 
the mind develops a mental plasticity. There are no clear lines between one object 
or one concept and another - socks can also be mittens. He argues that this does not 
entail giving up structure altogether, but implies a dynamism and elasticism in 
mental structure that allows the creativity necessary for adaptation in practice.
Cervero's (1988) approach to this dynamic adaptation in practice is to describe 
situations of practice as uncertain, indeterminate zones, and as being reshaped 
during practice. This implies a fluid situation, and it is Cervero's contention that 
these situations are then transformed into determinate ones through reflection-in- 
action, which describes the development of professional knowledge. Nelson 
(1993:125) has similar ideas of the development of knowledge from the practical 
experiences of individuals, and she describes the dynamic situations from which this 
knowledge is constructed thus:
they have fuzzy, often overlapping boundaries; they evolve, dissolve and 
recombine; they have a variety of "purposes" and projects 
Without a diffuse awareness which allows the perception of boundaries as fluid, this 
adaptation would not be possible, and it is continual adaptation to each slightly 
different situation which is a hallmark of practice.
Greenwood (1993a) has described this awareness as ill-defined or fuzzy  
representation, which she maintains is essential in everyday practice as it allows 
interpretation to be dependent on the context of the situation. She contrasts this 
with clear-cut representations which are necessary for theoretical work. Her 
assertion is that nurses use fuzzy representations in practice, and clear-cut 
representation of the same phenomenon in classroom discussion and for examination 
purposes. This demonstrates a clear distinction between the type of awareness 
deployed in practice as opposed to that used in theory.
Scott (1995:1 198) approaches this from a different angle, referring to this 
awareness as "agent attention", where the focus of the attention moves from the self 
to the other, and boundaries disappear. She sees this as fundamental to the caring 
stance of nursing, and describes it thus:
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In agent attention ... there is always at least the potential to lose a sense of self, 
to be so focused on the other that a sense of self disappears and with it a sense of 
boundary or closure.
In this study, Kathryn referred to this boundary indistinction as:
•  In nursing you're not really working as a single person, in a way, I mean when 
you're working on the ward everything that you do is influenced very much by 
other members of staff and other things that are going on in the ward.
Lara suggested:
•  You have to be continually aware of what others are doing so that you can be sure 
you are doing the right thing at that particular time. You have to keep re- 
prioritising.
4 .4 . TRANSPARENT
This idea of diffuse awareness suggests that one is only aware of a particular item by 
turning one's attention away from that which stimulates the impression of the item. 
It resonates with Polanyi's (1967) idea of "disattending from" - where an 
awareness of certain things is gained only by disattending from a particular thing - 
for example, one disattends from the particular features of a face in order to attend 
to the face. The "disattending from" is a means of enabling other options to be 
presented.
This is similar to the ideas expressed by Glynn (1993), who, in investigating the 
creative process in design, suggests that the more focused one becomes in attempting 
to problem-solve, the more one blocks oneself off from other possible solutions 
which might suggest themselves at other, more generalised, levels of analysis. 
Creative leaps require a more diffuse focus which permits lateral thinking.
In another context, Freud (1924) describes his method of psychoanalysis as 
"evenly-hovering attention" where he makes no attempt to concentrate the attention 
on anything in particular, because as soon as attention is deliberately concentrated 
to a certain degree or on a particular aspect, one begins to select from the material 
before one, and in this selection there is the danger of never finding anything but 
what is already known. He therefore describes a free-flowing attention, a "quiet 
attentiveness" which gives equal regard to all material presented.
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Heller (1984) describes this disattending from as disengagement, and suggests that 
it is a vital part of functioning in everyday life. She maintains that we would not be 
able to survive if we attended to the multiplicity of everyday demands with a sharply 
focused consciousness, going so far as to assert that disengagement is an 
indispensable pre-condition for being able to be continually active in daily life. 
This disengagement is a way of liberating our capabilities for other uses. This has 
echoes of Heidegger's much quoted example of being unaware of a doorknob until it 
sticks (Magee, 1987). Heidegger's term for this is transparency - one enters a 
room without being aware of turning the doorknob, because the whole activity is so 
transparent it does not have to pass through consciousness.
All these notions point to the existence of a different type of awareness used in 
practice - a diffuse focus, and the necessity for developing such a focus in order to 
practice effectively.
In this study, Kathryn discussed the importance of this type of awareness:
•  You're not actually focusing on the situation. You make a small mental note of it
I suppose. If someone asks you, [for instance, can that patient walk with a
frame?] it registers, oh yes. I've seen him do that, so then you know that he can 
do that. You just know that this has happened because you've been there whilst 
it has happened, even though you haven't really focused on it as such.
Ben suggested:
•  I find I am doing one thing but being aware of other things all the time. For
example, a lot of patients won't say if they've got any pain, so while I'm doing a
certain thing - say a dressing - I'm aware of other things about them - I pick up 
on their pain and other observations.
4 .5 . MULTI-EXISTENT
Another approach to awareness in practice is expressed as being aware of multiple 
realities. Berger & Luckman (1971) define multiple realities as the ability of the 
consciousness to move through different spheres of reality. Schutz's (1970) ideas 
of multiple realities are described by what he calls the various types of attention 
that are necessary for performing conscious action, such as awareness of past 
experiences linked to the action, a picture of the action held before the inner eye.
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awareness of the action as it occurs, retention of the projected action, reproduction 
of the action and so forth. Jarvis (1992b) has developed these ideas into a table of 
what he calls levels of consciousness [ranging from none through low to high] in 
relation to different categories of actions [ranging from non-action through 
experimental, repetitive, presumptive, ritualistic to alienating actions], all of 
which could be interpreted as the multiple realities of the diffuse consciousness 
necessary in practice.
In terms of nursing, Visintainer (1986) describes this focus on multiple realities 
as nursing using information from many different sources and maps from many 
different disciplines. She describes the care of a paralysed, artificially ventilated 
child who developed a sudden weight loss problem. The nurses focused on his 
problems as a normal two year old faced with separation from his parents, with 
normal food likes and dislikes and with the normal need to control his environment 
within his severely limited capabilities, as opposed to the medical focus of 
determining what caused the weight loss. By persevering with these multiple 
realities of the child's world the nurses were able to reverse the weight loss. She 
maintains this approach created a broader, multiple focus in nursing as opposed to 
the narrower focus on disease and cure, and likened nursing care to the assembling 
of a package from many different sources, rather than the application of a 
preassembled package.
The need to be aware of many things simultaneously seems an integral part of 
nursing practice, and consistent with a multiple reality focus. The research 
participants in this study substantiated this in various ways. Karin describes her 
experiences of the multiple realities of practice:
•  When doing a dressing you are not completely focused on the dressing, because 
you'd probably be talking to the patient and looking at the patient's face. You 
might have somebody asking you a question and you might look at them and you'd 
be concentrating on the trolley and other things.... Then you'd also be thinking - 
if it looked a bit inflamed or something - you might be thinking about their 
temperature or something like that, so you would be thinking about other things 
perhaps related to it, but not necessarily on the wound.
Kathryn had similar experiences to relate about multiple realities:
•  Say one patient needs a dressing doing. You'd need to know whether it was lunch 
time for example, or whether it was nearly 10 o'clock and the observations were 
going to need doing, so everything that you do, you do in relation to what other 
people are doing or what other activities that are going on in the ward. Even in 
deciding what task you're going to do next, you're taking in everything else
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around you like the other patients, other things that need doing, what your
colleagues are doing you're focusing on one main thing, but you've always got
to take into account other things that are going on.
4 .6 . BEYOND REFLECTION
Yet another approach to this notion of diffuse awareness is that of seeing it as lying 
beyond conscious reflection. Nyiri's (1988) argument is that much of practice is 
tacit, non-propositional and even inarticulate, lying outside reflection, and must 
therefore be transmitted by means other than explicit discourse, such as by 
tradition, by imitation, by developing a "feel" or "heuristic". Feigenbaum & 
McCorduck (1983 ) argue that it is precisely the use of such heuristics that 
distinguish experts from beginners in practice, as does Benner (1984:100) in a 
nursing context. She relates the following nursing narrative as an exemplar:
•  We had a patient who had an oesophageal dilation in X-ray. She was a very 
uncomplaining women of about 60 years of age. When she came back her vital 
signs were okay, and she was up in the bathroom. Later she started getting 
nauseated and she had streaks of very light pink drainage which I could account 
for by dilation procedures, but I just had this feeling that something else was 
going on. She became worse. I called the house officer. Her vital signs were 
still stable, but I indicated that I wanted the house officer to check her. The 
house officer examined her but was not ordering any tests. I pointed out that the 
patient's nail beds were cyanotic. The house officer was unimpressed. It was 
almost time for me to go off duty when the patient started having chills with a 
temperature, so I called the house officer again and said there was something 
going on with this patient, and that I wanted to see something done for her before 
I went off duty. Later I found that the patient had a rupture in her oesophagus; 
she also had aspiration pneumonia.
This idea of an awareness beyond conscious reflection is similar to Smith's (1988) 
notion that the apprentice develops expertise by concentrating not on the means and 
ways of working, but on the object being worked. This is associated with a 
spontaneity, an absence of planning. In so doing the consciousness is diffuse, 
allowing input from a range of sources without the hindrance of reflection on the 
action to hand.
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Schütz (1970:60) refers to this state of awareness as being linked to everyday 
experience. He describes this awareness as a state of "living within the stream of 
experience", which has a continuous ebb and flow quality [called the 'duration'], 
which he contrasts with living within the world of time and space, which has been 
spatialised, quantified and rendered discontinuous. The awareness associated with 
'duration' is not discrete or well-defined, but is rather a constant transition from a 
'now-thus' to a new 'now-thus'. He states that the stream of consciousness 
associated with 'duration' has by its nature not yet been caught up in the net of 
reflection. In this description Schütz encapsulates the beyond-reflection approach 
to the diffuse awareness of practice. This is similar to Cervero's (1988 ) 
observation that the managers in his study were able to perform well-learned 
patterns of behaviour without being aware of the effort.
This idea is used by Jarvis (1992d) in his analysis of how professionals learn 
practical knowledge. He suggests that not every action can be fully explained 
through articulation. Experts sometimes cannot say precisely how they do 
something, such as Ryle's (1990) example of chess players who cannot always 
articulate the rules of the game even when they are playing. Or again, his example 
that throughout the length of The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire Gibbon 
never infringes the rules of English grammar, and while they govern his entire 
writing, they do not dictate what he writes. Habermas (1979) describes this as a 
pre-theoretical knowledge, an implicit rule-consciousness which underlies know­
how. These examples illustrate an awareness which is beyond reflection.
In a clinical context, Benner (1984) suggests that expert practitioners no longer 
rely on analytic principles to direct appropriate action. Rather, the expert nurse 
has a wealth of background experience, giving an intuitive grasp of a situation which 
allows her to zoom in on the accurate region of the problem without having to waste 
time on considering a range of unhelpful alternative diagnoses. Ashworth & 
Longmate (1993) refer to awareness beyond reflection as being implicit theories 
which are lived rather than known. They suggest that nurses, for instance, may not 
have a conscious awareness of the germ theory of disease causation when they follow, 
as a matter of habit, the rules of asepsis. In this study Ben commented in almost 
precisely the same way:
•  You just do things automatically definitely you can do aseptic technique
without really thinking about it.
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4 .7 . PATTERNED
Another aspect of this diffuse consciousness is an awareness of a web of meanings. 
Berger et al (1974:20) suggest this is a pre-theoretica! consciousness of the 
structure of everyday life which allows individuals to steer their way through 
ordinary events and encounters with others. They refer to this web of meanings as 
a field of consciousness which is a "structure constituted by the modes and contents 
of what is consciously experienced". This consciousness does not refer to ideas, 
theories or sophisticated constructions of meanings, but to an everyday awareness. 
Schütz (1972 ) refers to this as a configuration of meaning formed at pre- 
phenomenal state of consciousness, which becomes available to the practitioner in a 
phenomenal state by the act of focusing the attention on it - as in the narrative 
(4 .1 .) where the nurse's initial awareness of an inexplicable "warning bell" was 
later focused upon to become an observation upon which she took action.
Neumann (1991) expresses this as a consciousness which is dependent on harmony 
with the unconscious, whereas Oakeshott's (1933) view is that to be conscious at all 
requires at least that the something of which one is conscious should stand above 
mere momentary states of sensation - to be conscious requires a body of related 
experiences in some degree organised and harmonious, of which one can be 
conscious. All this implies that there exists in practice an awareness of the related 
meanings of things, and that this awareness can exist at various levels, though 
mostly it is at some pre-theoretical level - hence the term diffuse awareness.
Eraut (1985:121) expresses this awareness state succinctly as a "semi-conscious 
patterning of previous experience" and suggests that in practice generalisations 
from this source are used even though the practitioner may not be able to articulate 
the generalisation or even trace its source.
An example of this in nursing practice is given in another nursing narrative. A 
nurse describes how a severely demented and restless patient was helped when a web 
of meanings of which she was vaguely aware gave rise to a conscious action:
•  Bill has severe senile dementia ... Bill is constantly on the move and rarely sits 
down. He often tries to leave the ward and if he were successful this would 
evoke fears among the staff for his safety, because his speech is slurred and 
unintelligible most of the time ... I wondered in what way I could bring some 
light into Bill's life, instead of accepting that he was what he was and that
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nothing could be done about it. His wife had told me that he had been a very keen 
gardener and had once tended two allotments at the same time. This gave me food 
for thought, because there was an area outside the ward which had been 
designated as a garden area ... but was now overgrown. I used some money from 
my small budget to purchase plants ... I part-filled a long wooden box with earth 
and then took Bill out into the garden area. I handed him some top soil in a bag 
and explained slowly and simply what I wanted him to do with it ... He seemed 
very confident and much time passed as he laboriously removed stones from the 
earth. He then picked up a piece of ice plant, planted it in the hole and closed the 
earth tightly around i t ... Since then Bill and another patient have watered the 
garden every day. (Smith, 1992:48)
The nurse in this narrative had a background awareness of the possibilities of 
gardening as therapy, and of the resources for gardening which she had at her 
disposal outside the ward area. These awarenesses were brought together by a 
sensibility she developed in a discussion she had with the wife of the patient, when 
she discovered his interest in gardening. By combining all these unrelated 
consciousnesses, she was able to help the patient to use his gardening skills which 
harnessed his restlessness and returned some sense of normality to the demented 
patient.
4 .8 . OPEN
The idea of openness as a diffuse consciousness stems from the literature on women's 
role in society. Smith (1979a: 152) refers to this openness of consciousness in 
relation to the work of a housewife:
A housewife, holding in place the simultaneous and divergent schedules and 
activities of a family, depends upon a diffuse and open organisation of 
consciousness available to the various strands, which are co-ordinated only in her 
head and by her work and do not co-ordinate otherwise in the world.
It is through this openness that she is aware of the needs of those for whom she 
cares. Graham (1983:27) describes the sense of this awareness in service-sector 
employment, such as secretarial and clerical work, nursing, teaching and social 
work, where the worker is aware of "her self always in response to others". 
Noddings (1984:7) describes this awareness as "an intuitive or receptive mode that 
is somewhat mysterious, internal and non-consequential" which involves
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apprehending the other's reality, forming an essential part of caring, and suggests
that all caring, in the final analysis, involves this engrossment.
The research participants in this study expressed this awareness. Lara commented:
•  You're open to everything else which affects your patient, but also the patient's 
significant others and the staff on the ward as well as other staff.
Karin:
•  You need to be able to have a sharp concentration on what you're doing, but you
also need to be able to be receptive to other things that are going on  You need
to be able to concentrate on what you're actually doing but then take in other 
information around you.
4 .9 . RELATIONAL
While it is undisputed that certain actions need concentrated focus, there is also 
another type of focus - a more diffuse focus - which is associated with actions in 
practice. Smith (1987) was aware that these different focuses existed in her 
critique of perspectives in sociology. She refers to the "bifurcation of 
consciousness" which exists as a chasm between the consciousness associated with 
the conceptual activities of thought, research etc. and the consciousness of concrete, 
practical, immediate activities.
Jarvis (1992b) articulates this when he maps levels of consciousness against 
categories of action, where various levels of consciousness are needed for different 
types of action. He suggests there is a need to understand the level of consciousness 
in order to understand the action, with professional action being about meaningful 
conscious action. He maintains that the ideal form of action that a nurse can 
perform in practice lies in the categories of the experimental /creative action and 
in the early stage of the repetitive category, while there is still a high level of 
consciousness about the action (1992a).
Sayer (1992), on the other hand, claims that too much self-consciousness of the 
process can interfere with the execution of the act, and therefore a diffuse focus is 
needed. This is echoed by Greenwald & Banaji (1995) who contend that much social 
action operates in an implicit or unconscious fashion which is influenced implicitly 
by past experience which is not always introspectively known to the actor.
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Heidegger (Magee 1987), while not denying that there is a place for contemplation 
and consciously directed action, maintains that much of what is characteristic of 
human activity is not guided by conscious choices and not accompanied by aware 
states of mind.
The point of all these contentions is to emphasise the assertion that, while focused 
awareness is undoubtedly used in nursing practice, what distinguishes it from the 
theory of nursing practice is the ability to use other states of awareness in relation 
to action.
This awareness in relation to action was discussed by the research participants. 
Ben described a moving from a focused awareness in an emergency-type situation to 
a more diffuse awareness which included the comfort of the patient when the 
situation was in control:
•  If someone were bleeding, you're focusing on where they're bleeding from and 
you're applying pressure and you're trying to get someone to give you a hand. [At 
that stage] you're not really focused on the patient. But then when you're 
putting up an IVI [intravenous infusion]... you have to concentrate on what 
you're doing, and then also on bandaging it up, making sure it's comfortable, it's 
running okay and everything, and then that the patient is happy with it and that 
you have told them why they're having it.
Kathryn described these different states of awareness in relation to talking to a 
patient in different circumstances:
•  If you're Just chatting to the patient because you've got spare time, then you're 
probably more focused on listening to what the patient's got to say, whereas if 
you're doing another task at the same time, then you're not fully devoting your 
attention to the patient.... When you're just chatting you're mentally devoting 
yourself, whereas when you're doing other nursing tasks you are physically 
doing something to the patient as well as trying to add a bit of chat in along the 
line so that it doesn't appear that you are completely ignoring the patient.
4. 10. CONCLUSION
These various attributes of diffuse awareness give some indication of the breadth of 
the nature of a different type of consciousness which is not sharply focused, and 
have been discussed in some detail to give an indication of states of consciousness
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which accompany nursing practice. While the sharp concentration used for 
theoretical work is also used at times during practice, what distinguishes nursing 
practice from nursing theory in terms of states of awareness is that practice 
additionally calls for this diffuse awareness.
From this analysis it is clear that to be able to practice effectively the nurse 
practitioner develops states of awareness which are different from that used to 
pursue theoretical work, and that theory and practice can be said to differ in 
relation to the states of consciousness which they employ.
This diffuse awareness forms part of the nature of practice, and contributes to a 
framework within which this nature can be understood, and with that the connection 
between theory and practice.
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CHAPTER 5
TEMPORALITY
5.1 . INTRODUCTION
Time has been conceived in various ways. The aim of this chapter is to discuss some 
of these perceptions relative to their use in describing a relational practical 
temporality, juxtaposed with a linear theoretical temporality.
The general sense of this difference is given by Bergson's distinction between two 
basic kinds of time, heterogeneous 'duration' which is concrete, and homogenous 
time which is abstract (Lacey, 1989). He suggests that in order to think and talk 
about the world, as opposed to experience it, time has to be 'frozen'. In this sense, 
time is homogenous, and can be referred to as theoretical time. Time perceived in 
this manner can be measured precisely, and is often referred to as 'clock time' 
(Davies, 1990). Schütz (1962) suggests that this spatialised, homogenous time is 
the universal form of objective time.
Time as experienced, or practical time, is heterogeneous duration. The 
heterogeneity of this conception of time stems from various notions of time
- 80  -
constructed by those experiencing it - for instance, time can be taken, or negotiated, 
or made, or used, or passed (Davies, 1990). In this conception of time, there is no 
sense of time being a constant or of it existing independently of those experiencing 
it, since it is given meaning by its historical, social and cultural contexts. Schütz 
(1962) suggests that this "durée" is concerned with our inner time, our actual 
experiences. It is relational, in that it exists essentially in relation to other 
aspects of life. Precise measurement of it is superfluous.
It is this sense of time which is of interest to this discussion, as this gives an 
indication of how time is encountered in practice, and allows it to be compared with 
theoretical time. There is no suggestion that the dichotomy being described is 
absolute, but rather that both kinds of time exist side by side in society, and are 
interwoven in a complicated manner. The dichotomy is drawn for purposes of 
clarity alone, and it is similarly for this reason that an examination of this 
heterogeneous time is suggested, in order to give further indications of the nature of 
practice itself.
Several ideas have been associated with this relational, practical temporality, both 
in the literature and in discussion with the research participants, and a more 
detailed analysis of the attributes of this relational time follows as an indication of 
some of the features of time as experienced in practice.
5.2 . CYCLIC
Davies (1990) argues that in Western civilisation two major ways of conceiving 
time have prevailed: linear time and cyclic time. [She does not hold that these are 
the only ways of conceiving time, but that they are generally considered to be the 
major forms.] The linear conception sees time as unidirectional, unfolding in a 
straight unbroken line towards an unlimited horizon. Historically it is a newer 
development than cyclic time, and traditionally said to date from the time of the 
development of writing. It is particularly associated with industrialisation and 
with measurement - clock time (Thompson, 1967). It is seen as extraneous to, or 
imposed upon natural life. Cyclic time, on the other hand, is associated with the 
pacing of life according to natural and local rhythms - such as the seasons of the 
year or the processes of daily lives - and the future is seen as a perpetual 
recapitulation of the present. Within this conceptualisation, precise measurement
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is inappropriate. Characteristically it is organic and related to the essence of 
nature. Historically it is a much older conception of time, and is traceable back to 
primitive societies and mythological understandings of events.
These contrasting perceptions give some pointers to the nature of theoretical and 
practical time. It is suggested that theoretical time mainly aligns more closely with 
linear time, with its focus on logical progressions (Toulmin, 1977) and concern 
with the abstract. It develops ideas from past experience and progress these 
towards the future - an unfolding linear progression with a future orientation. 
Practical time, on the other hand, is largely cyclic in orientation, being concerned 
with experiences which recur in many guises on a daily or seasonal basis. It is 
concerned with the concrete and the particular, and with repetition. This echoes 
Aristotle's ideas of the concrete being concerned with cycles (Toulmin 1976), and 
his contention that practical wisdom is only acquired from repeated involvement in 
practice over a period of time (Lauder 1994).
The cyclic nature of practical experiences is described by Salmon (1985) as the 
'non-additiveness' [i.e. non-linearity] of what is brought about by time, and is 
experienced in the relations between older and younger generations, as each 
generation of parents try to teach their children the lessons they have learned. This 
cyclic nature of time is what links lives and experiences together and gives solidity 
and continuity.
There is evidence of this sense of practical time being cyclic and hence repetitive in 
Oakley's (1985) analysis of the practice of housework. Her research participants 
describe as significant the recurring nature of the various practices and actions of 
housework, usually within a daily time scale - the daily cleaning, cooking, child- 
minding. This cyclic conception of time is important in her analysis, as it 
influences the practitioners' attitudes to their work. It is epitomised in the stock 
phrase 'a woman's work is never done'. Oakley suggests that this is not peculiar to 
housework, but that other occupations can be analysed similarly.
This cyclic concept of time is particularly relevant in caring and nurturing 
practices as it is this cyclic repetitivity that provides stability, support and 
security. For this reason, cyclic time features as a central concept in Davies's 
(1990:37) analysis of caring practices. She describes care work as
characterised by short cycles that are frequently repeated and by the fact that it 
is with difficulty subsumed under strict clock time, [italics in the original]
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She goes so far as to suggest that the fundamental rationality of caring and nurturing 
is destroyed when it is forced to operate within linear time, as it can no longer be 
responsive to human need, but must be organised along the principles of a technical- 
economic rationality. Thus, for Davies, a cyclic conception of time is fundamental 
to the understanding and performance of caring practices.
In the nursing context. Little & Carnevali (1976 ) suggest that this cyclic, 
recurring nature of practice time is one of the major distinguishing properties of 
the process of nursing. This is recognised by the participants in this study as a 
feature of practice. Karin described it thus:
•  You're continually doing the same [tasks]... for example if you work an all-day
shift on a ward then it does sort of seem a bit repetitive because you get 
everybody up in the morning and then you undo all the work that you've done 
because you're putting everybody to bed at night again, so in that sense I think 
that the things that you do are a bit sort of repetitive. I suppose it is the time, 
because the timing of everything in a way dictates what tasks that you do, so that 
in that way perhaps, it is a bit sort of repetitive.
5.3 . PROCESS ORIENTED
Another attribute of relational time, closely connected to cyclic time because of its 
inability to be subsumed under clock time, is process time, where time is conceived 
in relation to the task or process being undertaken.
This understanding has been suggested by a seminal analysis of the perception of 
time in relation to work, undertaken by Thompson (1967). He noted that time has 
been perceived differently since the advent of industrial capitalism. Prior to this, 
he contended, time was notated in terms of familiar processes in the cycle of work or 
domestic chores [e.g. lambing time, rice-cooking time]. This time was process- or 
task-oriented. Similarly, Durkheim (Starkey, 1988) noted that primitive 
societies organised their time around rites, feasts and public ceremonies. With the 
onset of industrial capitalism and clock-timed labour, the perception of time shifted 
to that of clock time - a linear-progressive perception. Time became a currency to 
be spent, as opposed to being passed, as in process-oriented time.
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A similar analysis was undertaken by Starkey (1988), who distinguishes between 
qualitative time - time organised around sociocultural events - and quantitative 
time - time subjected to clock measurement mainly for purposes of economic 
production and profit. Again, he suggests that this is a consequence of Western 
industrialisation.
While these writers discuss the development of these different perceptions of time 
in a historically linear manner, it is possible to portray them as co-existing in 
society, their deployment being dependant on the nature of what is being undertaken. 
In practice it is process time which is predominant, and quantitative time, while 
present, is less important. This was evident in this study. Ben described it thus:
•  If you're doing a bedbath, then it takes as long as it takes.
Kathryn:
•  You have a rough ideas of how long something's going to take, b u t... I suppose 
until you've finished you don't know how long it is going to take.
Davies (1990) suggested that the reason for this is that practice is needs-oriented, 
and therefore the task itself defines the amount of time to be consumed. Because of 
the responsive nature of care work, [or need-oriented communication], she suggests 
that of necessity it is based on a different relation to time than clock-time, and that 
it cannot be subsumed under clock time.
While both these conceptions of time are encountered in practice, it is the process- 
oriented time which ultimately defines nursing practice. This was nicely suggested 
by Karin:
•  Not all deliveries take the same amount of time, so that delivering one baby can 
take one hour and delivering another baby can take four hours or whatever, 
depending on what stage they are when they come in and how difficult the labour 
is, and on the patient herself.
5 .4 . FLEXIBLE
Another attribute of the relational quality of time as it is encountered in practice is 
its elasticity. This refers to the flexible and imprecise nature of time, which 
cannot be forced into pre-determined temporal categories. It is unresponsive to
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hard and fast temporal classification. Literature from several disciplines 
contributes to this understanding.
Neumann's (1991) ideas on this flexible sense of time are derived from his analysis 
of matriarchal and patriarchal psychological archetypes. He suggests that the 
perceptions of time associated with matriarchal archetypes are qualitative and 
changing, assuming different qualities during the process of change. This sense of 
time has periods and rhythms, it waxes and wanes, is favourable and unfavourable. 
Sometimes it is unique and concerned with a single occurrence. He calls this 
flexible time moon-time, and contrasts it with inelastic quantitative patriarchal 
time which is abstract and scientific, and has each section of time equal.
Forty years later Harré's & Gillett's (1994) ontology of discursive psychology used 
the similar distinctions between fluid and static time. They suggest that the 
primary entities of discursive psychology are the utterances, or speech-acts. The 
conception of time which they related to these utterances and sign acts - 
psychological time - is fluid and changing. In this usage, time is flexible and 
largely independent of how the clock ticks.
Salmon's (1985) discussion of the role of time in developmental psychology also 
stresses its flexible nature. She suggests that time is perceived as having a 
differential length and a differentiated speed, relating to one's own position in the 
human cycle - in childhood time seems to stretch tediously and limitlessly, but as 
one gets older life often seems to accelerate.
The pertinent point here is not the specific psychological issues these writers are 
addressing, but the fact that in order to develop their ideas it was necessary to 
conceive of time as an elastic entity.
In education, Jarvis (1992e) gives a sense of this impreciseness of time in practice 
in his analysis of the paradoxes of learning. He suggests that time can flow or stop, 
depending on the practical learning situation. In practice, when an individual's 
store of knowledge and skills is sufficient to cope with new experiences, time seems 
to flow by - the person is unaware of its passing. However, if the situation is new 
or when the individual's knowledge is insufficient to cope with the experience, time 
appears to stop. This indicates that perceptions of time are not confined to  
measurable time categories.
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Jarvis (1992b) gives another slant to this flexible attribute of time when 
discussing learning in the apprenticeship situation. He shows how the apprentice 
cabinet maker needs a flexible approach to time in order to see the possibilities that 
lie within the wood, or else the practice is mere 'busywork' - an occupation 
determined by business concerns rather than the practice of cabinet making.
The importance of flexible time in clinical and caring practices has received much 
attention. Davies (1990) argues that care-related practices intrinsically demand 
a flexible approach to time for, while it is possible to estimate in advance that it 
will take three minutes to feed a baby and ten minutes to listen to the emotional 
problems of a patient, to do so and act on that impinges on the quality of the practice. 
This argument is demonstrated by Linden's & English's (1994) study of the cost- 
quality equation in clinical practice. Where time is measured in precise categories, 
it relates to decontextualised skill performance rather than the totality of patient 
care which demands a more flexible approach to time in order to assure quality.
Frankenberg's (1988) analysis of the use of time in hospitals corroborates these 
ideas by suggesting that when the art of healing practices is used, the physician 
meets the sufferer in her own time as a coeval - the time of both patient and 
physicians being of equal value. He juxtaposes this with scientific medicine in 
which the physician distances himself in time from the sufferer by admitting her to 
a hospital where he controls the practices and use of time, and the sufferer is no 
longer an equal, but is treated as being in another time - time which is 'allochronic'. 
While Frankenberg is making a point about the use of power in hospitals, what is of 
interest here is the demonstration this provides of yet another angle on the 
flexibility of time in caring practices. Frankenberg demonstrates this further 
using another tack - that of the indistinction in the demarcation of private and 
public time in the working practices of hospital workers. Through the on-call 
system it is possible for working time to gain an elastic quality to the detriment of 
private time. Davies (1990) demonstrates similarly that in care-giving practices 
public and private time flow into each other, but in her case it occurs when paid 
caring is carried out at the home of the carer. Although for Frankenberg it is the 
status and power of these practices which are of interest, both these studies 
demonstrate this flexible quality in the use of time in practice.
Another use of this flexible approach to time is in the care of oncology patients. 
Good et al (1994) demonstrate how time categories are altered by the blurring of 
future horizons through emphasis on immediacy. It has become a legitimate caring 
practice in oncology to distinctly foreshorten time horizons through discourse.
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narrative and interaction so that some form of hope can be instilled in the sufferers 
'for the moment'. Patients are encouraged to concentrate on immediate needs, 
desires and experiences while concomitantly shaping a potential ending, with the 
effect of bringing the future into the present and enabling the patient to cope more 
easily with their suffering.
As opposed to shortening time, Appleton (1993) found that lengthening time - or 
taking more time over the care of individual patients - was the essential quality of 
creative nursing which enabled patients to distinguish between ordinary encounters 
of caring activities and those which were qualitatively so much better that they were 
described as a 'totally different practice' by the patients.
In this study, this elastic quality of time was discussed extensively and in a variety 
of situations, giving a flavour of the pervasiveness of the attribute.
Karin:
•  Sometimes you can't tell how long things are going to take. You think they are 
going to be really quick and then you start doing it - like a dressing ... you don't 
know what it looks like underneath, you don't know how much it is going to need 
cleaning, you don't know how co-operative the patient is going to be, or you don't 
know what it looks like - you don't necessarily know - you know what dressing 
you're going to put on but you might need extra things, you might need to wait for 
somebody to come and help you.
Kathryn:
•  [The time taken in practice] depends on what patients you've got - whether they 
want to chat to you ... or you might decide to do something else for the patient 
while you are there instead of carrying on with the observations ... When I work 
I don't rigidly say right. I've done that. I'm going on to the next patient. You 
could be held up.
Kate:
•  You try to do total patient care while you're there. If they ask you something 
you wouldn't say well I'm sorry I haven't got time to answer that, you would 
hopefully try and answer the question, ... or have a quick look at something if 
they wanted you to have a look at a wound or something they were worried about. 
So your time is flexible.
Karin:
•  When you're doing a job that involves people, then perhaps there can be more 
things to hold you up ... Nursing is a special case, really, because people, when 
they're ill, they need a bit more care and attention. If someone was not feeling 
very well you need to be a bit more sensitive. You've got to have a trusting and
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good relationship with the patients and a good rapport, and one of the ways that 
you build that up is by spending time with the patient.
5 .5 . PASSIVE
There is a sense of the importance of passivity or waiting in relational time - a 
waiting for time to ripen, or a waiting for the natural pace of events, such as healing 
(Neumann, 1991; Berger & Luckman, 1971). Waiting in this sense changes the 
perception of time, because, although time is allowed to float by, this is not 
construed as passive unemployment, but as a positive and constructive activity in 
caring practice. Davies (1990) suggests that waiting has a special circular and 
diffuse relation to time in that it weaves together different strands - of practice, of 
peoples' lives, of events - by allowing time for things to come together and mature. 
In this sense waiting is not unproductive, even though is difficult to classify in 
terms of quantitative time, being not only unresponsive to hard and fast time 
categories, but beyond them.
Berger & Luckman (1971:41) emphasise the positive aspect of waiting by 
construing it as the intersection or cushioning between "the different levels of 
empirically present temporality in everyday life" - that is, between measured clock 
time which is socially constructed and the natural physiological and psychological 
rhythms of organisms ["cosmic time"]. They suggest that there can never be full 
correspondence between these different levels of time, and that waiting facilitates 
their correlation.
The respondents in this study saw waiting as positive, and integral to their practice. 
Lara gave an interesting example:
•  There was a lady who had a little boy in [as a patient] the other day, and she 
wanted to go and get a coffee, so I literally just presenced myself in the room for 
the time that she was away, so that the little boy knew I was there. I wasn't 
actually doing something for him, but just [being there] so that he knew I was 
there, and the mum knew I was there as well, so I was helping her.
Waiting seemed a particularly important attribute of time in the care of oncology 
patients. Ben's experience with these patients taught him the value of waiting:
•  You take your time with them, you let the patient set the pace ... They can take as 
long as they like, for instance if someone is having a bath and they want to have a
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slosh around and a soak in the bath, then you have to wait, or go away or come 
back or whatever.
Lara:
•  In terminal care you presence yourself, waiting and just being there with them. 
I feel that if I was in their position I'd want somebody with me.
5 .6 . SIMULTANEOUS
The converse of waiting is also found in relational time - instead of time stretching 
seemingly unbounded with no apparent activity, it sometimes contracts so that 
activities occur simultaneously. Again Davies (1990) associates this essentially 
with general caring practices - one looks after the baby while simultaneously 
cooking the dinner.
Eraut (1985), on the other hand, suggests that this immediacy is common in all 
professional practice: time is immediate during the exercise of practice, and the 
professional does not spend time thinking through theoretical ideas while carrying 
out practice activities. Thompson ( 1987:30) goes even further to suggest that the 
practice of doing different things at the same time is part of our modern society.
Smith (1987) contends that this immediacy derives from the nature of the tasks at 
hand. She, too, associates these with caring practices because so often caring is 
related to organic functioning which does not keep to regulated clock time - the 
immediacy of a child falling, a baby needing to be fed, a nappy needing to be changed, 
is evident.
This sense of immediacy is capitalised upon in the care of oncology patients - as 
mentioned above - where the emphasis on the immediacy of everyday realities of 
living is used to shorten the time horizons of these patients in an attempt to foster 
some kind of hope (Good et al, 1994).
In this study this sense of simultaneity resonated with the experiences of the 
respondents. Ben described it thus:
•  You'd be trying to spend some time with a particular patient, getting them 
washed, doing a dressing or whatever, and you're guaranteed that someone in the 
room will say 'Oh, can you get me a commode' or 'My venflon's just come out
89
and I'm bleeding everywhere' or 'I'm being sick everywhere', and so, I mean, 
that happens all the time.
5 .7 . INTERSUBJECTIVE
The intersubjectivity of time refers to the notion that time is negotiated between 
people, so that, rather than being of a predetermined and constant measure, its 
extent is determined by those using it at that particular instance.
This notion of intersubjectivity is fundamental to the interpretation which Schütz 
(1962:xxx) makes of everyday life. He maintains that "the primary grounding of 
our being in the world is in subjective space and time", and, in that we are social 
beings, we share with others a temporal community as well as a community of space. 
This sharing of time involves intersubjectivity and negotiation, which must include 
a subjective dimension in the perception of time which extends beyond the objective 
measurement of clock time.
Berger & Luckman (1971) continue this argument by asserting that the temporal 
dimension of the world of everyday life is only available intersubjectively: that is, 
our understanding of time in the everyday is determined by agreement between the 
individual participants in that everyday life, and this understanding would differ 
across cultures and societies. In this manner they arrive at the notion of a 
'standard time' in each world of everyday life which is determined by the 
intersection between cosmic time, the socially established calendar, the temporal 
sequences of nature, and the inner psychological time of individuals.
Shotter (1975), in discussing psychological images of people, concurs with this 
notion by proposing that social reality is always negotiated between the actors 
involved in the situation, and since there is a temporal category to all social 
interaction, that, too is negotiated. Smith (1979a & 1979b) uses a similar 
argument, although she is discussing a different matter altogether. She makes a 
case for the inclusion of the subjective experience in sociological analysis, and part 
of this argument is that people's temporal [and spatial] co-ordinates are 
intersubjectively determined and therefore the subjective is crucial in any 
analysis.
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The point of interest here is the acknowledgement and wide use of the idea of the 
intersubjectivity of time by writers from various backgrounds.
In clinical practice the intersubjectivity of time operates on various levels. At a 
subliminal level nurses and patients negotiate recovery times which suit individual 
patients and situations as opposed to acknowledged standard times for recovery from 
particular operations. This is demonstrated in a incident related by Benner 
(1984) where a nurse and a patient tacitly negotiate the timing of his readiness to 
learn about caring for his ileostomy. MacLeod (1994) describes similar incidents. 
At an overt level intersubjectivity is most clearly portrayed in the organisational
practices of nurses, where working interactively as a unit is a key element of
nursing practice. Ben described it thus:
•  You definitely have to work as part of a team, so that means that your time
becomes your colleagues' time.
5 .8 . COLLECTIVELY CONTROLLED
Related closely to the issue of intersubjectivity of time is the control of time. 
Control moves from the individual and, becoming 'collective', passes to others or to 
events. Again this is most noticeable in caring practices, where the person being 
cared for - the patient, child, family - is deemed to have a right to lay claim to the 
time of the carer - the nurse, the parent.
Oakley's (1985) study of housework demonstrates this. Although the women 
describe themselves as being master over their time, they describe how their time 
is controlled by events [getting the children to school] and the needs of others 
[feeding baby]. Similarly, Davies's (1990) study shows that women in caring 
roles have very little control over how their time is used - their time becomes 
others' time.
Frankenberg's (1988) analysis of hospital time demonstrates various degrees of 
control over time in practice. He relates this to power within the institution: those 
with the greatest degree of control over their time - physicians, consultants - also 
have the most power, and make the most influential decisions, while those with the 
least control -patients - are the most powerless. Yet during hands-on practice, 
control of time is shared [if not equally] by those participating in the practice
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situation. There are echoes of this in Starkey's (1988) study of industrial control 
where control of an individual's time is seen as a key element in exerting control 
over the individual.
The idea of events controlling the use of time is resonated with the experiences of the 
respondents in this study. Emma :
•  There are certain things that need doing, but then something else might crop up 
- you get a new admission or something, and everything else just goes out of the 
window.
Lara:
•  You're not strictly in control of your time. You might plan your morning but 
then totally have to reorganise i t .... you organise in your own mind what you're 
doing, but you have to change, you have to be flexible.
5.9 . RHYTHMIC
Relational time has a rhythm intrinsic to that to which it is related. It is dictated 
by and responsive to the events and experiences of the people participating in it and 
has a rhythm natural to the particular situation in which the practice is based. 
Thompson (1967) indicates that this is the most prevalent in non-industrialised 
societies, where timing is dictated by the rhythms of nature - the tides, the seasons. 
Davies (1990) suggests this to be true for women's caring practices [babies feeding 
times have an intrinsic rhythm], as does Oakley (1985) in her housewives study - 
the rhythm of the daily/weekly chores.
In this study the respondents found that the various practices themselves had an 
intrinsic rhythm which determined their use of time.
Emma:
•  You get carried along on this wave of doing all the work and getting everybody up 
and washed and somehow the day is gone.
These rhythms are inherent in the practices themselves. At times they are obvious, 
such as the timing of events mentioned by Emma, and at other times practitioners 
develop the sensitivity to detect them and work with them, as illustrate in this 
nursing narrative:
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The patient was in his mid-eighties when he was admitted to our 'geriatric' unit. 
He was in a deep coma and it was obvious from the day he arrived that he was 
never going to recover consciousness. There was no problem about the nursing 
care he required ... The problem was the care we needed to give his wife ... She 
had a compulsive feeling that she must stay with him until the end, whatever the 
cost to herself. As the days went on it became apparent that, although his death 
was inevitable, it was by no means imminent, and we explained this to her, for 
the protracted vigil was obviously having a very serious effect on her. She 
insisted on staying with him all day and every night... Every day he grew a little 
weaker, and she did too ... We were all aware of her need to be with him and the 
guilt she might feel if she left him, but we also knew that she too would die, 
possibly before him, if we could not persuade her to consider her own health ... 
There came a day when her daughter sat in my office, at the end of her tether and 
begged me, 'I know I'm going to lose my father. I'm prepared for that. But if you 
don't get my mother to come home I'm going to lose her too .... There must be 
someone she would listen to.' ... That's when I realised who her mother would 
listen to. My only problem was ... how to make him speak. I walked into the 
patient's room and stood looking down at him with his wife. I said: 'I never knew 
your husband. I don't know what sort of man he was, or how he thought, or how 
you spoke to each other, or what sort of life you had together. I can't help 
wondering, if he could see you now, sitting here pale and exhausted, what do you 
think he would say to you?' There was a long, long silence. When she spoke ... 
she just said: 'Go on home, you daft old thing, there's nowt to be done here.' 
After she'd said it I put my arm around her... and I went to ring her daughter to 
fetch her home. (Stirling, 1992:25)
5 .1 0 . INTRINSICALLY BOUNDED
The final attribute of relational time is that it has boundaries. These boundaries 
occur in two forms: those extrinsic to the practice to hand, where previously 
determined time limits are imposed upon the practice, and those intrinsic to it, 
where the practice activity itself dictates the time boundaries of the practice, and no 
strictly measurement can be applied.
Frankenberg (1988 ) alludes to these extrinsic boundaries in the sense of 
scheduling - nurses go off-duty, ward rounds and clinics have fixed boundaries.
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Some of the participants in this study also referred to this overt sense of time 
boundary:
Emma:
•  There is a set time when you go for your break and you're expected to have done 
quite a lot before that so there is pressure to get everything done in a set time.
While this type of boundary is prevalent in the organisation of practice, it has more 
in common with homogeneous, theoretical time than with the time boundaries 
inherent in the actual practices themselves.
Closer to the essence of practice temporality, however, is the more subtle intrinsic 
time boundary. Smith (1979b) gives a sense of this in her discussion the 
boundaries between practical and theoretical time. Following on from Schutz's 
(1962 ) argument of each province of meaning having its own specific time 
perspective. Smith argues that each occasion or event has its own temporal 
structure - with its own boundaries - and participants pass from one to another 
much as in science fiction a box which is entered turns out to have a wall which 
opens into another time dimension. For Smith, every event has such boundaries, 
and people move between theoretical time perspectives and practical time 
perspectives continually, as she demonstrates in an analysis of a meeting.
Davies's (1990) illustrates this intrinsic boundary in her study on care work. A 
home help describes how she would sit on the edge of the bed of one of her clients for 
half an hour after her working hours were over and not claim overtime, as she felt 
her job was not yet complete - the boundary had not yet been reached. Davies 
concludes that care work is beyond the boundaries of clock time.
In practice these types of boundaries meet, and sometimes are in conflict- there is 
pressure to accomplish certain things within a particular time boundary, yet the 
intrinsic boundary of that activity has perhaps not yet been reached. The sense of 
tension between these two is suggested by Ben:
•  You have got a certain time restraint to do your work in ... It doesn't have to be 
done in that time, yet everyone feels that certain jobs have to be done during the 
early shift, and certain jobs must be done on the late shift. You do have certain 
boundaries.
Sensing these boundaries is integral to relational time in practice, as illustrated by 
Davies's home help. In this study Beth discussed the consequences of transgressing 
these time boundaries:
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•  And sometimes you come away from work and you think: no job satisfaction, 
because you don't feel you spent enough time thinking about the patient and 
[practising] as a whole.
The conflict between these two boundaries of time are illustrated in a nursing 
narrative:
•  It was a typical night shift, and it was too busy with too few staff ... I was 'doing 
the controlled drugs' and there were so many, taking so much time. Jimmy took 
the bitter elixir and pleaded: 'Will you sit with me please?' His eyes, always 
wide and staring as if searching for the next gasp of air, seemed full of fear that 
night. I reached out, squeezed his hand, so thin, so pale. Two buzzers echoed 
through the ward. 'I'll come back Jimmy,' I said gently ... I closed the door, 
answered the bells, doled out more morphine. The agency nurse appeared just 
as I was grabbing a coffee. 'The old man, Jimmy, he's gone. He's dead.' Jimmy 
was sitting bolt upright, eyes still open, still watching the door, still waiting for 
someone to return. Jimmy's was an expected death ... We laid him down and 
composed his limbs ... He had been unable to wait for the scrap of time I had 
promised him ... I had failed Jimmy because I had been too ashamed to admit that 
I needed help during a very busy night shift. I had turned and changed 
[patients], sedated and relieved physical pain - but I had let an old man die alone. 
(Fowler, 1992:45)
This narrative demonstrates the extrinsic time boundaries of the organisation of 
practice - the drugs needed to be dispensed at specific times - and the intrinsic 
boundaries of other practices - the timing of being with a dying patient is intrinsic 
to the activity itself, it is not externally determined, and the conflict that can arise 
between the two.
5 .11 . CONCLUSION
In setting out the various features of a conception of time which is different to the 
objective, measured time of theory, this analysis contends that time, as experienced 
in practice, is qualitatively different to that experienced in theory. It is claimed 
that practical time is relational, in that it exists essentially in relation to other 
aspects of practice. Some of these relationships are illuminated by the attributes 
discussed above. This is juxtaposed with the linear, objective and measurable time 
of theory.
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Practice time has also been identified as heterogeneous in the literature, and the 
attributes of relational time also give an indication of this heterogeneous nature.
The drawing of this dichotomy is an attempt to articulate the nature of practical 
time. It is not suggested that practical and theoretical time are mutually exclusive 
in the exercising of practical activities - as demonstrated in the discussion on 
boundaries. They can and do exist concurrently, but often such situations produce 
conflict, particularly in caring practices (Davies 1990).
The aim of this analysis is to map out the essence of a practice temporality, and in 
doing so to indicate that theory and practice differ in the temporal structures they 
employ. This relational temporality of practice forms part of the framework of 
practice against which the connections between theory and practice can be seen.
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CHAPTER 6
CONTEXTUALITY
6 .1 . INTRODUCTION
Practice essentially occurs in a context. To attempt to practice outwith an 
environment is incongruous. Theory, on the other hand, is abstracted, deliberately 
decontextualised in order that it can be used across various contexts and 
environments. Theory isolates and distils ideas from the world, while practice is 
fundamentally embedded in the world. Practice is concerned with the context of the 
individual person or situation. This context has an effect on that practice, and 
consequently practice is modified. This process operates at various levels, which 
results in practice being specific to particular contexts. Hence practice has limited 
use for the notion of generalisability which concerns abstracted theory.
The drawing of this dichotomy between theory and practice does not imply that 
practice is atheoretical, but that theory is part of the context of practice, and 
consequently subject to modification in the same manner as all other aspects of 
practice.
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A nursing narrative demonstrates this:
•  I approached the first bed which was occupied by a female patient who appeared 
depressed and untidy, probably around 50 years old. I knew she had been ill and 
in various hospitals for over two months ... Together we discussed her care. She 
was difficult to engage in conversation and catching sight of a photograph of a 
young boy of about two years old I asked her: 'And who's this little fellow?' ... 
Her eyes filled with tears as she said: 'He's my son and ... I've not seen him for 
over two months. He doesn't know who his mum is.' It transpired that Jean was 
only 35 ... She had been acutely ill and ... had undergone two major operations 
within three weeks. During all this time she had not seen her son once, because 
children under 14 were not allowed on the ward! ... We made a plan. I was the 
senior nurse on duty on the Wednesday evening. We arranged for her husband to 
bring Paul to the ward then. No one, I promised her, would stop her from seeing 
her son. On the day Jean spent time smartening up her appearance; she was 
animated with anticipation. Paul duly arrived ... Proudly his mother held him 
by the hand and introduced him individually to the other women in the ward ... 
Jean's comment to me after Paul's visit was simply this ...'Nurse, I can now 
remember why I need to get better. Thank you.' Jean did get better and she 
went home, but the incident stays vividly in my memory ... Nursing is about 
individuals, not about rules. (Tate, 1992:26)
To the narrator, the rule represents 'theory' - a generalisation created for good 
reasons, but the practice, being concrete and related to this particular situation, is 
formulated in this context and thus differed from the rule which was intended to  
govern such situations in general.
The importance of contextuality in practice, and its consequent juxtaposition in 
theory, becomes more evident as the concept of contextuality is explored. Some of 
the ideas around this concept of contextuality which serve to develop an 
understanding of its manifestation in practice, are now discussed.
6.2 . CONCRETE
The context of practice is located in the concrete. It essentially concerns real 
activities, particular people and specific things, and the detail surrounding these at
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a fundamental level, whereas theory draws back from the concrete in order to be 
concerned with the general.
Castell (1989:40) gives a philosophical illustration of this separation. She 
contrasts, after Havelock, the Greek world of Homer with that of Plato. Homer's 
world is concerned with the concrete, with actual particulars, whereas Plato's 
world has moved to the realm of general ideas. Plato is not concerned with the 
things of the city, but with the city itself, not with the just or the unjust act, but 
with justice itself. Thus the transition is made from " a world of 'doings' to a world 
of 'things', from 'people-acting-in-a-setting' to things in themselves." This 
illustrates the process of abstraction whereby theory removes itself from this 
"world of 'doings' " in order to be concerned with "things in themselves".
Gorovitz & MacIntyre (1976) suggest that this contextual distinction between 
theory and practice is at the root of the inability of laws to predict outcomes - while 
laws govern the behaviour of hurricanes and salt marshes, for instance, it is 
ignorance of the environmental context which leads to the inability to understand 
perfectly their particular behaviour. Hence theory can have no more than a certain 
degree of predictive success in the context of actual practice. They suggest that 
theory is interested in what certain entities have in common, since the similarities 
support the generalisations, whereas the practitioner is interested in what is 
distinctive about them, as it is the particulars which are of crucial importance in 
practice.
Smith (1987:89) argues the same point, but from the opposite angle, when she 
discusses being able to participate in the conceptual activities of theorising as 
opposed to participating in occupational practices. She suggests that the concrete 
context of practice differs radically from the abstraction of theory almost to the 
point of mutual exclusion:
If he [the conceptualiser] is to participate fully in the abstract mode of action, then 
he must be liberated also from having to attend to his needs, etc. in the concrete 
and particular.
In the nursing arena, Visintainer (1986: 34) recognises the decontextual nature of 
theory, and proposes its consequent irrelevance in practice until it becomes 
contextualised. She suggests that:
what particular theory may be used to understand the problem or to manipulate the 
condition depends on what is wrong with a particular person at a particular time 
and what human function is most in need of manipulation.
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For her it is the concrete and particular nature of practice which is paramount in 
defining the domain of nursing and hence its relation to theory.
McCaugherty (1991a:540) shares this view on the contextualising of theory in the 
field of nursing education. Since practice concerns the particular and the concrete, 
theory is best used in relation to a particular situation and the best focus for 
teaching nursing care is the particular patient. He suggests that in this way 
"generalisations 'come to life', and specific examples can be seen in context." It is 
possible to infer from this that in order for theory to be useful in practice, it has to 
lose one of its defining characteristics - its generalisability - and become 
contextual in a concrete and particular mode.
The claims of both of theses writers underscores the contention that practice can 
only be understood in the concrete and particular.
This is borne out in a study undertaken by Kosowski (1995:237) of how nursing 
students learned to become caring practitioners. She found that it was impossible 
for the students to recall caring practices in general or in abstraction. Caring 
practices were so deeply embedded in particular concrete interactions that in order 
to practice caring, or even recall it, attention had to be paid to these particular 
details and situations.
A similar position is recounted in this study by Emma, who describes her abstract, 
theoretical learning about breathlessness and contrasts it with the concrete 
situation of practice:
•  [In theory] you know what would happen, but it's just not the same. You know 
that if you had a patient who had breathing problems, you could possibly imagine 
that they had problems talking to you, but I didn't think that I would be so 
worried about them. When I was talking to somebody who had breathing 
problems I was constantly worrying about whether he was going to collapse or 
something, because he couldn't breathe properly, but you can't really appreciate 
that when its only a problem in the abstract.
Ben succinctly suggested:
•  Practice is related to things and to people and to what is actually happening.
In comparing her clinical learning with her theoretical learning Karin said:
•  In the ward situation it is the details you're trying to learn.
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6 .3 . SITUATED
Related to the notion of the concreteness of the practice context is the idea that the 
context of practice is situational, as opposed to the isolation of theory. While 
theory is concerned with narrowly defined, abstracted notions, practice is concerned 
with a wholeness of all the things impinging on the situation - the gestalt of the 
practical circumstances. Thus context involves not only the minute detail of the 
concrete and particular, but also the whole picture of the entire situation - the 
situatedness.
Dreyfus (1980) makes this argument when discussing scientific practices which 
involve a kind of know-how derived from the total situation which cannot be 
captured by strict rules - in opposition to scientific theory, which comprises strict 
rules. Following Kuhn (1962) and Polanyi (1967), he suggests that these skills 
are learned, in an apprenticeship manner, as part of the context in which they 
originate. They cannot be acquired from textbooks, nor can they be decontextualised 
like the context-free physical properties they reveal. Practice, therefore, only 
has meaning in specific situations. Dreyfus contends that this is particularly 
important in human sciences which have to deal with the human context - to remove 
it from its situatedness restricts the understanding of it, as the situation is internal 
to the science itself.
This argument is similar to that used by Usher & Bryant (1989) in debating the 
practices of the spectrum of adult educators [from the full-time professional 
educator to those whose activities have repercussions for adult learning]. Their 
position is that each practice is situated in its own particular context, and because of 
this situatedness of practice, there are differences between practitioners' roles and, 
consequently, the specific meanings that they and others attach to their practice. 
Additionally, in order to practice effectively, the practitioner needs to have a 
situational or contextual knowledge, as each context has its own distinctive features 
which will provide possibilities and impose constraints on what can be done. 
Cervero (1988) contends similarly that teachers' practices and the knowledge 
derived from these practices are situation-specific. Clearly, for Cervero and Usher 
& Bryant it would be impossible to conceptualise any practice outwith its situation.
Stanley & Wise (1983:34) suggest the situatedness of practices by comparing it 
with the detachment of grand theory. While they agree that the neatness, simplicity
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and elegance of such theories is impressive, they are concerned that "the only thing 
wrong with them is that they don't 'work' " in practice.
This problem of theories not 'working' in practice because they are not situation- 
related has been well documented in the field of nursing, and is one of the major 
concerns informing the theory-practice gap debate. Wong (1979) identifies this 
inability to transfer theoretical knowledge from the classroom to the practice area 
as manifested in an inability of the students to problem-solve, and as rigidity and 
inflexibility, fragmentation and apathy in the practice of the students. Her 
approach to the issue, however, is rather traditional - she sees it as a problem in 
need of remedial action by way of transfer learning theories. Looking at the 
problem from the point of view of acontextualisation versus situatedness throws 
another light on it: theory, necessarily couched in abstract, generalised terms, is 
not designed to be 'transferred' directly to the particular situation of individual 
practice. Skeet's & Thompson's (1985) case study gives a pertinent example of 
this: students' knowledge was so acontextualised that they were immobilised in 
practice situations, necessitating a reconceptalisation of the entire curriculum.
Greenwood (1993a) sees the situatedness of practice as one of the major reasons 
why nurses form 'fuzzy representations' of practical concepts and mental schemata, 
as opposed to the clear-cut schemata of theoretical concepts. She suggests that the 
context influences the categorisation of concepts and schemata, causing clear-cut, 
distinctly categorised theory where there is no situatedness to muddy the water, and 
fuzzy categorisation of practice concepts because they are affected by the various 
situations of practice.
Maeve (1994) would find points of agreement in that analysis as her contention is 
that actual practice is different from theories of practice because each reality is 
generated from different people living in different worlds, and therefore the reality 
of practice is necessarily situated in the particular contexts of these different 
worlds. This is similar to the analysis of practice that Benner (1984) proposes by 
demonstrating that expertise in nursing is contextual, since an expert nurse 
becomes a novice again when she moves to a new area of practice.
A rationale for Benner's findings might be suggested in Visintainer's (1986 )  
discussion of the use of nursing knowledge. Visintainer argues that it is impossible 
to determine what theory's application dominates over another in nursing practice 
because practice is so situation-dependent that the relevant knowledge needed to 
accomplish it is equally situation-dependent.
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In this study Lara told how the performance of the same task changed according to the 
context in which she was working:
•  You might be taking someone's temperature on an adult ward and they understand 
easily why you're taking it, where it's taken. They've got some basic 
background knowledge about why you're doing it and how you do it. But on a 
children's ward you might have to put it under teddy's arm before you put it 
under the little boy's arm, so that's because of the context in which you're doing 
it, but you're doing the same task.
Ben saw the situatedness of practice in the inability to precisely apply the theory he 
learned in practice:
•  [Practice] is a situational thing, 'cos you might not always be able to do things 
strictly to theory like you've been taught to do, simply 'cos you've got other 
things happening all around you and you've got other things that are more urgent 
that you need to attend to, and loads of other little jobs. So yea, it can be very 
situational.
6 .4 . INDIVISIBLE
Not only is practice situation-dependent, it is also dependent on the person who is 
carrying out the practice activities. Whereas theory, being independent, is not 
influenced by the theoretician - germ theory as a cause of disease remains the same 
no matter who is espousing it - practice is indivisible from the practitioner.
Smith (1987 ) makes this point in tracing the development of objectivity in 
sociology. She submits that in order to become sociologists, graduate students learn 
to discard their experienced world as reliable sources of information and to confine 
insights within the conceptual frameworks of the given discipline. In this way 
theory separates the knower from what she knows and from the situation 
determining her knowing. In practice, however, the two cannot be separated since 
the practitioner is part of the situation [in the broadest sense] in which she is 
practising, and this must therefore have some bearing on what she knows.
An illustration of how practices are indivisible from the practitioner is given in a 
nursing narrative. The nurse is faced with a situation for which she has not been
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prepared theoretically, nevertheless she derives the practice she engages in from 
her experiences and her own response to the situation:
•  [On a woman's surgical ward] one of my allocated patients was a young woman
with recently diagnosed inoperable breast cancer. I knew no more about her 
than this. A consultant ward round was in progress, during which she was to 
learn her diagnosis/prognosis. While the doctors were with her, I hovered 
outside her room ... After several minutes they left her room, leaving her alone 
with the knowledge they had just imparted. At this point the temptation to find 
something else to do was great... but I was suddenly aware that this would be an 
important encounter for us both. I knocked on her door and waited to be invited 
in ... I sat beside her on her bed. She said: 'They have just told me everything.' 
I rapidly scanned my woefully inadequate previous experiences of dealing with 
this kind of situation. I found myself saying a feeble sounding: 'I am very 
sorry.' ... Never in my training had I been taught to say this. I held her hand 
and we made eye contact. My urge to leave this to someone else evaporated. She 
cried and raged in the following hour. We talked about her life ... Later she 
thanked me for what I had done. (Allen, 1992:39)
An appreciation of this indivisibility of practice and practitioner underlies the 
contention of Usher & Bryant (1989) that practitioners can have different 
understandings and meanings of their practice to that of their colleagues as a result 
of the situatedness of practice.
In this study Ben found an interesting way of expressing this inseparability of the 
practitioner and the practice:
Nursing is not a job that you go to carry out, it's vocational. You are a nurse 
and you take all of you to work... You don't go to work and suddenly you go into 
your office mode - you take your whole self to work ... You are always a nurse - 
or a carer.
6.5. CONNECTED
While theory exists in a situationally isolated manner, practice is connected - to 
other practitioners, other practices, other situations, activities and processes - in 
an inextricable way which influences the way it is discharged. This connectedness
- 104
of practice contributes to its efficacy, whereas detachment is a strength of theory, 
enabling generalisation.
A sense of this contrast is given by Neumann (1991:216) in the analysis he gives of 
patriarchal and matriarchal consciousnesses. Theory can be likened to patriarchal 
consciousness which embodies
the processes of abstraction, which assist in the free disposal and application of 
ideas and ... lead to the manipulation of abstractions, like numbers in mathematics 
and concepts in logic. In the psychological sense such abstractions are in the 
highest degree without emotional content.
Practice, on the other hand, can be said to be akin to matriarchal consciousness, 
which is expressed in "diversified branchings" which are never divorced from 
other activities, moods, the unconscious and situations. As opposed to the "free 
disposal and application of ideas" practice needs to be adapted according to the 
situation, suggesting that it is intricately connected to each situation and that these 
connections are not identical to each other - hence the need for adaptation. Were 
this not so, ideas could be simply applied - templated on - to a practical situation 
without adaptation, which Neumann suggests is not the case.
Carr (1986) shares this idea of the interconnection of practice in the field of 
educational practice. His point is that educational practice is not carried out in an 
unthinking, robot-like manner, but by individuals who execute it with 
intentionality and within a social situation. Practice is therefore linked to the 
thinking processes of individuals and their social contexts, and cannot be acquired in 
isolation.
Connectedness is an important theme in nursing, and the nursing literature is 
replete with debates and case studies where the interconnectedness of practice is 
shown to be so important that some writers suggest that the learning of nursing 
practice cannot take place effectively anywhere but in practice. Darcy (1975) 
shows that learners cannot learn in isolation because nursing practice is connected 
to all other activities of the hospital, and therefore the learning of practice must be 
as dynamic as the practice itself.
Ingram (1994 ) puts forward a similar argument, but uses as justification 
Carper's (1978) analysis of the four ways of knowing - empirics, aesthetics, 
personal and ethics. He suggests that nursing practice can only be taught/learned 
in a practical context because practice involves more than prepositional knowledge 
- involves the linking of all four of Carper's ways of knowing. His demonstration of
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this, using the Glasgow Coma Scale for assessing patients' levels of consciousness, 
shows this connectedness of nursing practice.
Gurnard's (1992 :166) study of student nurses' learning demonstrates the 
perceptions of learners that most learning about nursing occurs in the clinical 
setting. The students commented that other learning was "in an artificial 
environment; you are always aware that it is a game", because it is not linked to 
other events, actions and people.
Dalmiya & Alcoff (1993) illustrate the connectedness of a form of learning 
undertaken by midwives which includes the telling of stories to one another about 
experiences of childbirth. The advantage of learning through story-telling is that 
stories provide connected information - background information, scene-setting and 
detail on all aspects of the practice in an interlinked manner- which shows the 
practice as connected to other aspects of practice and general life.
Maeve (1994) takes the argument for the connectedness of practice even further in 
her assertion that nursing practice is personal and can only be demonstrated, not 
taught, as the theoretical knowledgebase propounded as the core of nursing does not 
meet the reality of practice. Clinical practice is 'knowing how' and this is personal 
and dependent on connected, contextualised experience.
In this study Karin echoes Neumann's ideas of connection and hence adaptation, by 
explaining that:
•  Everything that you do is influenced by everything else around you and you never 
do anything in isolation. You always adapt things that you do according to the 
situation that you're in.
6 .6 . SOCIALLY CONSTRUCTED
Another attribute of the contextuality of practice is that it is socially constructed. 
It occurs within a certain social milieu which influences its activities. While an 
abstract theory remains the same across various social contexts, the activities 
undertaken in relation to practice may differ in accordance with the social context. 
This argument derives its pertinence from the notion that practice is connected to 
the everyday, which is largely socially defined. Heidegger noted this by
- 106 -
distinguishing between the uses of scientific laws and theories and the world of 
practical coping. Magee (1987:261), in discussing Heidegger’s ideas on meaning, 
puts it thus:
So you shouldn't expect that scientific theory, which can explain context-free  
causal relations very well, could ever explain the everyday meaningful world of 
significance that Heidegger describes.
It is this meaningful everyday world which is necessarily defined socially, and is the 
social context of practice.
The idea of socially embedded practice has been addressed by many writers. Smith, 
(1988) in discussing skills and competencies associated with practical training, 
makes the case that these all have social meaning in that they express common 
systems and ways of acting which are understood by the members of a certain 
society. The processes are already a social phenomenon as they embody common 
understandings, rites and usages already rooted in the particular society. Thus 
practice is embedded in the social context, and comprehending it involves an 
awareness of society, and the rules and customs within it.
The work of Argyris & Schon (1974) supports this notion by arguing that engaging 
in situations of practice is essential for professional learning. As it is impossible 
to engage in practice situations without some idea - at whatever level - of the social 
rootedness of these situations, this reasoning supports the idea that practice is 
context-driven.
In a similar vein Dreyfus (1980) shows that social practices are only meaningful 
against a background of shared practices. These practices occur against a taken- 
for-granted background of habits, customs and everyday interactions, which can 
only be presumed precisely because they are socially constructed.
In a nursing context, Clare (1993) argues that nursing practice is socially 
constructed even to the extent of nurses accepting socially constructed hegemonies 
which, she argues, teaches that nurses should accept unquestioningly the routine 
practices and utilisations of knowledge created by others, although at times this is at 
variance with their own experience.
In this study Jo referred to the socially constructed real-life world of the hospital, 
where a parent, understanding the social implications of a child being in hospital, 
displays feelings of anxiety, and she compares it with the artificiality of role play of 
theory which formed part of her learning session:
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When you see the parent crying, and they're so upset, stroking the child's hand, 
it gets you and you just become more aware, perhaps of how sensitive the 
situation is and how there is so much feeling wrapped up in it so you take care of 
them both ... You try putting yourself in the situation when somebody is reading 
it out to you [role play], and you can't use all your cues which will be in the 
surroundings of the hospital and be in the situation. It just does not mean that 
much. You can try and put it into a role play, but in real life the feelings are 
there and they're so obviously genuine. That's what is incorporated in the 
practical situation - it's real life, it's taking place now and it means a lot more 
than if you were role-playing it.
6 .7 . DIVERSE
The context of practice is not the clear-cut, defined and hence known context of 
theory. The context of practice is diverse, complex, varied, unpredictable and at 
times confusing. Its complexities on occasion cannot be known or allowed for in 
advance, and are generated from and bound to the context of the practice. This 
contrasts with the controlled and organised environment of theory - or as Magee 
(1987:261) puts it in paraphrasing Heidegger:
To get to the predicates and laws of science you have to leave out the level of 
practical coping in the world.
Usher & Bryant (1989) argue that the complexity of practice has a direct bearing 
on the actions of practice. These complexities derive from the distinctive features 
of each situation and the consequent possibilities and constraints on what can be done 
in that social situation. Thus the situational or contextual knowledge which the 
practitioner needs to have in order to practice effectively, includes an awareness of 
these complexities and their implications for action. As these practice complexities 
relate to particular situations, they differ from theoretical complications which are 
largely internal to the theory, and not derived from external situations.
In the practice of nursing McCaugherty (1991b) maintains that these complexities 
and diversities derive from the fact that the clinical setting or hospital ward is an 
ever-changing environment [as opposed to the stability of defined, abstracted 
theory]. Added to this is the notion that nursing is not an exact science in that there 
will always be more than one way in which to meet any objective. This causes
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practice to be more complex and varied than any theoretical description of it, and 
perhaps confusingly different from the theory of it. An appreciation of this leads 
Grypdonck (1980) to suggest that the limitations, imperfections and unacceptable 
situations - the "horrors" of nursing - are all part of the complex frame of 
reference of what constitutes nursing practice.
While (1994 ) recognises that practice in real life occurs in complicated and 
challenging situations, and uses this to support her argument that the assessment of 
performance in practice is thus a difficult process, and should be based on the 
practitioner's performance in real-life clinical settings, and not upon artificially 
isolated competencies.
In the same vein Clare (1993) suggests that students are well aware that "real" 
practice is complex and unpredictable, and therefore, while overtly complying with 
"classroom"-oriented training, they actually place more emphasis on the knowledge 
they derive from their own clinical experiences.
6 .8 . CONCLUSION
From this discussion it can be concluded that contextuality in practice exists at 
various levels - from the minute detail of the concrete and particular, to the 
broader gestalt of its situatedness, which includes the notion of the inseparability of 
the knower and the known. All these ideas are inextricably interconnected, which 
give a total picture of contextuality as being varied and complex.
In presenting this discussion of contextuality, an attempt has been made to indicate 
that contextuality is a discriminator against which the differences between theory 
and practice can be shown. While theory is deliberately acontextual in order for it 
to achieve its aims of generalisability, practice is essentially contextual, and to 
decontextualise it is to render it almost meaningless. Some attributes of its 
contextuality have been shown which give some indication of the extent to which 
practice is context-driven.
This contextuality of practice has implications for the teaching and learning of 
practice, some issues around which have been mentioned briefly. These will be 
referred to again later.
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In drawing this distinction between theory and practice, this analysis attempts to 
indicate further features of a conceptual framework of practice against which the 
connections between theory and practice can be seen.
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CHAPTER 7
KNOWLEDGE
7.1 . INTRODUCTION
The debate about what counts as knowledge is one of the oldest in epistemology. This 
has been expanded in recent times by considerations of non-propositional 
knowledge, variously known as tacit or personal knowledge, practical knowledge, 
theories-in-use, praxis, experiential knowledge or know-how by such luminaries 
as Polanyi, Ryle, Kuhn, Oakeshott, Habermas, Dreyfus, TW Moore, Argyris & 
Schon, Nyiri & Smith. The purpose of this chapter is not to debate the existence, 
merit or nature of this non-propositional knowledge, but rather to show various 
attributes of a knowledge which is used by practitioners in practice as a contrast to 
the knowledge used in theory.
Distinctions between various kinds of knowledge are abundant in the literature, and 
these provide a background for this discussion on the knowledge used in practice. 
Various differentiations have been made which assist in articulating the nature of 
the knowledge employed by practice as opposed to theory. Toulmin (1976 ) 
proposes a grid of broad reference points to indicate these different types of
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knowledge: abstract opposing concrete; theoretical versus practical; pure or 
applied; general opposing particular; mathematical contrasting with historical; 
collective or personal. While this is by no means an exhaustive analysis, it gives 
an indication of the contrast between the knowledge of theory and that of practice.
The analysis of people-working professions given by Bennett & Hokenstad (1973) 
claims that the knowledge base of such professions has been criticised traditionally 
as being underdeveloped. They assert that this stems from a simplistic notion of 
knowledge as it relates to practice, and, in a more comprehensive analysis of 
knowledge used in practice, they include the more unusual forms of knowledge such 
as intuition, interpersonal skills, rule making knowledge, techniques of helping, as 
well as the usual forms of substantive and prepositional knowledge. These forms of 
knowledge are important because
In the human services, the object is the client himself, his personality, behaviour 
or relationships, rather than a third party or thing such as a law suit, a viral 
disease, a set of blueprints, or an engineering proposal. (Bennett & Hokenstad, 
1973:22 )
This knowledge, however, is not easily articulated, but becomes visible through 
narratives and practice activities. The following narrative serves as an 
illustration:
•  Annie was wheeled into the ward in a very distressed condition, screaming what 
sounded like 'heart attack soon!' She had been transferred from the local 
general hospital, [having recently had] a second cerebro-vascular accident, 
which had left her hemiplegic, dysphasic and confused. I arranged for a doctor 
to examine Annie, and noticed, to my surprise, that her eyes seemed very lively 
and alert; she watched everything we did. She seemed to be listening to our 
requests and explanations and sometimes when she moved her more mobile side, 
it coincided with our instructions. This puzzled me and I mentioned it to the 
doctor, who said that we could not fully assess Annie's abilities until we received 
her scan report. In the meantime I decided to find out more about Annie. She 
had lived until her recent stoke in a nursing home where she had been well liked 
by both staff and residents. She had been dysphasic since her first stroke, and 
to ensure she kept people's attention while she struggled to formulate an answer, 
she would often say 'answer that soon.' This simple information made 
everything clear... Annie was still struggling to communicate ... I returned to 
Annie and took her hand. I told her that I knew that she understood and that it 
was difficult for her to talk to me, but that together we would find ways of 
talking without having to use words. Annie relaxed immediately and her cry of
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'answer that soon' became softer. The scan report became less important and 
when it arrived it simply confirmed the diagnosis. It gave my confidence a 
considerable boost to discover that my nursing observations could provide at 
least as much information on a patient's mental functioning as a sophisticated 
machine. I made a communication chart for her, using words and pictures to 
help her indicate her needs by pointing at the chart. Involving Annie in little, 
everyday decisions such as what to wear, what to eat, when to have a bath, helped 
put her in control... I now use this knowledge to teach other nurses, carers and 
relatives. (Maclsaac, 1993:43)
There are various ways to categorise the knowledge this narrator used, - for 
example, tacit, practical, experiential - some of which have been mentioned. The 
following discussion deals with the attributes of knowledge of most significance in 
nursing practice, in order to provide a contrast with the abstract, pure, 
generalised, objective and detached knowledge of theory.
7 .2 . SUBJECTIVE
Theoretical knowledge is concerned with certainty, objectivity and generalisability 
(Popkin & Stroll, 1986). Practical knowledge, on the other hand involves 
subjectivity, so that the circumstances and individuality of the knower are integral 
to the knowledge. Schütz (1962) refers to this as the intersubjectivity of 
knowledge, and uses it as a cornerstone in his analysis of knowledge of social reality 
and everyday life. Without this intersubjectivity, common-sense would be 
impossible, and everyday life would lose the taken-for-granted quality which makes 
it possible. Berger & Luckman (1971), drawing on Schütz and extending this in 
their sociology of knowledge, claim that it is this very intersubjectivity that 
enables us to interact and communicate in the practical world, and this, unlike 
theoretical knowledge, requires no additional verification beyond acknowledgement 
of its existence.
From this is derived the interpretive approach to knowledge, which suggests that 
knowledge is constituted and sustained through the interpretive activities of the 
individual members, and these activities do not occur in some independent reality, 
but are part of the subjective experiences of the members. These meanings and 
knowledges thus created are therefore subjective (Carr & Kemmis, 1986).
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Code (1993) goes so far as to say that all knowledge is subjective, in that what is 
known by the knower must necessarily include the identity, interests and 
circumstances [the subjective elements] of the knower as part of that knowledge. 
The illusion of objectivity, universality and perspectivelessness in knowledge can 
only be sustained when considering knowledge of everyday simple objects such as 
sticks, apples and patches of colour. In areas of knowing others. Code argues, there 
is no justifiable reason for ignoring the subjectivity of knowledge, particularly 
since in the field of human knowledge acquisition most of our knowledge is 
interactive and dependent on others. From this is developed standpoint 
epistemologies which, in acknowledging the social and historical context of 
particular knowers, seek to validate some of the discredited subjective perspectives 
on knowledge. This, according to Harding (1993) does not suggest that all ideas of 
objective knowledge must be given up, leaving only relativity to be embraced, but 
rather that all other forms of knowledge are strengthened because unexamined 
assumptions are articulated.
Further arguments for the subjectivity of practical knowledge come from those who 
acknowledge the role that power and the prevailing hegemony play in determining 
what counts as knowledge (Foucault, 1980; Lerner, 1986; Whitbeck, 1992; Alcoff 
& Potter, 1993). If knowledge were objective and independent, power would not be 
a factor in determining it. This is particularly important in nursing practice 
where the prevailing hegemony is theoretical knowledge and science (Clare, 1993), 
and this contributes to the invisibility of nursing practice.
In research terms Collin (1981) reasons that the knowledge of research results 
cannot be dealt with as separate from the researcher - the self is integral to the 
knowing, and consequently must embrace the subjective.
Collins & Fielder (1981) make a strong case for the subjectivity of knowledge in 
nursing practice by arguing that the knowledge required in caring is not necessarily 
the knowledge of empirical generalisations, but rather knowledge of people's 
uniqueness and of particulars [i.e. specific persons and events], and a sensitivity to 
their subjective, inner life, which can only be known on a subjective basis.
In this study the participants recognised the subjective origin of the knowledge they 
use in practice. Kathryn suggested:
•  [This knowledge] is not something that you have necessarily learned, it's just 
something that you know because of the person you are... and the importance that
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you attach to things. The way you nurse is a reflection of what your personality 
is and what things you do.
7 .3 . EXPRESSIVE
There is an expressive element in practical knowledge, whereby emotions play a 
role in generating the knowledge that is used in practice. This contrasts with the 
traditional view of knowledge as impartial. Jagger (1992) expresses this as the 
myth of epistemology - that of inquiry as dispassionate. She argues that both 
sensory perception and emotion prompt us to act appropriately. They are a 
necessary part of the practical knowledge of human survival. They have 
instrumental as well as intrinsic value and should thus be incorporated into human 
inquiry. She points to the role of so-called 'outlaw' emotions - unconventional 
emotions which stimulate different perspectives - through which knowledge grows. 
Emotion is already part of knowledge and knowledge creation.
Mangena (1994:281) argues that in objective, scientific inquiry, knowledge is 
obtained by suppressing emotion in order to be objective. She terms this knowledge 
scientistic rather than scientific, in that it is fragmented, representing the human 
mind as functioning separately from the body and emotions, and is therefore only 
partial, one-sided and unrepresentative of the wholeness of human experience. She 
argues for a natural knowledge in order to realistically represent the whole of 
human understanding. She suggests that in order to claim universality, we are 
"required to represent reality as an integrated whole, albeit comprising distinct 
specificities". A similar argument is presented by Sober (1979), who suggests 
that the deprivation of data from emotional sources is debilitating, and the 
importance of the emotions should be explained by putting them within the context of 
gathering relevant information by the best means available.
Lloyd (1 9 9 2 ) suggests reasons for the emotionality of knowledge being 
unrecognised: in the search for certainty in prepositional knowledge, the simple and 
the self evident was sought by the reduction of the complex and obscure to the 
simplest elements which had to be true. The resultant units were then combined in 
an orderly manner [Descartes' standards of distinct and clear perceptions]. 
Passion, emotion and imagination was held to blur these distinct and clear 
perceptions, and were thus downgraded and ignored. However, even subsequent
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philosophers could not explain everything by way of Reason, and had to invent 
concepts such as God [Descartes, Berkeley] and intuition [Spinoza]. The role of 
emotion in knowledge should thus be recognised. Jagger (1992:149) offers a nice 
summary:
Emotions are neither more basic than observation, reason, action or theory 
building, nor secondary to them. Each of these faculties reflects an aspect of 
human knowing inseparable from each other.
Oakeshott (1962) sees a different role for emotions. He argues that the practical 
knowledge of professionals contains nuances which distinguish this knowledge from 
the knowledge of lay persons, and these nuances are derived from feelings and 
emotions pertaining to specific professional behaviour.
This is similar to the argument that Hughes (1990) puts forward in the nursing 
context - that caring practices contain a knowledge that goes beyond that which 
objective, scientific knowledge can teach. Kiger's study (1994) of student nurses' 
learning about death and dying shows that their knowledge derived from these 
experiences involves a high degree of emotional content.
The point of all these writers is that emotions are pertinent to the knowledge used in 
practice. The experiences of the respondents in this study resonated with this. 
Ben:
•  Being ill is an emotional situation for people, isn't it. Emotions affect your 
knowledge because if you're doing a certain procedure - a dressing - and this 
person gets very upset, your scientific knowledge tells you that really you 
should finish this dressing to keep it clean, yet the emotional [knowledge] tells 
you to stop it straight away.
7 .4 . RELATIONAL
Perhaps the most significant attribute of the knowledge used by practitioners is its 
relationality: it is connected to activities, people, situations, contexts and 
experiences in an inextricable manner. Theoretical knowledge, on the other hand, 
is necessarily isolated and separated from the situations and contexts in which is 
generated.
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7 .4 .1 .  RELATIONAL REGARDING PEOPLE AND ACTIVITIES
The idea of knowledge being connected to people and their activities is not new. For 
Habermas, knowledge is the outcome of human activity that is motivated by natural 
needs and interests. It is not educed from a 'mind' which is detached from the 
situation and the concerns of everyday life (Carr & Kemmis, 1986). Equally, in 
the interpretive approach to knowledge derived from the social phenomenology of 
Schütz, is the idea that knowledge of society, or the "intrinsic meaning structure" of 
society, is not an independent system external to those participating in that society, 
but rather it is constituted and sustained through the interpretive activities of the 
individual members of that society.
This has echoes of Sayer's (1992) argument that knowledge is gained through 
activity. This includes the activities engaged in during attempts to change our 
environment, as well as through interactional activities with other people - or as 
Dreyfus (1980:11) puts it:
All our knowledge ... is always already shaped by what might be called our implicit 
ontology, an "ontology" which is in our practices as ways of behaving towards 
things and people.
In the field of professional knowledge, Eraut (1985) sustains this line of argument 
in asserting that the knowledge created and used by professionals is invented and 
developed during professional activity, by solving problems and developing their 
experience. Much of this knowledge creation is particularistic and untidy. 
Academics provide the post-hoc evaluation and construction of theoretical 
rationales. This has the effect of tidying, abstracting and decontextualising the 
knowledge, thus creating the theoretical perspective and rendering it generalisable. 
In this process, however, it is possible that something is lost. This could be one 
reason why Gorovitz & MacIntyre (1976) suggest that understanding the scientific 
and prepositional knowledge about something complex [such as a hurricane] is only 
half the picture - the contingent circumstances need to be comprehended as well in 
order to understand its particular behaviour- i.e. it needs to be recontextualised. 
What is relevant and interesting in practice is not what is generalisable, but what is 
distinctive and particular about each occurrence.
Toulmin (1977) has grasped the sense of this in his review of the trends in the 
philosophy of scientific knowledge. He traces the focus of academic attention from 
being on the general, the abstract and the timeless in the 1950s to being concerned
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today with the contextual, with social connectedness and with relation to 
particularities. Elsewhere he illustrates this by demonstrating that the practical 
knowledge of a physician is as much particular, time-bound and tentative, and hence 
personal, as it is physiological and psychological. The evidence the physician uses 
is a mixture of the articulate and the intuitive as well as a response to the signs and 
symptoms and appearance of the patient (Toulmin, 1976). This is the sense in 
which Usher & Bryant (1989) claim that the practitioner needs knowledge which is 
contextual and situation dependent in order to fully comprehend the constraints, 
possibilities and implications for action of each situation.
This is substantiated by the work of Benner (1984), MacLeod (1990 ), Clare 
(1993) and Woodrow (1994), who show that the knowledge used in practice 
centres on knowledge connected specifically to an area of practice, a unique case or 
local understandings. Dowie & Elstein (1988) go as far as to suggest that this 
knowledge could exist in the unique personal experience of the person concerned, and 
may exist only in that individual's actions, whereas Nelson (1993) argues that 
knowledge is connected to the community as a whole, and not specifically to single 
individuals.
7 .4 .2 . RELATIONAL REGARDING SOCIAL CONTEXTS
While the main thrust of these arguments has been that practical knowledge is 
related to practitioners and their activities, mention has also been made of the 
connectedness of the knowledge used in practice to the social context. Smith
(1988 ) makes the point, when discussing the knowledge inherent in skilled 
behaviour, that there is a social dimension to all intelligent behaviour. For him, 
practical knowledge is embedded in the social context because that provides the 
common systems, meanings, rules or ways of acting necessary for practitioners to 
understand and work within their 'discipline'.
This is cognate with the notion that the social context of knowledge is rooted in the 
community from which it is generated. Nelson (1993 :151) develops this 
argument, presenting evidence to show knowledge as communal, historical and 
contingent. She contends that all knowledges are radically interdependent on other 
knowledges and projects. Events are made sense of, organised, predicted, controlled 
and have meaning attributed to them in multiple and meaningful ways and contexts, 
according to the appropriateness of the evidence. She holds, therefore, that 
communities, not individuals, were the "primary agents of epistemology: the
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primary generators, repositories, holders and acquirers of knowledge". [Einstein 
acknowledged this by suggesting that the reason he was able to see so far was because 
he stood on the shoulders of giants]. The idea that knowledge is communal is also 
present in the ideas of Bernard (1973 ) and later Heron (1981 ). Bernard 
demonstrated the need for this communal approach to knowledge when she showed 
that men and women not only view a common world from different perspectives, but 
they also view different worlds as well. In each there are agreed modes of deciding 
on what counts as knowledge - even if these are not articulated. Heron's 
contribution is that the language of research or knowledge needs to be agreed upon by 
the participants, and the truth of this knowledge depends on the shared values 
between the relevant parties. Anything other than this is an exploitation of either 
of the parties.
Addelson (1993) approaches the same notion from a different angle, arguing that in 
the moral epistemology arena it is more productive to generate moral knowledge 
from a collective, community stance, rather than the traditional stance which sees 
individuals rationally making up their minds over various controversies.
Yet another approach to the social context of knowledge challenges the socially 
contrived hierarchical structure of knowledge as it is conceived in traditional 
epistemology, where prepositional knowledge is valorised and other forms of 
knowledge are thereby silenced and disauthorised (Alcoff & Potter, 1993). 
Calloway (1981) suggests that dominant groups generate models and systems which 
impede and inhibit muted groups in society. She suggests that this disenfranchises 
knowledges derived from other forms of expression, such as art, myth, ritual, 
special speech registers. These forms produce collaborative knowledge. Church & 
Poirier (1986) suggest that this collaborative knowledge is particularly relevant 
in nursing where the mode of working and generating knowledge with 
patients/clients tends to be collaborative rather that the traditional medical mode of 
handing down received knowledge.
7 .4 .3 . RELATIONAL REGARDING EXPERIENCE
Other writers have used this idea of knowledge as experientially contextual as 
fundamental to their analysis. Gilligan (1982) shows the knowledge used in 
certain moral stances is essentially of an experientially contextual nature. In 
demonstrating that girls' approach to resolving serious moral dilemmas was based 
around notions of care and responsibility connected to the actual experience in which
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the dilemma arose, rather than experientially-disconnected notions of rights and 
wrongs which Kohlberg had shown as the approach used by boys, she challenges 
Kohlberg's analysis of the moral development of children. Colliere's (1986) 
historical analysis of women's role in caring practices argues that it was precisely 
because the knowledge women used was contextual and experiential that it was 
condemned as unscientific by rational science, which contributed to the invisibility 
of women's knowledge and social and economic contribution in that area.
This idea that the knowledge which is used in practice is related to experience as 
well as to context and activity is widespread. Jarvis (1992e), in discussing 
practical knowledge, suggests that it can only be learned in primary experience 
where actors have to use their new-found information to practice, experiment etc. 
In this sense only practitioners can be expert, as when they leave practice they 
cease to be in a position to increase their practical knowledge (Jarvis ,1992d). 
Thus the knowledge used is connected to the practice itself. It is created and re­
created in practical everyday experiences, and as such is interactive and dependent 
upon the particular situations. Castell (1989) suggests that it is the rationalising 
of these experiences which transforms them into practical knowledge.
Much of the literature which reasons that experience plays a large part in 
determining practical knowledge comes from writers pointing up the neglected 
contribution of women's knowing in various practices. Versluysen (1980 ) 
indicates that one of the reasons that the work of women healers has been devalued 
and trivialised in history is that the knowledge used is largely experience-based. 
In sociology Smith (1987) argues that the experiences of women, the practical 
knowledge thus derived and the potential of these to generate sociological problems 
has been ignored, to the detriment of the discipline as a whole. Dalmiya & Alcoff 
(1993) demonstrate that there is considerable knowledge in experience, and cite 
"old wives' tales" and the Mahabharata as examples of skilled knowing that is not 
theoretical or propositional knowledge. In research methodology, Calloway (1981) 
has argued for the relevance of recognising experience as a means of making other 
modes of knowledge visible, as experiences allow knowledge to be organised from a 
different perspective . Many others have argued that acquiring practical knowledge 
is largely via experience of one sort or another (Calloway, 1981; Crouch, 1991; 
Clare, 1993; Davies, 1993).
An important consequence of the knowledge used in practice being related to 
experiences, actions, situations and contexts is that this knowledge is not always 
clearly visible. Davies (1993) calls this embedded knowledge and suggests that it
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is only in practice that this is discovered, particularly by role-modelling. Castell
(1989) suggests that this contextual knowledge is relayed through narrative, just 
as ancient classical knowledge, such as that espoused by Homer, was enmeshed in and 
structured by narrative. Consequent upon this problem of the obscure visibility of 
relational knowledge is its devaluing and disenfranchisement.
7 .4 .4 . THE RELATIONALITY OF KNOWLEDGE IN NURSING PRACTICE
There has been a vast amount of attention paid to the relationality of knowledge in 
nursing, some of it expounding the value of such knowledge and indicating that this is 
the unique and fundamental knowledge essential for nursing - its sine qua non - and 
others indicating that nursing education is failing its students because relational 
knowledge is undervalued and trivialised.
Writers concerned with relationality of the knowledge used in nursing practice have 
expressed this in various forms. Kirkevold (1993) expresses it as the values, 
goals and action strategies derived from the embedded knowledge of practitioners 
which includes their conception of the 'lived experiences' of the patient as well - a 
complicated web of relational knowledge. Collins & Fielder (1981) suggest that 
knowledge for nursing practice does not spring from only one type of knowledge, but 
from a grasp of unique facts constituting an individual life, which is gained in 
practice through experience of the particular knowledge of specific persons and 
events. Visintainer's (1986) angle is that because nursing practice manipulates 
various phenomena, rather than manipulating theory [which explains and orders 
phenomena], nursing uses knowledge which is contextual and situational.
However, most of those writing on the relational nature of knowledge used in 
nursing practice do so by analysing practice itself, which accords with Bennett's & 
Hokenstad's (1973) conclusion that those working in people-oriented professions 
identified their knowledge base as related to their work, rather than to formal 
theories. Benoit's (1989 ) study of midwifery, for instance, showed that 
traditional midwives possessed a unique, esoteric knowledge which was passed on to 
trainees in practice situations. This type of knowledge is present in all forms of 
midwifery - from traditional granny-midwives, apprentices, vocationally trained 
or university trained practitioners. McIntosh (1996 ) suggests practical 
knowledge forms part of the community nurses' 'artistry' which is that part of 
practice which extends beyond articulation, while Mander (1992) demonstrates 
that midwives use personal experience to provide knowledge for their practice.
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rather than research-based knowledge. Miller (1985) argues that the practical 
knowledge of nursing is relational in many ways: to experience, to the concrete and 
particular, to patterns of activity, to wisdom passed on by word of mouth and to 
procedures learned by "sitting next to Nelly". Benner's (1982) demonstration of 
the relationality of knowledge used in practice derives from her notion that as the 
learner gains expertise [i.e. practical knowledge], her actions become more 
situationally determined and therefore much less formalised.
The respondents in this study were most voluble in their discussion of the 
relationality of the knowledge they used in their nursing practice. Emma 
commented:
•  You can't just learn from lectures, you need to experience it - not just the 
nursing but working with others and planning your care, dealing with patients 
and all that - you can't learn that from books. Books can't tell you about 
individual experiences and they can't tell you about everything that you're going 
to encounter... you can't get the variety from books - books just tell you about 
the basic theory or an example. The lectures just tell you the ideal and when 
you come and work in the hospital nothing happens like that really.
Ben suggested:
•  Knowledge is situational because you have to consider the patient. If you have a 
scientific fact that tells that something should be done this way, and yet the 
situation tells you that you're not going to be able to do it that way, because you 
might have to think of the patient first. So your knowledge is situational - you 
adapt it, don't you, within certain boundaries and to a certain extent. The 
scientific knowledge is fact, isn't it, its right or wrong, but in nursing care, 
nursing practice - not the scientific stuff - you have to take into consideration 
the patient, so it can be situational.
Jo:
•  We did all that in lectures, but as soon as I'd carried out my first admission it all 
stuck - I realised what was meant. We had been told all that in lectures, and I'd 
understood it, but until I'd started doing my first admission it wasn't relevant. 
Like I think I'll always know that now because I've used the knowledge.
Kate described the development of the relationality of her knowledge thus:
•  You start by observing what's going on around you, start linking what people are 
doing with what you know how to do in theory, and then you do it in practice. So 
you can't work without experiential knowledge. A lot of the things we do ... is 
not necessarily something we've been taught to do ... it's just something that you 
do because it's obvious as opposed to because you've been told or you've learned 
it. I suppose it's probably because you have previous experience of situations
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that are similar. Once you've practised or have been on the ward for a little 
time you start to think in a different way.
Kathryn suggested:
•  Most of my knowledge has been from the other nurses around me and through 
myself exploring and actually experiencing things, doing things for myself.
7 .4 .5 . SOME PROBLEMS OF THE RELATIONALITY OF KNOWLEDGE
Some problems have been identified because of this relationality of knowledge used 
in practice. One of these is discussed by Silva (1977) who suggests that because 
nursing values practical meaningfulness in the knowledge it uses, it needs to derive 
its knowledge in ways other than those of traditional science, and therefore 
sacrifices traditional concepts of rigour. It is thus at variance with traditional 
science and knowledge-making. This in itself need not necessarily present an 
insurmountable obstacle, as a case could be made to support this as an alternative 
paradigm - for which there has already been much precedence, from the work of 
Kuhn (1962), Argyris & Schon (1974), Reason & Rowan (1981 ), to Harding 
(1993), Alcoff & Potter (1993) and many others. What is more difficult is the 
problem referred to by Kirkevold (1993 ), Lewis & Brykczynski (1994 ) and 
Kosowski (1995) that this knowledge, being relational to the extent of being 
embedded in that to which it is related, is inarticulable. It can only be detected in 
the practices themselves - in various behaviours, in specific incidents. It could be 
argued that it becomes meaningless to try to articulate this knowledge as it then 
immediately becomes decontextualised and depersonalised, with more left out than 
included during this process. The problem with that, as McIntosh (1994) points 
out, is that while this knowledge remains inarticulated and invisible, belonging to 
the private domain, it can mask both good and bad practice.
This has been one of the major problems for nursing education, and probably the 
reason that so much emphasis is placed on formal theoretical learning by the 
institutions controlling education - a stance which has received much criticism 
from teachers and students alike. French (1989), for instance, found schools of 
nursing were ineffective in providing learning which was relevant to clinical 
practice, and that the most significant influence on the learning process was the 
clinical nursing team, who could facilitate the relational learning of the students. 
Similarly Heims (1990 ) shows that the most effective means of learning is 
developing knowledge around concepts which are contextually-based.
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The problem for Clare (1993) is that, although the knowledge which the students 
find useful in practice is not propositional, classroom knowledge, but experiential 
knowledge derived in practice, the students are taught to deny this in favour of 
classroom knowledge. A similar problem was encountered by Skeet & Thompson 
(1985) who needed to reorganise the entire nursing curriculum to include life 
experience and common-sense in the knowledge used practically, as the students 
were so concerned with propositional knowledge that they were ineffective 
practically.
While many points have been raised in this discussion, the major thrust has been to 
demonstrate that the knowledge used in practice is relational, in juxtaposition to the 
independent knowledge of theory.
7 .5 . INTUITIVE
Another attribute of the knowledge that practitioners use is that it is intuitive, 
which gives it another level of meaning from the precisely defined knowledge of 
theory - what Polanyi (1967) refers to as "the tacit dimension".
Habermas (1979:12) recognises this in his discussion of language use. Drawing on 
Ryle's distinction between 'know-that' and 'know-how', he argues that competent 
speakers of a language not only have the explicit knowledge of the language, the 
'know-that', but they also have an intuitive rule consciousness which he calls 
'know-how'. They draw on intuitively known meaning relations. This enables 
them to "peer through the surface" to an understanding of what is being 
communicated beyond the explicit meanings.
Tripp (1993 ) goes further than merely recognising the role of intuition by 
asserting that this intuitive knowing is one of the key characteristics of a 
professional person. He maintains that professional knowledge contains expertise 
which comes from intuition, experience and "rightmindedness" rather than solely 
from scholarly disciplinary knowledge, and it would be difficult for a practitioner to 
perform effectively by simply acquiring highly developed academic skills or 
practical competencies. Similarly, Bennett & Hokenstad (1973) identify intuition 
as part of the knowledge base of practitioners in people-oriented professions.
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Other analysers of professionals also rely heavily on the notion of an intuitive 
knowledge in articulating the pervasive sense that professionals' knowledge is more 
than prepositional knowledge. Eraut (1985) refers to this as the "mysterious 
quality" in professional knowledge - a semi-conscious, intuitive mode of knowledge 
use, involving metaphors and images, and also known as associative knowledge - 
which is acquired through substantial professional experience. Toulmin's (1976) 
analysis of physicians' knowledge likewise depends to some extent on the notion of 
intuition in analysing how a physician responds to signs and symptoms and the clues 
presented by the patient's condition. For Polanyi (1966 & 1967) and Smith 
(1988) the use of intuition is what defines skilled experts.
In the context of nursing practice, Benner's (1984) study accords with these ideas. 
She found that what distinguished expert practitioners was a deep background 
understanding and knowledge which involved an intuitive grasp of situations which 
allows the expert to "zero in" on exactly the right area for assessment and to select 
the relevant information from a vast array of clinical data (Benner & Tanner, 
1987). The assertion is that practitioners use intuition as part of their expertise, 
and not necessarily in opposition to analytic reasoning. MacLeod (1990) identifies 
intuition as part of the complex practical knowledge exhibited by the expert nurses 
she studied.
It has also been recognised that intuition plays a large part in assessing the clinical 
competence of students. Hepworth (1989:411) suggests that those who assess 
nurses' clinical competencies use mainly peer-aided judgement and intuition. Girot 
(1993) found, likewise, that in spite of various assessment tools being available, 
intuition was the favourite mode of assessment, as the tools were perceived as being 
too reductionist to provide a complete picture of the students' abilities. This has 
echoes of Skeet's & Thompson's (1985) experiences where intuition and instinct 
had to be included in the knowledge used practically in order to facilitate effective 
practice.
Participants in this study recognised the role of intuition in their practice.
Ben:
•  Sometimes you Just know that the patient is in pain - something tells you that 
person is in pain - like a sixth sense that comes with experience. But you tend 
to find that the more experienced nurse who's been in that situation a hell of a lot 
of times more that you have, sometimes will pick up the situation before it's 
actually happened.
Lara:
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I usually just put myself in the position of the patient and think what I would 
have liked from me, and if I can imagine it in that way then you know what to do 
then. I think that's where intuition comes into it. You don't know all the time, 
but it works.
7 .6 . UNCODIFIABLE
The knowledge used by practitioners is not comprised of the discrete, isolated, 
objective entities of theoretical knowledge, but is diffuse and diffracted, dissipated 
and uncodifiable - nebulous.
This notion has been propounded by Eraut (1985) in his discussion on different 
kinds of professional knowledge. He maintains that while analysis and research 
might produce explicit information on how to solve problems, this knowledge will 
always be subsidiary to the knowledge of problem-solving acquired "on the job". 
In this respect he identifies a "practical knowledge" which is uncodifiable and 
expressed only in practice and learned only through experience of practice. 
Oakeshott (1962) writes similarly of a sort of knowledge which he calls practical 
because it exists only in use, which is not susceptible to formulation in rules and 
cannot be shared by the methods of formal doctrine, yet it is necessary for mastery 
of any skill, and the pursuit of activity is impossible without it. Dreyfus (1980) 
reasons that this knowledge cannot be codified because it has a flexibility which is 
lost when converted into propositional knowledge. Many of these ideas hark back to 
Aristotle's idea of 'praxis' - a form of knowledge which is embodied in the 'practical 
arts'. Because of the practical nature of these 'arts', the knowledge pertaining to  
them is necessarily uncertain and incomplete (Carr & Kemmis, 1986).
All these deliberations give the sense of this attribute of uncodifiability of the 
knowledge used by practitioners, and counter it with the discretely categorised 
knowledge of theory.
By way of a background to this uncodifiability is Curtis's (1971) submission that 
we do not always learn things intentionally - there are things we learn that we did 
not plan to learn, and this occurs largely through our 'doings' or 'due to  
circumstances' or 'in response to the environment' i.e. through practice. It 
therefore defies classification as it occurs while the attention is being focused on
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other things - a sense here of Polanyi's (1967) "disattending from" learning. This 
accords with Greenwood's (1993a) notions that abstracting information via clear- 
cut mental conceptual categories or schemata allows clear recall and hence 
structured formal knowledge, whereas learning in practice involves fuzzy concepts 
which cannot be clearly codified. This also has echoes of Argyris's & Schon's 
(1974) clear high ground of theoretical knowledge and marshy lowland of practical 
knowledge, and of Zerubavel's (1991) fuzzy and fluid mind which has with no 
distinct boundaries to its concepts, and of Glynn's (1993) creative processes.
Another clue to the uncodifiability of this knowledge stems from the idea that this 
knowledge is synthesised from a variety of sources (Monts & Burger, 1976; 
Church & Poirier, 1986) and is part of a total integrative process (Benson, 1979; 
Skeet & Thompson, 1985; Heims, 1990), and therefore any attempt to make this 
knowledge discrete would destroy its nature and thus would be counter-productive. 
Jarvis (1995f) agrees that practical knowledge is not always articulable and that 
practitioners often mix together, in an unconscious way, knowledge from a variety 
of sources to constitute the knowledge they require in a given circumstance. In the 
nursing context Woodrow (1994) has identified that clinical learning is informal 
and the knowledge acquired depends on multiple factors, such as personality, 
environment, circumstance.
Greenwald (1995) describes this knowledge as implicit cognition and suggests that 
it derives from influential earlier experiences which affect performance and which 
are not remembered in the usual sense - i.e. are unavailable to self-report or 
introspection. This cognition is thus evident only in behaviour [practice] and is 
not codifiable.
As with the relationality attribute of this knowledge discussed above, this 
uncodifiable aspect of practical knowledge assists in rendering it difficult to  
articulate, which causes it to be referred to as invisible (Ellison, 1965; Colliere, 
1986). This invisibility has been a concern of many writers (Spender, 1978a & 
1978b). The seminal work of Freire (1972) showed that the disadvantaged people 
with whom he worked possessed large volumes of knowledge which they were unable 
to recognise as such because the knowledge was not sanctioned by the socially 
dominant group. Their knowledge and values, being thus unacknowledged, were 
therefore invisible, even to themselves. Millman & Kanter (1987) reiterate this 
position in arguing that both reality and questions of knowledge are subject to social 
definition, and when this definition ignores certain aspects of social reality, these 
aspects become invisible. This applies particularly to informal, private,
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supportive social structures - caring structures, hence nursing (Colliere, 1986; 
Davies, 1990). This could be a reason that nursing narratives have become an 
important feature in disseminating nursing knowledge recently (Derbyshire, 1992; 
Baker & Diekelmann, 1994) as a way of making this knowledge visible and of 
circumnavigating its inarticulateness and uncodifiability. Lauder (1996 :94 ) 
argues specifically that because it is not possible to capture nursing knowledge in 
specific theories, narratives present a means of representing this uncodifiable 
knowledge, being, as he puts it,
repositories for a rich tapestry of formal theoretical knowledge, cultural norms, 
tacit knowledge and moral values.
The uncodifiability of this knowledge was referred to by Lara in this way:
•  [This knowledge] is something that you wouldn't necessarily read in a book, but 
it's there, in front of you, it's obvious to you, it's common sense. It's also
previous experience and thinking ahead as well. I suppose it's also using your
imagination. It's such a complicated thing, isn't it, because you don't actually 
analyse what you're doing in your head, you Just do it.
Jo expressed her difficulty in codifying her practical knowledge thus:
•  When you come to do the actual practice, you use the knowledge that you've been 
told as the basis and work from that - there are other bits as well that you'll add 
because of your personality, your style ... it's past experience, its things that
you pick up, it's the thing that works for you, its the way you constantly change
things to make it better.
7.7 . CONSTRUCTED
This attribute of the constructedness of the knowledge used by practitioners refers 
to the notion of this knowledge being constructed on an on-going basis and without 
necessarily following any set of rules, from whatever is to hand in practice - 
activities, events, relationships, the context itself - as opposed to the formal 
deductive and inductive methods of theoretical knowledge.
Carr & Kemmis (1986) recognise this as part of the development of social reality. 
They suggest that social meaning/knowledge is both constructed by social factors, as 
well as producing this social reality, and they use this insight to argue for a 
constructivist epistemology which sees knowledge as developing by a process of
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active construction and reconstruction. Eraut (1985) suggests that the practical 
knowledge of professionals is constructed from previous knowledges, ideas, 
procedures and actions which have been used effectively by the practitioner, and 
from the reported experiences of others, but in such a way that it may be difficult 
to trace its derivation - no formal rules are followed. Nyiri (1988) submits that 
practical knowledge is constructed from traditions and practice, and hence lies 
outside the domain of reflection and reasoning and only transmittable in practice via 
tradition and custom, an idea supported by Oakeshott (1962) and Usher (1989).
The idea of knowledge as constructed is expounded by Belenky et al ( 1986:15). In 
tracing the way in which women developed knowledge, they found that women 
constructed their knowledge from their experiences, and that the knower is an 
intimate part of the known. They define constructed knowledge as
a position in which women view all knowledge as contextual, experience 
themselves as creators of knowledge, and value both subjective and objective 
strategies for knowing.
To assemble this knowledge Belenky et al suggest that the knower builds on 
subjective convictions, gains access to the experience and knowledge of others, 
connects with other facts and others' experiential knowledge and integrates all this 
into a constructed knowledge.
In a similar vein, Collin (1981) found it impossible to discuss the findings of her 
research into mid-career changes as distinct from herself - her knowledge was 
constructed from her personal involvement and development in and through her 
research, as well as from the experiences of her participants. Whitbeck's (1992) 
multifactoral interactive model of knowledge constructs knowledge from 
relationships between people - based on an understanding of the relation of self and 
other as a relation between analogous beings, and on a rejection of dualistic ways of 
thinking, of domination and of competition.
In nursing, knowledge is seen as constructed in various ways. Knowlden 
(1991:201) demonstrates how a nurse constructs the practical knowledge she is to 
use that day from her observations of the patient and the situation, her 
understanding of the context, her participation in the situation and previous 
subjective and objective knowledge, and concludes that "nurse-practised caring is 
knowledge construed from personal experiences". Luker & Kenrick (1992 )  
demonstrated that community nurses used various sources - experience, various 
types of publications, information from colleagues, intuition, general knowledge.
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local knowledge, knowledge of their clients, 'gut' feelings - to construct the 
knowledge on which they based their practice.
Miller's (1985 ) analysis of areas of divergence between nurse theorists and 
practitioners shows knowledge of practitioners as constructed from experience and 
tradition, patterns of action and concrete and particular knowledge, while theorists 
rely on abstract and general knowledge, knowledge of underlying principles and a 
body of theoretical knowledge derived from research. In nurse education Benson 
(1979) describes a programme where deliberate attempts to expose students to 
non-traditional community settings as learning experiences were undertaken so that 
students could learn to construct their knowledge in a different way, thus becoming 
more positive about care of elderly people.
In this study the participants were aware that their knowledge was constructed from 
various sources. Karin described how she constructed her knowledge about patients 
from visual observation, even though she was not specifically dealing with them:
•  Because you are working in the same area as the patients ... you get to see more 
of all of the patients. So that way you learn - you pick things up about different 
patients because you actually see them. You might not necessarily be looking 
after them, but because you see them whilst you're dealing with other patients 
that you are specifically looking after in that bay, then you have a rough idea 
about what they're doing... you seem to know more about more of the patients.
Emma realised how she constructed her knowledge from others and from interacting 
with others in the environment, without necessarily being consciously aware of 
doing this:
•  I pick things up by watching other people ... especially the little things. If you 
did actually sit down and think about it, you would have learned quite a lot just 
by working, and not necessarily by saying: "How do you do this, and how do you 
do that?" ... I just pick things up as I'm going along - that is quite a substantial 
part of my learning because I'm shy and I don't ask questions that is the way I 
learn. It is a subtle way of constructing your learning.
7 .8 . ORGANIC
The idea of the knowledge used by practitioners being organic implies that it is 
inherent in the practice. This more than contextuality - which infers that the
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circumstances are relevant to and affect the knowledge. Organic knowledge signifies 
that the situation itself produces the knowledge - in a more fundamental sense. 
Rich (1976), after Briffault, refers to women's knowledge as organic by nature 
since it is involved with the essential practical activities of the particular society. 
For instance, in some societies it is the integration of agriculture, craft, invention, 
centred around the mother and children. It is organic in that it works with the 
fundamental elements of what is already there, rather than trying to impose a 
structure on it or domination over it.
Hardy (1990 :331) gives a sense of this in nursing when she suggests the 
fundamental aspects of nursing knowledge in practice as being derived
through practice, constant observation and study and a focus on the patient which 
is safe, knowledgeable, effective , effic ient, creative, thoughtful, caring, 
interdisciplinary, participatory and enriching for all participants.
But perhaps the best sense of this attribute can be seen in this nursing narrative, 
where a nurse derives knowledge of how to deal with a situation from the situation 
itself - and as she explains, there is no special way of handling this situation, and no 
way of determining in advance what to do, other than gathering the knowledge from 
the situation itself at that particular time:
•  I had been involved with Sue since her consultant decided that the advanced state 
of her disease might necessitate more detailed symptom control and support than 
was usually available. Sue had now developed obstruction of the large bowel 
which was irreversible and had started faecal vomiting and her spasmodic 
abdominal pain was getting worse ... As I sat on her bed, I wondered what was 
going through her mind. Could she feel my pain as I desperately tried to find the 
right words to tell her that death wasn't far away? It was as if I was looking at 
myself in a mirror and seeing a woman, still young and very much wanting to 
live. I told her: 'We can help your symptoms. Sue, and we can almost certainly 
get rid of the pain. We may not be able to stop the vomiting completely but it 
doesn't have to be as often as this, and we can stop the nausea.' There was so 
much I knew we needed to discuss and share. I continued: 'Tell me how you feel 
at the moment? What is worrying you most? What does the pain feel like: 
Sharp, dull, burning,?' But the silences in between the questions seemed 
endless and my mental pain intensified. Suddenly she drew me closer. 'This 
must be awful for you, love, telling me that I am going to die.' No more words 
were needed. Tears flowed between us. The understanding was total. She, in 
turn, was able to ask those things that she really wanted to know: 'How long have 
I got? Does my husband know? What will the boys do when I am gone? I am 
frightened, yet relieved that I don't have to pretend anymore. It will be easier
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now, won't it? Will you be there when I talk to my family?' We then discussed 
how we would use a subcutaneous syringe driver to control her symptoms and 
decided that she should have a nasogastric tube. During the next week she had 
eggs and bacon, strawberries and ice cream, even though she could not swallow 
them, and she stayed pain-free, with minimal vomiting. She even went home 
for a day to say good-bye and sort out her affairs, and died peacefully one week 
after developing the obstruction. I think the hardest thing to understand ... is 
that there are no special words ... Sue's ability to support me during her final 
week helped me more than any amount of reading or attending lectures to 
understand the need not to hide behind the anonymity of professionalism, but to 
reach out and meet our patients as fellow human beings. (Heston, 1992:50)
7 .9 . PRACTICAL
A vast amount of literature which describes knowledge other than propositional 
knowledge refers to it as practical knowledge. This alludes to knowledge which is 
found only in practice and is not propositionalisable. While some of these writings 
incorporate in the ideas of practical knowledge some of the attributes which have 
been discussed above, it is necessary to give an idea of some of the seminal works in 
this area even at the risk of repetition.
The idea that knowledge can be more that traditional propositional knowledge has 
received considerable attention since the ground-breaking work of Polanyi (1967) 
and Ryle (1990). Drawing on Gestalt psychology, they suggest that one can know 
more than one can tell, and this knowing has been variously called practical 
knowledge, (Argyris & Schon, 1974), tacit knowledge (Polanyi, 1967), knowing 
how as opposed to knowing that. (Ryle, 1990). Others have referred to is as 
embedded knowledge, or traditional knowledge (Nyiri, 1988). Polanyi argues at 
great length that while concentrating on propositional knowledge it is not possible to 
see the entity as a whole. Argyris & Schon use this in the illustration of learning to 
ride a bicycle: detailed knowledge of all the physical laws and operational
instructions involved in riding a bicycle does not constitute the practical knowledge 
of how to ride a bicycle - various other dimensions are involved: sensory, muscular 
dexterity, feeling. Attention to the particulars of these means the learner looses 
sight of the whole, and a skilled performance requires the whole - the tacit 
dimension. Nyiri argues that practical knowledge seems to lie outside the domain of
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reflection and reading - it is transmitted by tradition. Skilled experts gain their 
knowledge by trials, by failures and by knowledge which is handed down - hence 
traditional knowledge - and eventually get a "feel" - a "heuristic" which constitutes 
their expert knowledge.
The thrust of all these writers is that there is an attribute of the knowledge used by 
practitioners which is essentially practical only, and in that sense not available 
through reflection, sensing, intuiting or other means. It therefore presents 
another attribute of the knowledge used by practitioners.
Hanson (1994) found this when researching the taken-for-granted knowledge of 
cancer nurses. She found a depth of knowledge among cancer nurses which she 
related to practical knowledge, and found that this was submerged - much in the way 
that Polanyi would have spoken of as tacit. Sarvimaki (1994:139) describes this 
practical knowledge as being
to a large extent unarticulated, it is implicit in action and manifests itself in 
action.
There are echoes of this in Colliere's (1986) work on the knowledge of nurses and 
midwives, where she suggests that the knowledge of mothers and later midwives and 
nurses is invisible, being dispossessed by virtue of it being learned as part of 
practice, and therefore not part of accepted propositional knowledge. Similarly 
Castell (1989) recognises that there is a knowledge contained in practice and used 
by practitioners which cannot be is written down and is not propositionalisable. 
This is demonstrated in Carroll's (1988) analysis of nurses' estimation of the 
likelihood of patients' developing pressure sores. She shows that knowledge used in 
practice has a tacit dimension which is inherent in the practice of nursing itself, 
but could not recorded as "knowledge". The fact that nurses "just knew" that a 
patient was likely to develop a pressure sore was as important to their assessment 
of the patient as any objective measures like the Norton Scale.
In this study the participants readily acknowledged that there was a type of
knowledge which was only available to them through participating in practice. 
Kate's expression of this is:
•  What I'm doing when I'm on the wards is, I suppose, conditioning myself to work
as a nurse, rather than to just have knowledge about being a nurse.
Ben suggested:
•  It's all very well learning how to do aseptic technique, but when it actually 
comes down to it, it is a completely different thing.
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Karin sensed this in her comment:
•  In the university we are taught about nursing, about issues to do with nursing, 
but in the ward we learn how to become nurses.
7 .10 . Dynamic
The dynamic aspect of the knowledge used by practitioners relates to its changing 
nature. Unlike theoretical knowledge which aims at producing constants across a 
variety of situation, the knowledge used in practice varies.
Cervero's (1988) analysis of how professionals acquire expertise recognised this 
as an important factor of the type of knowledge they were acquiring. This knowledge 
is dynamic in relationship with practice from which it emanated, in that it shapes 
practice and is derived from practice. In no way could the situation be static or 
constant. Elbaz (1983) found similarly that the knowledge used by teachers in 
practice has a dynamic quality which allows it to be wide-ranging and to grow as 
experience impacted on it. She is careful to point out that this does not simply 
create a jumbled mass of information, but rather that this dynamic aspect allows 
knowledge to be organised, structured and integrated by the individual, to produce a 
consistency in practice.
Darcy (1975) suggests that is true of the clinical knowledge that practitioners 
accrue. Its dynamic quality, she proposes, is the result of clinical practice not 
existing in isolation from other activities and functions of hospitals.
The respondents in this study recognised this. Ben suggested:
•  Your knowledge of practice is changing. You've got definite knowledge that you'll 
always keep, but there are parts of it that are dynamic, changing, depending on 
things you've seen, reactions you've got.
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7 .1 1 . CONCLUSION
This discussion has set out various attributes of a knowledge which practitioners use 
during their practice as integral to that practice, but as distinct from the 
theoretical knowledge which is learned as a knowledge base for their professional 
practice.
The study of knowledge is a sophisticated and developed one, and to make any 
significant contribution would necessitate a detailed and profound analysis of a 
specific part of it - which is beyond the scope of this discussion, which has had a 
much broader focus. There are also many issues which are pertinent to non- 
propositional knowledge - such as the notion of praxis which combines many of the 
attributes mentioned, or ideas of practice theory - which have not even been alluded 
to for the same reason.
Equally, many problems exist with the attributes of knowledge which have been 
discussed - such as the inability to discuss knowledge which is unarticulable; the 
role of power in determining what counts as knowledge; the consequences for 
practitioners of the invisibility of this knowledge caused by both its inarticulability 
and its academic unacceptability - some of which have been mentioned, but not 
developed on the same grounds.
The aim of this section has been to give some idea of what distinguishes the 
knowledge practitioners use during their actual practice, so as to show that practice 
and theory differ in respect to the nature of the knowledge each employs, and thus to 
as denote this as another characteristic of the conceptual framework which allows 
practice to be juxtaposed with theory.
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CHAPTER 8
REASONING
8.1 . INTRODUCTION
Theory and practice differ regarding the reasoning processes each uses to form 
judgements. The judgements of theoretical deliberations are analytic, scientific and 
logically deduced from the evidence available. Established techniques or other 
accepted standardised procedural structures are often used. The reasoning
processes are linear and hypothetico-deductive (Clark, 1991). This is not the 
case in the judgements made in practice. Judgements are often made using non­
standard techniques and data that are to hand. Whereas in theoretical judgements 
the focus is on getting the entire set of relevant information prior to making the 
judgement, in practice the emphasis is on getting enough information to take 
decisive action - i.e. prudent and judicious action, rather than a true statement of a 
scientific law (Pellegrino, 1979). Practical judgements are not aimed at 
certainty, but rather on arriving at the best possible decision in the circumstances. 
Voss & Post (1988) refer to this as the solving of ill-structured problems, and 
suggest that there is a pragmatic element to these judgements - they are made in 
terms of whether they will work. Clark (1991) terms this 'practical reasoning'
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and suggests it is much less rigorous than theoretical reasoning but draws much 
more widely on the entirety of life experiences and knowledge.
A narrative helps to demonstrate this practical reasoning. The narrator disregards 
rules and accepted practice, and makes a judgement based on previously gathered 
data, the situation itself and a gut feeling about how the patient might react:
•  My heart sunk as the front door opened a crack and the occupant shrieked at me: 
'What do you want with that black bag?' Her GP had asked me to go and assess an 
elderly patient who had 'oozing legs', lived the life of a hermit and had refused to 
open the door to the district nurse or social services. She occasionally allowed 
him in for a social chat but was adamant that she was not going to be examined or 
go into any hospital. I was his last hope of her accepting any help. As I stood 
there the stench through the crack of the door was unbearable and my immediate 
reaction was to beat a hasty retreat. Instead I replied: 'If I put the black bag 
back in the car would you let me in for a chat?' She asked why. I explained to 
her that I specialised in 'sore legs' and that I might be able to help her get them 
better, but not through a two-inch crack of her front door. She swore at me, 
which made me giggle, and much to my surprise, when I returned from the car, 
the door was open. I went into the front room and was confronted with the most 
squalid surroundings I had ever seen. She had hoarded at least 40 years of 
newspapers and rubbish that was stacked halfway to the ceiling. Cobwebs hung 
down at least a foot and her chairs had holes in them with the stuffing hanging 
out. She watched my face as I accepted her invitation to sit down. If I had shown 
any trace of repulsion for her or her house I knew that I would have been asked 
to leave ... I noticed her legs were swollen and some old rags that were wrapped 
around them were soaked. Her abdomen was enormous and I suspected she had a 
tumour causing primary lymphoedema. She began to unveil the legs - filthy 
dirty, oozing profusely, with areas of eczema present. She was adamant that I 
was not to make any written notes about her. It was obvious she needed 
hospitalisation to investigate her abdomen and all I could hope for was to make 
her legs more comfortable. I asked if I could call on alternate days to wash and 
dress them, and she agreed. Over the ensuing three weeks ... her legs did not 
respond to treatment. I grew to like her and despite the terrible conditions 
found I enjoyed visiting her. I gained her tru s t... and on my next visit she said 
she had decided to go into hospital. I was pleased with the outcome as it had been 
obvious from my first visit that she required hospitalisation ... She made me 
realise that 'nursing by the book' is not always in the patient's best interest. I 
had been very worried that I had not taken any notes or informed my nursing 
officer of my action; I had also left her in squalid, if not dangerous conditions.
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On the other hand ... if I had betrayed her trust the likely outcome would have 
been a forced hospital admission. (Keachie, 1992:40)
This narrative demonstrates some features of a practical judgement: the use of 
contextual cues, instinct and the disregard for rules. These and other attributes of 
practical judgement will now be considered.
8 .2 . INTUITIVE
One of the most discussed attributes of judgement is intuition. Writers recognise an 
association between judgement and intuition, and present arguments either to deny 
or support its relevance in decision making. This discussion seeks to show that, 
whatever denials are made for its existence or otherwise in judgements in 
theoretical work, its role in theory is insignificant compared with the importance 
given it as part of decision making in practice.
The link between judgement and intuition is discussed by Oakeshott (1933) in his 
analysis of the modes of experience. He suggests that within judgement it is 
possible to distinguish sensation, reflection, volition, feeling and intuition, but the 
distinction is made for analytic purposes only, since these activities are not 
different from one another in principle, and cannot be separated from one another 
finally and absolutely. To do so would make them meaningless abstractions, since 
they only derive meaning by relating as a whole. He thus recognises that intuition 
is integral to judgement. Having established this link, the debate moves on to 
determine the significance of the role of intuition in judgement.
Gedye's (1979 ) computer simulations of clinical judgements, where clinical 
judgements are produced by artificial intelligence using only explicit processes, 
suggest no role for intuition in the decision making process. Yet Gedye recognises 
that these simulations are only an aid to physicians' decision making, and thus the 
role of intuition cannot be denied.
An insignificant role for intuition is assigned by Sober (1979), who suggests that 
clinical judgements can best be understood as occurring within an information- 
processing system, where the input is clinical and observational data about the 
patient, and the output is a differential diagnosis. This is claimed as the
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methodology of clinical decision making. However, some situations are so complex 
that all the data cannot be entered into the system, and in such cases it might be 
more effective to approach the situation indirectly - hence a possible role for 
intuition.
Perhaps unintentionally, Cassell (1979) makes the case that intuition is useful in 
practice, but not in theory. He recognises the value of intuition, particularly as a 
"lived" part of the everyday, but sees is as unsystematic. For it to be useful, he 
claims, it needs to be separated [abstracted] from observation and schematised. As 
Wilker (1979) points out, what Cassell is suggesting here is the development of 
theory. Thus Cassell's position is to recognise a role for intuition in practice, but 
to suggest that, for it to be useful, it needs to be restructured and incorporated as 
part of a scientific theory.
Sisson et al (1986) suggest that the numerous and interacting factors involved in 
clinical Judgement provide so much information that the intuitive thinker cannot 
comprehend the aggregated meaning, and is thus bewildered. The intuitive 
judgement is therefore poorer when much information is used, hence their support 
for the decision analysis method.
The significance that Wilker (1979) assigns to intuition is that it is useful in the 
absence of a structured theoretical understanding. This is similar to the argument 
put forward by Dowie & Elstein (1988). Drawing on Hammond's Cognitive 
Continuum Theory, they suggest that in less well structured tasks, the dominant 
mode of thinking is intuitive [the "intuitive judgement" end of the Cognitive 
Continuum], whereas in well structured tasks the mode of thinking is analytic [the 
"scientific experiment" pole of the Continuum]. Zalkind & Shachtman (1986 ) 
illustrated this in their decision analysis approach to the swine influenza 
vaccination decision - it was only once the problem could be precisely formulated 
that the systematic methodology of decision analysis could be used.
It could be argued that theoretical tasks, whose substantivity depends on articulation 
and therefore by definition are more structured, use, according to Dowie's & 
Elstein's reasoning, a systematic, scientific approach to judgements, whereas the 
opposite is the case for practice, where an intuitive mode of decision making would 
predominate.
These writers are dismissive of the role of intuition because they seek a systematic, 
scientific approach to decision making - a theoretical approach. In so doing, they
- 139 -
support a dichotomy between judgements which use intuition and those which do not, 
thus giving weight to the argument that intuitive-including [and thus to them non- 
systematic] practical judgements differ from intuitive-excluding [systematic] 
theoretical judgements.
Dawes (1988 ) acknowledges that intuition plays a part in making holistic 
judgements which are usually believed to be good decisions, but argues that 
systematic decisions based on a few explicable and defensible principles [statistical 
predictions, regression equations etc.] are better than intuitive decisions, because 
they can be explicated and thus debated, because they are not subject to the biases 
and prejudices of the decision makers and because the basis on which they are made 
can be understood by those affected by them.
While these are valid and reasonable suggestions, the underlying assumption is that 
decisions can be considered and debated. In practice that is not always the case, as 
many decisions have to be made instantaneously without recourse to debate or 
statistical and other measures, and necessitate the use of contextual cues which will 
be lost as soon as the decisions are abstracted in the manner which Dawes suggests.
Eraut (1985) makes this point in his analysis of how teachers make decisions in 
practice. Comparing their practice with that of a lawyer preparing a brief, or a 
clergyman visiting a bereaved person, he suggests that the latter have time to 
prepare, whereas during practice the teacher has no time to reflect as the pressure 
to act is immediate and to hesitate is to lose. He therefore suggests that whereas 
decisions made in preparation may be considered, debated and made systematically, 
those made in practice are largely intuitive.
In a similar vein, Cervero (1988) recognises this role for intuition in his analysis 
of how executives solve problems. Drawing on Isenberg's (1984 & 1985) study, 
he shows that a combination of intuition and calculated deductive thinking is used, 
and that these are not separately employed, but rather are part of integrated 
"thinking/acting cycles". Intuition is not the opposite of rationality, nor is it a 
random process of guessing. In defining intuition as "based on very rapid 
recognition, categorisation and retrieval of familiar patterns" (Isenberg 
1985:185), Cervero stresses the link between immediacy and intuitive decision 
making. He illustrates this by suggesting five different ways in which intuition is 
used in practice: intuitively sensing when a problem exists; relying on intuition to 
perform well-learned behaviour patterns without being aware of the effort; using
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intuition to synthesise isolated bits of information and experience into an integrated 
picture; as a check on more deductive thinking; to by-pass more in-depth analysis.
These uses of intuition in practice accords with the 'expert' level of performance in 
Dreyfus's & Dreyfus's theory of expertise. Their model distinguishes between five 
different levels of performance from novice to expert, and maintains that experts 
think intuitively, whereas novices tackle the tasks analytically (Hamm, 1988).
Siegler & Goldblatt (1981) suggest that it is necessary for clinicians to use 
intuition in making clinical judgements as they are often forced to act in many 
situations where there is insufficient data and limited time for gathering 
information. Feinstein (1967) sees the necessity for intuition on different 
grounds. He distinguishes between therapeutic decisions and the 'environmental 
decisions' of humanistic healers, and suggests that environmental decisions are not 
resolvable by the traditional methods of scientific analysis used for therapeutic 
decision making, and therefore other methods such as intuition are needed.
Elstein (1979) supports the intuitive influences in decision making by showing 
that clinicians can hold only four or five working hypotheses simultaneously, and 
thus in order to add a new one, an old one must be dropped. This is often done on a 
'most preferred' basis, and Elstein's analysis demonstrates that the method for 
combining information into a preferred conclusion is informal or intuitive.
Away from the clinical area, the use of intuition in decision making is supported by 
Clark's (1991 ) work on social work practice. He describes the reasoning 
processes used by practitioners as intuitive in that it is transparent to its possessor 
but invisible to others.
In nursing practice the use of intuition in decision making is widely recognised. 
Benner (1984) applied the Dreyfus model to the clinical practice of nurses, and 
found that there was a match between the analytic judgements of beginners and the 
intuitive decision making of experts. In another study she demonstrates Dreyfus's 
six key aspects of intuitive judgement being present in the practice of expert nurses 
(Benner & Tanner, 1987).
Using another model - Hammond's Cognitive Continuum - Hepworth (1989) found 
that the judgements about students nurses' clinical proficiency is largely intuitive, 
and suggests that a possible reason for this is the uniqueness of each nurse-patient 
encounter, and the value placed not only on the execution safe procedures, but on
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reaction to subtle non-verbal communications from the patient and on maintenance 
of a physically and psychologically therapeutic environment. In this complex 
situation the most effective judgements were reckoned to be intuitive.
Jones's (1988) study found that nurses made decisions about which cues were 
significant in the process of diagnosis at a subconscious - or intuitive - level, 
although there were occasions when decisions were made strategically.
Conversely, judgements made in practice but using the analytic theoretical approach 
can be counter-productive - as demonstrated in Skeet's & Thompson's (1985) 
study of theoretically well-prepared but practically naive students, who, when 
undertaking clinical practice, were able to make 'theoretically correct' judgements 
which fell far short of acceptable standards of practice. Their solution was to 
incorporate instinctive and intuitive faculties and life experiences in decision­
making in practice.
The findings of Luker & Kenrick (1992) are similar. In a study of how community 
nurses make judgements, only 8.5% identified the source of influence on their 
clinical decision-making as scientific knowledge. All others identified combinations 
of common-sense and practice-based knowledge [which included items such as 
intuition, gut feelings, experience, knowledge of particular situations and people]. 
In concluding that although community nurses consider that a large proportion of 
their work requires a scientific basis, their clinical decision-making is largely 
founded on experiential knowledge, Luker and Kenrick are demonstrating the 
difference between the theoretical and practical judgements.
An interesting angle on this process was given by one of the participants in this
study, Jo, who described how she made a particular decision thus:
•  You try and put yourself in their [the patient's] place and see the ward from
their viewpoint, and make the decision from a position of empathy.
Karen's version of this was:
•  If you're in an area that you don't know that much about, you make decisions 
which are not based on formal knowledge.
In summing up this attribute, it appears that intuition is used to make judgements 
when rapid decisions are required, in situations where experience - or expertise - 
is of greater value than propositional knowledge, where a wide and disparate variety 
of poorly articulated cues is available, where the relation between the cues is a 
complex with no discernible systematic connections and where the context is seen as
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equally important to the decision - in short, in practice situations. Thus while both 
intuition and analytic methods are used in making decisions in theory as well as in 
practice, the intuitive mode is more characteristic of practice, while the analytic 
mode is typical of theory.
8 .3 . INTERSUBJECTIVE
Intersubjectivity in decision making refers to the inclusion, as part of the decision 
making process, of the subjectivity of both the decision maker and the person 
concerning whom the decision is being made, as well as the perceptions and 
interpretations of other professional practitioners. This recognises that practical 
decisions are not made in isolation, as can be the case with theoretical decisions. It 
does not imply that impartiality is sought, as, for example, Engelhardt (1979:xv) 
suggests is the case when some analysts of decision making have as a goal 
"objectivity in the sense of intersubjectivity". Rather it acknowledges that the 
emotions, prejudices and contexts of the total community from which the situation 
arises, are part of the decision making process.
Cassell (1979) argues for the necessity of intersubjectivity in the field of clinical 
practice as it recognises the patient as a socio-cultural person, actively involved in 
the sensing, understanding and interpretation of the disease, as well as being subject 
to the unconscious, psychosomatic elements of illness, thereby acknowledging the 
contribution of socio-cultural, psychological and idiosyncratic variables in disease 
production. To this he adds the subjectivity of the reporting of the disease, in terms 
of determining timings, placing, causes and values ascribed to events in the disease 
process by the patient, and how patients associate these to the experiences of 
significant others in their lives. In arguing for the recognition of the subjective in 
clinical judgement, Cassell claims it as a response to the demand for a medicine of 
the person, as opposed to a medicine merely of the body.
Cline's (1985) analysis of decisions made in clinical judgement suggest that 
attempts to ignore the subjective elements of the situation in order to obtain an 
objective or 'scientific' assessment of the condition imposes too tight a delineation on 
the interactions and thereby restricts the scope of the judgements.
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An alternative angle on this notion of intersubjectivity is the recognition that in 
practice decisions are made within the interpretive framework of the decision 
maker. This term was used by Polanyi (Brownhill, 1981:369) to describe
a group of systematic mutually supporting beliefs which one accepts and then uses 
to interpret other data.
It is similar to one of the findings of Carroll's & Johnson's (1990:26) analysis of 
current theories on decision making. They term this "its how you see the problem", 
and suggest that decisions are made in accordance with how situations are 
interpreted, and not as they exist "in some objective reality".
In the nursing context, this notion resonates with Bryans's & McIntosh's 
(1996:25) argument that nurses use their "unique collection of prior knowledge 
and interpretive frameworks" in making decisions in practice. Hepworth's (1989) 
analysis concludes that the professional judgements of nurses are of necessity based 
on the complex interplay of numbers of factors which rules out claims for objective 
judgements.
This was confirmed in this study by Ben who suggested:
•  There are a lot of things feeding into how you make your judgements, 'cos you're 
using all your senses, you're using your hearing, your - yeah, everything.
Kathryn recognised the subjectivity in her decisions:
•  How I make a decision depends on what the decision is about, really. Some 
decisions are neither right or wrong decisions, and are made on personal 
preference, like you might prefer to put someone in an actual bath rather than 
give a bedbath - what you find easiest, maybe, when both ways of doing 
something are just as valid. Perhaps how you've had most experience of doing 
something which in turn would affect how you find it easiest. Your common 
sense comes into it as well.
8 .4 . ITERATIVE
Judgements made in practice are iterative rather than linear. The reasoning 
processes are often cyclic, moving between various modes of knowing and sensing, 
linking general principles and concrete situations, in order to arrive at a sound 
judgement.
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Clark (1991:40) found this iterative process in the judgements of social workers. 
He describes it thus:
It seems that what is entailed is not a linear process analogous to the certainties 
required by the hypothetico-deductive model of scientific explanation, but an 
iterative, cyclic or dialectic process in which external realities and internal 
'knowing-in-action' are constantly compared and contrasted.
He suggests that in practical situations both theoretical knowledge and data from 
external sources may be seriously incomplete, so that this iterative process will not 
necessarily result in certainty.
Dowie & Elstein (1988) suggest that a similar process is used by practical experts. 
In comparison with novices, experts are able to be flexible and adaptable, to  
reframe new questions as variants of known problems and to change direction 
without hesitation, because they have well developed networks giving them effective 
interaction with their store of knowledge.
This iterative process is described in the nursing context by Jones (1988). She 
discusses both a "backward chaining" reasoning, where decisions are made by a 
backward search through data which would confirm a tentative judgement, and a 
"forward chaining" process where a firm decision is reached via small, incremental 
steps of inferentially determined information. She also suggests that inter­
linkages are made between memory of previous experiences and all these processes 
together determine decisions. In her study of ward sisters' practice, MacLeod
(1990) describes their decision making as iterative, in that it is characterised by 
the intertwining of the processes of noticing, understanding and acting in a way that 
links the past, present and future. Redmond's (1993) study of the clinical 
judgements of cancer nurses found that the decision making in practical [cancer] 
nursing is not systematic, linear problem-solving, but of an iterative nature.
All these studies would suggest that in practice this iterative process ensures that 
the interconnection between all areas of the context, life experiences and knowledges 
underpins clinical judgement.
In this study Ben described how this iterative process worked for him between the 
use of instinct and other knowledges:
•  If you instinctively know that someone's in pain, or you get a gut feeling that this 
person's going to die, you don't automatically then rush off, go straight into doing 
something practical, you have to look a bit more behind it - because that's just 
your instinct, you have to back it up with some of your knowledge.
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Karin illustrated how, in arriving at her decision, she had moved between 
recollection of a past experience, current knowledges and empathetic sensitivity:
•  I decided to give the baby a bath, rather than a wash using a bowl of water. I 
made the decision because that's what I'd been told to do the day before in a very 
similar situation, because I thought that was the policy on the ward, and because 
I thought it would be nicer for the baby who was a bit mucky, and I'd not had any 
theory saying I shouldn't do it.
8 .5 . NON-SYLLOGISTIC
Judgements that are made in practice are not necessarily based on discernible 
formulae, unlike the judgements made in theory. In practice, while overall 
strategies may be planned, the judgements made during the actual exercising of 
practice are often extemporaneous and impromptu, and the practitioner often cannot 
articulate exactly what has prompted the judgement.
Cervero's (1988) findings show that professionals are constantly make judgements 
and decisions, and cannot state the rules or theories on which they are based. He 
likens this to Schon's (1983) knowing-in-action, where Schon describes it as 
existing in three forms: professionals know how to carry out certain actions and 
judgements without thinking about them prior to or during performance; they are 
not aware of having learned to do these things; they are unable to describe the 
knowledge that the action reveals. Argyris & Schon (1974) suggest that clinical 
expertise is obtained precisely because of this ability to synthesise without 
resorting to formal analysis. Judgements made in this manner cannot be bound to 
articulated rules.
Scriven (1979) finds one of the most interesting facts about clinical judgements is 
that they turn out to be right even when the judge cannot explicate the reasons for 
the judgement. He argues that clinical inferences which lead to clinical judgements 
are often derived from rough guidelines, and that these cannot be formalised into 
exact or statistical generalisations. He points out, however, that simple formulae 
often tend to be more reliable, but concedes that the problem with rule-based 
formula is that they must leave out some relevant variables. So while Scriven 
suggests that a case could be made for preferring to use formulae in making clinical
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judgements, the point of interest here is the acknowledgement that practitioners 
most often make clinical judgements without recourse to rule-based formulae.
Possible reasons for not using rule-based judgements have been suggested as the 
complexity of the task and the inefficiency in terms of time and costs such 
judgements would involve. After exploring the nature of the uncertainties in the 
interpretation of clinical tests and signs and symptoms, and fact that clinicians do 
not necessarily have training in manipulating probabilities and have no language to 
communicate values, Eddy (1988) concludes that such a complex synthesis of 
imperfect information is required to make a clinical decision that it would be 
difficult for a team of researchers, let alone a busy clinician. Dowie & Elstein 
(1988 ) suggest that although clinical decisions perhaps ought to be made 
inductively - waiting for all the data and then reasoning from them - this does not 
happen in practice because it is inefficient in time and other costs, including that of 
the patient's condition. This is substantiated by the work of Cline (1985) who 
suggests the processes of professional judgements are similar to the processes used 
in everyday judgements, where there is a reliance on only a few major variables as 
opposed to forming complicated, multivariant judgements from all available cues. 
He quotes evidence in support of his thesis that judges tend to overestimate the 
extent to which they use a variety of cues in judgmental tasks, and underestimate 
their dependence on a relatively small number of factors. The research of Kirwan 
et al (1986) also demonstrate that few cues are used to make clinical decisions 
although many are available. Physicians typically relied on only five cues even 
when many were available. Voss & Post (1988) term this "decomposition", where 
a problem solver delineates a few factors - usually no more that three - as the key 
to the solution.
Another slant on the reasons for not using rule-based judgements comes from the 
assessment of the logic used in practical judgements. Some writers have suggested 
that other forms of logic than that used in syllogistic, rule-based reasoning is used 
by practitioners. Tripp (1993) demonstrated that the logic of drama is a vital part 
of professional judgement, and is chosen at appropriate times in preference to the 
logic of syllogistic reasoning. Dowie & Elstein (1988) suggest that the form of 
reasoning used in the Dreyfus and in the Schon models of professionals' practical 
judgements is symbolic and non-quantitative, in contrast to the statistical models 
suggested by theoreticians. Pellegrino (1979) sees no single logical method of 
reasoning being used in clinical judgements - rather several modes can be detected 
in a benignant eclectic approach favoured by clinicians. He suggests that a right 
clinical judgement does not depend on its certitude, rigour, logical or mathematical
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soundness, as the aim is not a scientific truth but the right action for a particular 
patient. These arguments suggest that the use of such a variety of modes of 
reasoning would preclude rule-based judgements.
Yet further evidence for not using rule-based judgements comes from the work of 
McNeil et al (1986), who found that decisions are influenced by how data is 
presented, rather than by the actual data itself. For example, different judgements 
were made if data were presented in terms of survival or death compared to the 
judgements which were made on the same data if these factors were omitted. 
Llewellyn-Thomas (1988) substantiated this by showing that the style in which 
data concerning states of health were presented in their experiments influenced the 
values assigned to those states of health: if vivid, first person narratives were used 
to describe the state of health a lower value was ascribed to it than if a detached, 
impersonal style was used. The use of this type of evidence in forming judgements 
is inconsistent with syllogistic reasoning, and consequently would impede the use of 
rule-based judgements.
Eraut's (1985) suggestion for not necessarily using rule-based judgements in 
practice derives from his observation that because practical problems are ill- 
defined, there may be more than one solution. Therefore judgements need to have a 
wider basis than simply linear, rule-based methods.
In the nursing arena, as in other practical contexts, judgements are not always 
rule-based. Jones (1988) shows that the strategies used by nurses in making 
judgements vary according to the individual nurse, the context and the data field 
available. Furthermore, the various systematic models of decision making 
available to nurses - such as decision trees, information processing and decision 
analysis - have little impact on practical decisions, as there is seldom enough 
information of the right calibre available. In addition, such mechanistic procedures 
are seen by nurses as unacceptable in a professional philosophy of humanistic, 
person-centred caring. Jones thus claims that judgements made by nurses in 
practice cannot be reduced to simple, quantifiable rules of procedure - a similar 
finding to that of Redmond (1993) in her study on cancer nurses' clinical 
judgements.
In the interests of increased professionalisation for nursing, there had been a move 
towards showing that nurses' judgements were based on systematic evaluation, 
particularly following the Nursing Process as a model for making decisions 
(McCarthy, 1981), and following models used by physicians (Tanner et al, 1987).
- 148 -
These, however, operate on a macro level of strategic planning, and not at the level 
of day-to-day decision making in practice. McCarthy herself recognises that the 
Nursing Process may not detailed enough to be effective at a basic level of decision 
making. Jones & Brown (1991) suggest that the use of the Nursing Process, being 
a rule-driven approach, has reduced the complexity of nursing practice to 
procedural problems. In this sense it addresses management issues in nursing and 
not the actual practice of nurses. They contend that judgements of everyday nursing 
practice are rarely accomplished in a rational, linear manner.
In this study the participants recognised the complexity of the factors contributing 
to their decisions which precluded rule-based judgements. On being asked why she 
took the parents and the child [who was the patient] into the playroom at a 
particular juncture of his care, Lara said:
•  What fed into my decision was my knowledge of the ward, its geography, the ward 
policy, and my humanity.
With considerations such as these forming part of the decision making process, it 
would be difficult to establish rule-based judgements.
8.6 . HETEROGENEOUS
Judgements made in practice are not necessarily founded on the systematic analysis 
of propositional knowledge - what Schon (1983) calls technical rationality. The 
basis for making judgements in practice is diverse, and while propositional 
knowledge is included, many other sources were used to inform the judgement, since 
the aim of the judgement is not conformity leading to the confirmation of a truth as 
is the case in theoretical endeavour, but rather performance of a particular 
activity.
Clark (1991) found that the social workers in his study based their judgements on a 
variety of sources, such as personal experience, popular sources like the media, 
networks of colleagues and associates and common sense, and combined these with 
their own imagination. Only rarely did they acknowledge formal academic sources. 
This is similar to the findings of Luker's & Kenrick’s (1992 ) study of district 
nurses' sources of decision making, and to Stiernborg's (1992) findings regarding 
student nurses' sources.
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Practical wisdom is frequently used as an umbrella term for this diverse basis for 
decision making. Eraut (1985) suggests that practical wisdom is involved in the 
judgements of professionals, which includes a sense of purpose, appropriateness and 
feasibility. The acquisition of such wisdom depends upon, amongst other things, a 
wealth of professional experience. Goldberg’s (1986 ) overview of clinical 
Judgement in psychology showed that it is based on "clinical wisdom" rather than on 
propositional knowledge, and is relatively unrelated to the amount of information 
available to the Judge. Further relegation for the use of such knowledge was 
occasioned by the finding that Judgements were not improved by increasing 
propositional knowledge and training.
Several other cognitive skills are identified as important in making Judgements in 
practice. Scriven (1979:16 ) distinguishes, amongst others, the skills of 
perception, reaction control, synthesis and rapid calculation in his analysis of some 
practices, and suggests that such skills are learned by exposure rather than 
theoretical teaching, being related to practical rather than theoretical Judgements. 
He asserts that clinical Judgement is often "purely perceptual or mainly 
psychotherapeutic rather than ratiocinative". Tripp (1993 ) maintains that 
Judgements made in practice by professionals are really a matter of an expert guess, 
as they are usually made in situations where there is a lack of knowledge, and it is 
this ability of the professional to make this expert guess which is valued.
Tripp (1993) also suggests that there is an ethical dimension to professional 
Judgements. As the well-being of the client is affected by the decision, the basis for 
making it cannot be merely epistemological - a deduction shared by Engelhardt et al 
(1979:xxii), who conclude their appraisal of clinical Judgements thus:
It is, moreover, much more than simply an enterprise in epistemology. Clinical 
Judgements in their rich and full sense are freighted with values, including ethical 
and moral values.
For Pellegrino (1979) the ethical dimension in clinical Judgement is necessary 
because the question is usually not what can be done for a patient but what should be 
done, and the decision commonly is a balance between what is deemed to be good 
scientifically, what the physician thinks is good and what the patient will accept as 
good. Scriven (1979) argues that the ethical dimension of clinical Judgements is 
part of the basic logic of reasoning in matters affecting patient care, and practical 
reasoning alone cannot explain clinical Judgements. This is illustrated by Candee's 
& Puka's (1988 ) ethical analysis of a particular clinical decision using both 
deontological and utilitarian approaches.
- 150 -
Other influences include legal considerations, since decisions take place within a 
particular jurisdiction (Dowie & Elstein 1988 ), as well as economic 
considerations, where scarcity of resources necessitates rationing processes 
(Schwartz & Aaron, 1988), although ultimately the essence of both of these is 
ethical.
There is wide recognition of the diversity of influences on the practical decisions 
made in nursing. Mention has already been made of the variety of sources identified 
in community nurses' decision making by Luker & Kenrick (1992). Jones (1988) 
demonstrates that many cognitive skills are used in arriving at a nursing 
Judgement, because the data available in practice is uncertain, incomplete and at 
times contradictory. Jones & Brown (1991) found that decisions made in clinical 
nursing practice are usually value Judgements resulting from the negotiations 
between alternative points of view and contradictory lines of reasoning. 
Additionally they point out that clinical situations are complex and changing, 
therefore broad-based thinking is necessary to meet the needs of complicated 
decision making.
In this study Karin discussed her awareness of the influences on her decisions:
•  What influenced my decision was the patient's wishes, what your colleagues 
think, prior knowledge, and what you'd like if you were the patient.
Ben attempted to explain how he arrived at decisions:
•  It's not Just specifically based on wisdom. You have to adapt that with all your 
theory, your practical experiences on the ward ... and then you may decide to do 
things slightly differently because of the situation, because you may find that it 
is slightly more productive doing something like this - and so its not Just 
wisdom, its a Just whole lot of things. And, yeah, it's all interconnected, 
definitely.
8 .7 . CONTEXT RESPONSIVE
The Judgements made in practice are not independent and detached, as are theoretical 
Judgements. They are responsive to the situations from which they arise and 
sensitive to contextual issues.
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This is demonstrated by Cline (1985) who, using various studies of the clinical 
judgement of psychologists, showed that the Judgements were vulnerable to the 
context in which they were made, and this included the personalities of the Judge and 
client, the physical environment, the professional experiences and background of 
the Judge, the norms of the institution in which the Judgement takes place and the 
reasons for making the Judgement. After an analysis of two different models 
cognition in practice - the analytic model of Hammond and the intuitive model of 
Dreyfus & Dreyfus - Hamm (1988) concludes that clinical Judgements vary with 
the structure and context of the task, and that the way of thinking adopted by the 
clinician changes in response to that structure and context.
Voss & Post (1988) refer to this phenomenon as domain-specificity, and imply that 
there is an element of pragmatism involved, which "converts" a problem to one 
which can be solved in terms of the context in which it is produced. Spicker
(1979) acknowledges this context responsiveness by suggesting that Judgements 
made in clinical practice have a "concreteness" about them - they are grounded in 
the context and phenomenological environment from which they arise.
Another slant to this susceptibility to context is presented by the "hindsight" 
experiments of Arkes et al (1988). Hindsight bias leads to the assigning of a 
higher probability to that outcome of an event that is known to have occurred, than 
was actually assigned to it while it remained uncertain, so that when physicians seek 
second opinions, the second opinion is likely to corroborate the first, as it is made 
within the context of knowing the first opinion.
Nyiri (1988) suggests that the influence of context on Judgements is peculiar to 
practice. He maintains that faculty of Judgement cannot be imparted to a machine 
because it is lacking in social context - Judgement can be practised only, not taught. 
This accords with Engelhardt's (1979) conclusions that choices are made within a 
particular cultural milieu which will always affect the choice being made. 
Currently in health care the milieu favours treatment over neglect which affects a 
variety of decisions, including whether to allow a patient to die. In nursing the 
milieu of humanistic, individualised, person-centred care affects the mode of 
decision making selected by nurses, leading to a rejection of mechanistic measures 
(Jones, 1988).
Not only are Judgements affected by the context, they also originate from the context. 
Tripp's (1993) analysis of the practical Judgements of teachers found that the 
majority of their decisions were made instantly in response to situations, and were
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influenced by an understanding of the situation and by the personality of the teacher, 
rather than by techniques and set procedures.
Pellegrino (1979) recognises the responsiveness of judgements made in practice 
from another angle. He suggests that when physicians make clinical Judgements, 
these are made in response to patient needs, rather than to establish scientific 
truths, so that a Judicious decision, rather than a true decision is sought.
The contextual responsiveness of decisions have been acknowledged in practical 
nursing. Jones's (1988) analysis of nurses' Judgements made in practice showed 
that these were highly contextually dependent. This notion is supported by 
Redmond's (1993) findings and by those of Luker & Kenrick (1992). Jones & 
Brown (1991) suggest that because nursing decisions are often negotiated, they are 
contextually defined and responsive to situational contingencies. Bryans & 
McIntosh (1996 ) suggest that this responsiveness is a hallmark of excellent 
nursing practice, and is one of their reasons for treating with caution a 
predetermined approach to decision-making in practice.
A nursing narrative demonstrates this contextual responsiveness of practical 
reasoning. The nurse acknowledges the difficulty of her decision making in her 
advise to and support of the relative of a patient. The specific data which inform the 
decision are not obvious, other than a general responsiveness to the situation.
•  John was married, in his 60s, and had been in the nursing home for a couple of 
years. His wife, Ann visited him nearly every day. One night when I arrived on 
duty I was told that John's condition had worsened considerably that day. He was 
suffering from a chest infection and did not appear to be making any progress. 
Ann had been sitting next to his bed for most of the day. I offered her a bed for 
the night but she said she wanted to go home to see her youngest son who was on 
holiday. When Ann decided to leave at 1.15am John's breathing was strong and 
his condition had been stable for a couple of hours. Ann asked if I thought she 
should stay. I said I felt that if she was meant to be there when her husband 
died, then she would be. If, however, she was not there, one of us would be in 
her place so John would not die alone. John passed away peacefully three hours 
later and although Ann was not present she arrived within minutes. I went with 
her to visit John in his room ... As we left the room, Ann and I stood and talked 
for a while outside John's room. She realised that although he had been very ill 
a number of times before, and she felt that she had been prepared for his death, 
she still felt shocked ... I said I didn't think I would ever get used to it - each time 
someone dies it is a different experience and every death I had the privilege of
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being present at was special in some way. Ann said she was glad I had been with 
John when he died ... When I came off duty, I sat for a while and wondered if I had 
said the right things at the right time ... It is sometimes difficult to judge what is 
the right thing to say, when is the right time to say it, when is the right time to 
be silent, or when is the right time to offer a hand to hold. Perhaps knowing 
this is part of what nursing is all about. (McGarvey, 1992:43)
The respondents in this study easily identified the contextual nature of their
decisions. Kathryn explained:
•  Sometimes you decide to do things which you know perhaps you shouldn't really 
do, but which you do because of the situation that you're in. In the pressure 
area care of this patient who really doesn't like lying on his side at night, you 
know that, really, you should turn him, but you've got to weigh up the patient's 
wishes and whether you want to wake him up in the middle of the night or let him 
sleep a bit longer and turn him a bit later on, that sort of thing.
Ben:
•  Sometimes a situation can mean that its impossible to carry out what you've 
specifically learned, so you have to adapt your decision with all your theory, 
your practical knowledge.
8 .8 . CONCLUSION
This discussion has attempted to put the case that Judgements made in practice differ 
from those made in theory on a number of points.
The precise, analytic and detached nature of theory necessitates similar methods of 
decision making, whereas the less differentiated nature of practice calls for 
different considerations in making Judgements. Equally, the reasons for making the 
decision are different in theory and practice - theory aims to substantiate clearly 
defined problems and reach true statements concerning specific theories, while 
practice uses Judgement to guide action, recognising that there is not necessarily 
only one possible or right outcome.
The Judgements made in theory are thus different to those made in practice. The 
aim of this discussion has been to give some indication of the attributes of the
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decisions made in practice and thereby to show how they differ from theoretical 
judgements.
In doing so, an attempt has been made to indicate that theory and practice differ 
regarding their use of judgements, which contributes another dimension to the 
conceptual framework which distinguishes theory from practice.
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CHAPTER 9
POWER
9 .1 . INTRODUCTION
Theory and practice differ substantially in their relation to power. The aim of this 
chapter is to map these differences in demonstration of another aspect of the 
conceptual framework which seeks to distinguish theory from practice.
Theory has oblique connections to power - it articulates ideas about power, but is 
detached from the effects of power. Theory is concerned with the exposition of the 
manifestations of power, making visible its various sources and forms, rather than 
any direct participation with these manifestations. While it could be argued that 
this in itself is a powerful position, the point must be made that theories in 
themselves are powerless, and it is only through the activities which are consequent 
upon holding certain theories that theory itself has any connection with power.
Practice, on the other hand, is directly involved in the manifestations of power. In 
practice, the effects of power can be seen, and through practice power is exercised. 
Rather than being distanced from the effects of power as theory is, practice, being
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the vehicle of power, is essential for the operation of power. Practice is both 
subject to power and exercises power itself.
These shifts in power in practice can be clearly seen in a nursing narrative. In this 
narrative power initially resides with the nurse to give pain relief and comfort, but 
it moves to the patient who has the power to give or withhold the information the 
nurse needs in order to be able to care. Ultimately power is shared by the creation 
of a situation from which both benefit.
•  Elsie was admitted with severe pain at the end of a late shift last summer. We 
settled her into a bed and she was given some analgesia. She slept for short 
spells through the night, the analgesia was repeated regularly and the pain 
gradually came under control. The next morning I asked Elsie if she would like 
help with a wash. She agreed. As I washed her I was aware she was just letting 
me go through the motions of giving her some care; allowing me to do something 
she had no heart in. But what exactly hadn't she got her heart in? Was it the 
washing, the care, or was it more than this? I wanted to know how Elsie was 
feeling. I tried to frame a question so that she would answer it truthfully rather 
than in a way designed to make me feel better. I couldn't find the right words. 
So gently I asked Elsie: 'How are you feeling this morning?' Elsie told me 
wearily that she was feeling tired. As I helped Elsie to dress I tried to stay 
quiet, to be gentle with her. I didn't want to add to her weariness by talking. 
When she was in the chair I asked if she would like me to oil her legs and put on 
her support stockings. Elsie agreed. As I sat on the floor and gently massaged 
her legs, Elsie began to tell me more. She said she felt tired of fighting, that she 
knew that 'her time had come'. She felt sad for her family that she couldn't fight 
anymore to 'give them the time they needed to catch up with me'. As Elsie was 
telling me this I gently carried on oiling her legs, aware that what I did or said 
might have an effect on her - she could continue to tell me how she was feeling or 
she could stop. I hoped that she would feel that I cared for her. She was looking 
straight into my eyes, penetrating right into me. All this time I was telling 
myself 'hang in there Sue, stay with it, that's all that's being asked of you'. 
Elsie explained to me how her disease had progressed quickly, how little time 
her family had had to get used to the idea that she was sick, let alone dying. Her 
husband wanted so much for her to try more treatments to find something that 
would work and make everything all right again. He was angry at her for being 
tired of fighting, for accepting that she was getting more poorly. She felt 
abandoned by him, hopeless. By the time Elsie had told me these things, I had 
finished putting on her stockings. We sat quietly together for a while. Elsie 
seemed to have said all she wanted. How do I close this, I thought? As she
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moved, she dismissed me saying she would like to rest now. I went away gently, 
not wanting to disturb the intensity of the time we had spent together. I thought 
about what had happened. I told myself that although I had felt that I had nothing 
to offer, I had in fact given Elsie quite a lot. I think I gave her an opportunity to 
express how she was feeling; I showed her that I wasn't afraid to listen. And I 
think I gave her a little bit of me. I think about that little bit of me. I wrote 
that evening: ' I stayed with the patient but my heart emptied of everything that 
could protect me.' I have never written down how I have felt after talking to 
anyone like this - barren and vulnerable. I recognise it by the way I quieten 
myself , by the way I strain every sense to capture what I am being told. A 
month later, rereading what I had written, I wonder how many times I have felt 
like I did that day. To me, what I had written was overwhelmingly powerful. 
But then to work with patients is powerful, often overwhelmingly. Somehow as 
nurses we cope. (Duke, 1992:50)
This narrative captures the nuances of power as it is encountered in practice. 
Power is revealed in encounters between practitioner and client in subtle ways as 
this narrative shows, as well as in more obvious overt displays.
Power, therefore, can be analysed on various levels. On a macro-level, power is 
seen as operating in a subjugating and controlling manner - it dominates through its 
material forms and through society's cultural structures. In this sense those who 
are the most economically productive and those with the most articulate structures 
have the most power. Bourdieu (1977) analyses this as symbolic power exerted 
through socio-cultural apparatuses in sophisticated societies. The dominant class 
simply has to let the system it dominates take its own course in order to exert 
domination. Thus they define the field, determine the rules, shape the language in 
which it is discussed and prosper from their dominance, but always at the expense of 
others. The fact that they succeed in exerting this symbolic power is a result of the 
recognition of their symbolic 'capital' by others (Marker et al, 1990). In less 
sophisticated societies, where economic, cultural and educational systems are 
inadequate to sustain domination by symbolic mechanisms, power operates on an 
individual or corporeal level. At this macro-level, ideology [such as an ideology of 
education, of democracy, of economics], and hence theory, is involved with the 
production of dominance.
It is also possible to analyse power at the level of the mechanisms or effects of 
power - the micro-level, where the actual operations of power are manifested. 
This analysis is proposed by Foucault (1980) who is interested in the actual
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apparatuses of power - the mechanisms which are necessary, for example, for the 
confinement of insane people, for the médicalisation of delinquency, for 
surveillance. This approach considers how power is constituted and constructed at a 
basic, practical level. It deals with the embodiment of power. Foucault 
(1980:125) argues, power
becomes a m atter of obtaining productive service from individuals in their 
concrete lives. And in consequence, a real and effective 'incorporation' of power 
was necessary, in the sense that power had to be able to gain access to the bodies 
of individuals, to their acts, attitudes and modes of everyday behaviour.
As Gatens (1992) points out, this does not negate the existence of symbolic and 
material overarching forms of power, but seeks to emphasise the less spectacular 
but more insidious forms of power. Foucault argues that power, when it is 
exercised through these subtle mechanisms, is not based on ideological constructs, 
being both much more and much less than an ideology. It is visible only through 
practices - or what Foucault calls its external visage, where it installs itself and 
produces its real effects. Hence theory [ideology] is not directly involved in this 
form of power. This is a form of power discernible in practice alone.
In this sense, then, practice relates to power as both dominating and dominated, as 
opposed to the oblique relation between power and theory. This domination takes 
different forms, all of which have the effect of shaping practice. Some of these 
forms of domination are now analysed.
9 .2 . INSTITUTIONAL
On a macro-level, one form of domination of practice is through socially constructed 
institutions or systems, together with their associated symbols and status 
structures. It is within these that practice takes place, and thus through these that 
the effects of power can be seen. Theory, on the other hand, is not directly involved 
in the workings of these institutions, although theory is obliquely associated with 
them through its articulation of them. Consequently theory is not directly affected 
by the power of institutions in the way that practice is.
Bourdieu (1977 ) has shown how, historically, some groups and sub-groups 
actually possess more power than others, and thereby succeed in exerting control 
over others (Marker et al, 1990), thus establishing institutionalised power. Once
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institutionalised, this power dominates and determines practice - such as the 
institutional conceptions of the family affecting many legal, social and medical 
practices. Gilbert (1995) demonstrates how the concept of the family shapes not 
only health care practices but is carried forward into a web of social practices.
In the field of health care it is the institution of medicine which occupies this 
position of domination. Ladd (1981) puts forward the argument that as a group 
doctors are no longer private entrepreneurs but have become part of the power elite 
in that, as a result of the new technology at their disposal, they have become decision 
makers with powers to decide and determine outcomes far in excess of what was 
available a few generations ago. Not only does this power give them control over the 
lives of other individuals, but it also enables them to determine the prevailing 
hegemony which consequently dominates all other health care workers. Wellard 
(1992) notes that doctors are legitimately empowered by the state to determine the 
direction of health services, which results in society accepting the medical view of 
health as the legitimate model. Drawing on the work of Willis (1989 ), she 
analyses this power as authoritarian and deterministic, enabling the medical 
profession to maintain a monopoly over health care delivery. The effect of all this 
medical dominance of the health care sector is that other health care workers feel 
powerless in determining their own practices.
Many writers have pointed up the effect of this hegemony on nursing practice. 
Benoit's (1989) study of the development of midwifery in Canada found that 
traditionally mid wives possessed a vast store of knowledge - practical, experiential 
and personal - which they had used in their rural practices, but in regional 
hospitals the medical dominance of maternity care and the technological orientation 
of large hospitals had virtually eliminated this, reducing the midwife's role to that 
of hand-maiden and technocrat. A similar development was noted in nursing. 
Church & Poirier (1 9 8 6 ) argue that historically nursing has been in an 
apprenticeship relationship to medicine which has had the effect of significantly 
stunting the professional development of nursing. Maeve (1994) shares this view, 
arguing that because nurses are socialised into the hierarchical, power based model 
of healing, they tend to minimise, mistrust and undermine their own contribution as 
healers and their own caring practices.
The current prevailing dominance of nursing is not only by the medical profession, 
but also by hospital administration. Church & Poirier (1986) maintain that since 
the work of the majority of nurses is confined to institutions in which they have 
little authority, their practices are severely restricted. This curtails not only
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practice, but also the development of nursing. Colliere (1986) makes a similar 
point by contending that the whole health care system is ruled by a dominator- 
dominated system, where only doctors and administrators are considered capable of 
making decisions. Although nurses have to make many decisions in order to assure 
the health care service, they are deprived of any recognition of their decision­
making capacity. Consequently they are socialised into judging themselves from the 
perspective of the dominant professions and thus denigrating their own position, 
status, knowledge and practices.
Colliere (1986:103) argues that this dominance affects patients as well, who are 
"bound to accept what has been decided for them, not with them". This perception of 
the powerlessness of patients in the clinical situation has recently become of great 
interest to nurses who see their practice as including that of acting as patients' 
advocate against this prevailing power of the medical and administrative 
professions. A nursing narrative illuminated this. The nurse recognises the 
patient's powerlessness, and acts on her behalf.
•  Mabel was not a pleasant woman by all accounts. The brief history I gleaned 
painted a dismal picture of self-neglect, antisocial behaviour and cruelty to 
animals. She was known as unco-operative and extremely unpleasant, and here 
was I, about to admit her to the nursing home where I am matron. Mabel 
suffered from osteoarthritis. Her lower limbs were severely contracted and she 
had survived for goodness knows how long by crawling around her bungalow on 
her hands and knees, sleeping on the floor and eating dog food. She refused all 
help offered by the social services department and had refused entry to the 
warden and her home help. She was finally taken to hospital by ambulance, 
following a fall, and there she had remained for eight months. She was filthy 
and needed several baths before being considered fit to join the other patients in 
the ward. After her admission, her warden-controlled bungalow was fumigated, 
its contents burned and her pets destroyed, since they were suffering from 
maggot infested open sores and malnutrition. Mabel was installed in her own 
nicely decorated, comfortable room and she hated it. She hated the nurses for 
the cleanliness they forced on her. She hated the intrusion on her privacy. She 
hated the other residents and, above all, she hated her lack of freedom. Despite 
all this I liked her - she had guts. She was not going to give in. I began to  
wonder if I had done the right thing, bringing her here. Mentally she was 
extremely alert and knew what she wanted. Did I have the right to force our 
standards on her? If she was happier struggling on at home in filthy conditions, 
should she not have the right to do that? I decided to contact various people with 
a view to returning her home, and they all said no. After three months of
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watching her misery, I finally convinced the powers that be that she should go 
home for two weeks' trial to see if she could cope. I knew that she would not be 
able to cope unaided, but a care package could be arranged for her. Mabel went 
home. She is not coping well. Her care in the community is costing a fortune 
and her standard of living is poor in my opinion. But she is happy and alive 
again, and the smile on her face when I visit overrides all my doubts about 
sending her home. (Anon, 1992a:46)
As nursing is traditionally a women's occupation, its practices are subject to 
domination by another social institution in addition to the medical establishment and 
administration - that of patriarchy, which affects the position and status of women 
in society as a whole. Rich (1976) discusses the unconscious dominance of 
patriarchal power over woman, the pervasiveness of this power and how it limits 
women's expression. She argues that it is difficult to grasp as it saturates 
everything, even the language in which it is described. Its pervasiveness is such 
that women have access to only so much privilege or influence as the patriarchy is 
willing to accede and only for as long as the price for male approval is paid. In 
these terms women's practices are only valid and visible to the extent that 
patriarchy is prepared to acknowledge them. History shows that this is not 
extensive, particularly in caring practices. Colliere (1986) contends that the 
only visible work performed by women carers is that which is task-orientated in 
relation to [male] medical treatments - caring practices are never revealed as part 
of this work. Versluysen (1980) argues that because of the power of male view 
point, women's work in health care and healing roles has been trivialised or 
ignored, or dismissed as amateur domestic medicine.
These institutional dominations determine the shape and validity of nursing 
practices. Wellard's (1992) study of the practices of nurses working in renal 
dialysis demonstrates this. She found that dilemmas arose for nurses as they were 
expected to undertake medically determined work for which they had no legitimate 
authority, and that they had little power to determine the care they delivered. 
Their nursing expertise was not accepted by the medical profession as being either 
valid or valuable in the treatment of the patients, and consequently ignored. This 
shaping of nursing practices by the prevailing hegemony is examined by both 
Thompson (1987) and Stevens (1989), who point up the effect of unequal power 
relations on clinical nursing practices and the importance of understanding these 
power relations in making nursing practices visible.
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The participants in this study were well aware of the power of the medical system 
over nursing practice. Lara recounted:
•  There was a doctor on the ward who was prescribing medication at a dosage too 
high for the children, and the sister told him about it and he wasn't at all happy 
to be told, probably because of his position, even though she had worked on that 
ward for years and years and he is quite a newcomer, but because he was a doctor 
and she was a nurse he didn't want to be told he was doing something wrong.
Karin observed:
•  I think people are kidding themselves if they think you're a team and everyone's 
got an equal part to play in that team. It's not like that. Nurses do most of the 
work in the team, but the doctors get all the credit for it. No one genuinely 
thinks that everybody is on an equal footing.
Another aspect of this institutional domination is that it brings with it a 
hierarchical structure, with related status and symbols, as a means of enforcing 
domination. Not only is there a hierarchy within the medical institution itself, but 
because of its domination, its structure also pervades that which it dominates, 
causing a hierarchical structure within nursing as well. This was an important 
issue of the participants in this study, who saw this form of power functioning at 
various levels through the status of the different nurses, to shape their practice. 
Karin gave a general overview:
•  I think that the things that you do are affected by the relationship with 
everybody around you and the position you hold - I mean what is appropriate for 
a staff nurse to do might not be appropriate for an auxiliary nurse to do, or a 
student nurse to do. The power status comes with what grade you are as a nurse, 
so the higher grade you are the more you're expected to know and the more 
experience you're expected to have, so somebody might expect that person to be 
able to do something they wouldn't expect somebody else to be able to do it they 
weren't of that particular grade. The activities that you undertake are affected 
by your power level, and I think, probably, the way that you behave as well to a 
certain extent.
The ability of this hierarchy to exert power over the patient was discussed. Kim 
spoke of this in terms of the status of the patient in the health care arena, and Jo 
referred to the role of symbols in the exertion of power. Kim:
•  You can say the patient is as much part of the team because without the patient 
there wouldn't be all these people, but no-one thinks that the patient is 
important.
Jo:
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•  When you put on your uniform there are expectations that you have to live up to 
- that you can nurse anybody in any situation and you have the upper hand.
Kathryn mentioned her powerlessness as a student nurse:
•  On one particular ward I was asked to take one end of the ward and I didn't feel I 
had the authority to ask some of the auxiliaries to help me, so I then ended up 
doing more than anyone cold possibly have expected me to do on my own.
Karin and Ben summed up the effect of power on practice. Ben:
•  Power shapes practice because people tend to do what nurses and doctors say 
because they think the nurse knows best. You can exert that power, and take 
advantage of it as well, and sometimes you do use it, but you don't use it 
indiscriminately, you use it because you know it is in the best interests of the 
patient. The power is there. It can be abused, and it also shapes practice.
Karin:
•  No matter how good your standards of practice are, if you're not in a position of 
authority or of some authority you're not going to be able to influence other 
people in their practice.
9 .3 . KNOWLEDGE-BASED
Another form of the domination of practice on a macro-level is through knowledge. 
Since theory, by its abstracting and articulation, is the means of making knowledge 
visible, it is obliquely relate to the source of the power rather than being the 
recipient of its effects. Practice, on the other hand, is directly affected by the 
power of knowledge.
It has long been acknowledged that knowledge is a channel of power, and that power 
and knowledge are inseparable (Foucault, 1980). Domination through knowledge 
occurs in various forms - two of which are relevant to this discussion: power to
the determine what counts as knowledge and therefore which forms of knowledge are 
valid and authoritative, and power from controlling access to knowledge itself.
The search for knowledge has been driven by the awareness that knowledge creates 
power, and this is particularly transparent in the fields of science and technology 
(Longino, 1993). Further analysis of the relationship between power and
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knowledge by both Bourdieu (1977) and Foucault (1980) demonstrates the power 
relations within various forms of knowledge, revealing that power plays a role in 
determining what counts as knowledge, and establishes a hierarchical order, or 
status, of various types of knowledge. In this way propositional and scientific 
knowledge is privileged over other forms of knowledge - which then, as Foucault
(1980) shows, become subjugated knowledges. Alcoff & Potter (1993) contend 
that traditional epistemology valorises and emphasises propositional knowledge as 
the paradigm of knowing, thus creating a hierarchy of knowledges that replicates the 
mind/body and mental/manual hierarchies and silences women's traditional 
knowledge as "old wives tales". This situation is sustained in the everyday world of 
practice because of what Thompson (1987) refers to as a characteristic of everyday 
life - a naive, pre-reflective adherence to established versions of the world which 
reinforces acknowledged power relations.
As propositional knowledge has gained dominance, other forms of knowledge, which 
are commonly found in practice, are left powerless (see chapter 7). Consequently, 
experiential, practical and personal knowledge, being subjugated forms, have an 
inferior status as knowledge in the power hierarchy, and therefore practice, to 
which these forms of knowledge are allied, is, as a result, subordinated. Various 
writers have addressed this. Castell (1989 ) argues that because of the 
asymmetrical power relations unequally invested in society's institutions, teachers' 
practice is supposed to be informed by their attention to theory or propositional 
knowledge - academics are paid to perpetuate this asymmetry and unequal power 
distribution, as it becomes their profession to speak [propositionally] on behalf of 
those whose practical knowledge has been silenced. Douglas (1971) makes a 
similar point in his reference to Garfinkel's (1967) study of the work of the 
Suicide Prevention Centre, where practices were recast as "scientific standards" 
because of the power of propositional knowledge over practical knowledge.
Usher (1989) claims that this desire for power in the form of status and academic 
respectability leads to the search for theorised foundational knowledge in the field of 
adult education, whereas what practitioners need is not foundational but pragmatic 
knowledge. Moore (1981) sees this power of propositional knowledge [or theory] 
maintained in the practice of teaching through indoctrination by theoreticians - re­
orientation into the 'correct' way of thinking and acting - and this determines what 
is good practice. Students and practitioners can thus be manipulated to 'agree' with 
views which they are not sophisticated enough to dispute or strong enough to resist. 
Oakeshott (1962 ) perceptively suggests that this situation stems from the 
rationalist mentality in knowledge creation, which, having contempt for what it does
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not understand, sees custom and habit as bad in themselves, and thus ignores 
knowledge gained from experience, even though thereby this rationalist approach 
can only ever know half the story.
This dominance of propositional knowledge is equally apparent in clinical practice. 
Frankenberg's (1988 ) study of medical practice demonstrates how power is 
distributed in hospitals: those with the most [propositional] knowledge - 
physicians, consultants - also have the most power, and make the most influential 
decisions, while those with the least knowledge [in this context] - patients - are the 
most powerless.
The power of propositional knowledge has also been acknowledged in nursing.
y
Ingram (1991) suggests that nursing needs the propositional knowledge of theory in 
order to enhance the power of nursing and provide greater professional autonomy. 
Likewise Chinn & Jacobs (1983) propose the development of theoretical knowledge 
precisely because they see it as the basis for power. Bishop & Scudder (1991) 
point out that it is for reasons of power that nursing is being portrayed as applied 
theory, and one of the strongest objections to new curricula in nursing - which 
stress practical and interpretive knowledge - is that these will reduce the power of 
nursing. For the same reason, they suggest, the argument is put forward that it 
should be the academic community which decides what is acceptable in a nursing 
curriculum, irrespective of practitioners' considerations. On a similar note 
Thompson (1985) suggests that for reasons of power, nursing has accepted the 
authority of empiricism, and nursing scholarship and hence practice have worked to 
the agenda of this prevailing authority, even though this might not necessarily have 
been the most helpful or in the best interests of nursing - demonstrating the 
domination of propositional knowledge.
Not only is nursing education dominated by the privileging of propositional 
knowledge, but clinical practices are equally affected. Clare (1993) suggests that 
one of the major problems in clinical practice is the hegemony of theoretical 
knowledge and science. She found that students she studied place more importance 
on the practical knowledge they acquire during their clinical experience, but for 
examination purposes they are tested on propositional "classroom" knowledge. 
Thus, because of the hegemony of propositional knowledge, they experience their 
classroom education as a denial of their lived experience in clinical settings.
This phenomenon of students recognising the value and importance of their practical 
knowledge, but having to subjugate it, is referred to by Ferguson & Jinks (1994)
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as the hidden curriculum, and has been researched by various other writers (e.g. 
Fretwell, 1982; Melia, 1987). The fact that it is referred to as a 'hidden 
curriculum' emphasises its submissive position. In this study the participants saw 
this phenomenon as an 'inverse' power structure, where practitioners covertly put 
more faith in their own practical knowledge than in the knowledge advocated by 
theorists of the 'ivory tower', while overtly subscribing to the theories of 
propositional knowledge. Emma noted:
•  What has become important is doing the care, rather than all the theory behind 
it. Theories don't seem so important. If you know what you're doing with a 
practical thing, you're less likely to think about the theory because you've been 
doing it so long.
Elaine commented on what was important to her during the actual administration of 
parenteral nutrition:
•  When putting up a bottle of IV feed. I'm not thinking about the theory of 
nutrition. It's nice to know about nutrition, but I don't really apply that when 
I'm here on the ward. I'm not really that bothered about what's in the bottle, its 
more a case of the actual mechanics of how it's going in, setting the timer, the 
rate and all that sort of thing, rather than what nutrition this patient is getting.
Visintainer (1986 ) maintains that nursing practice has suffered from the 
privileging of propositional knowledge. She notes that there is an order of primacy 
that governs practice - scientific knowledge has dominance over the practical and 
intuitive knowledge used in caring practices, and issues of the body are dominant 
over those of the mind. She suggests that while no one in nursing or medicine would 
deny the importance of the psychological, cultural and spiritual aspects of health 
care, these are relegated to the domain of "common knowledge" available to the care 
giver merely through living, and as such not included as valid knowledge, or 
sidelined. This deprives nursing practice of valuable information and ideas for the 
delivery of care. Hanson's (1994) study of the care of cancer patients found 
similarly that the nurses' common-sense knowledge and skills in relation to  
psycho-social care of persons with cancer remain submerged, reflecting the 
dominance of the scientific knowledge and the medical model of health care. Yaros 
(1991) suggests that, although nurses are the single largest group of health care 
providers and should command great power, this power is not realised, as power 
resides in scientific practices which nurses have not been able to translate to the 
bedside. Nurses have been insidiously socialised into believing the medical 
monopoly on health care which has subordinated nurses and rendered their 
knowledge illegitimate.
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This relegation of practice in the hierarchy of scientific and propositional knowledge 
was observed by Ben:
•  Nursing is a very practical job. It has a lot of scientific knowledge behind it and 
theory behind it, but if you look at who does the practical side of things, it is 
always the lower end of the scale, the lower end of nurses [i.e. in terms of 
status].
Another way in which knowledge is used in domination is by controlling the access to 
knowledge. Lerner (1986) argues that by appropriating knowledge for themselves 
and excluding women, men established patriarchal dominance. In clinical practice 
this domination is obtained through controlling access to the knowledge needed for 
practice. This is demonstrated in the narrative about Elsie (quoted above) - Elsie 
controlled the knowledge the nurse needed to care for her and thus kept control of the 
situation. In this study the participants were aware that, as students, they were 
kept in a powerless situation through the denial of access to knowledge. Karin 
recounted:
•  I don't know something because I've not actually been looking after that patient, 
but some people seem to know things about patients that they haven't been 
looking after. I don't know whether its because if you're a staff nurse and in 
charge of an area or in charge of the ward in general, people feed things back to 
you. If you're not in charge, you don't get to know all the little things. People 
don't feed things back to you, because you're not in charge.
Kim suggested:
•  Perhaps at times you don't need to know that thing about a particular patient. 
It's partly what position you're in on the ward.
9 .4 . TEMPORAL
A further form of the domination of practice on a macro-level is through time. 
Theory and practice relate to the power of time differently. Since theory stands 
outside the immediacy of time, it is not subject to the controlling effects of time, 
whereas practice is placed in direct relation to time and is governed by it.
The significance of time in creating power derives from the notion that control of 
time confers power. Those who have most control over their time are deemed more 
powerful that those whose control over their time is limited. Starkey (1988) 
recognises this in his analysis of power in industry. He suggests that it is through
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the control of time that power is exerted over the labour force. Using a Marxist 
framework, he demonstrates that industry is organised around clock time through 
which discipline and control are exercised, and that in order to liberate workers 
from the control of capitalism it is necessary to free them from work-controlled 
time, thus giving them time over which they exercises their own control. A similar 
analysis is given by Davies (1990). In a hospital setting Frankenberg (1988) 
shows that power relations are maintained through the control of patients' time - 
the patients are made powerless thereby ensuring their conformity with treatment 
by removing from them all control over their time.
Zerubavel (1979) observed how this control of time in hospitals is related to status 
and power within the hospital. More power is accorded to those with greater 
control over their time scheduling, giving most power to consultant physicians who 
have most control over their time. Power then decreases through the hospital 
hierarchy via more junior doctors to nurses, leaving the patient, who has virtually 
no control over his time in hospital, powerless. This phenomenon was recognised in 
this study by Ben, who also noted the effect of this control:
•  The patient lets the consultant walk off without asking him what this treatment 
involves, how long they're going to be in hospital, and then afterwards they think 
to ask the nurse, you know, how long will I be in hospital, what does this 
treatment mean, 'cos the nurse seems to have more time and so is less important 
and they don't want to waste the consultant's time 'cos they don't feel themselves 
as being important enough.
The effect noted by Ben is that the powerless patient acknowledges the importance of 
time in creating the power differential, by not wanting to "waste" the time of 
someone whose time is deemed more important than his own. This effect was 
mentioned by Lara, but in her case the less powerful person is the student nurse:
•  Sometimes you just have to drop what you're doing. If the doctor asks you to run 
and get something for him you might be busy, but you feel that you ought to go 
and get it because perhaps his time is more important than yours at the time.
In his study of the use of time in hospitals, Frankenberg (1988 ) notes the 
juxtaposition between the art of healing and the science of curing. In healing, the 
healer meets the sufferer in the sufferer's own time, as an equal, so that control of 
the time is shared equally between the two, with neither dominating. However, in 
practising the science of curing - analysing and treating disease - physicians 
distance themselves in time from the patient, spending only as much time with the 
patient as they need to, thus remaining in control of the use of time and thereby
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exerting power over the patient. There is a correlation here between the practices 
of nursing care and medical cure - the former being able to exert less control over 
time in the hospital situation and thus having less power than the latter.
Power is thus exerted over practice through time. Those with the more control 
over their time have more power to determine practical activities. This was noted 
by the participants in this study. Lara (quoted above) observed how her practice 
was influenced by those whose time she considered more important than her own, 
and Ben showed how this relation between time and power affected his practice from 
a different angle:
•  When you're a junior student, you work alongside your mentor and you work to 
their time, but in your third year you've got more experience and you can 
organise your own care-giving to a certain degree, so you have your own time as 
well.
9 .5 . PRACTICAL
The above discussions have centred on an understanding of power as operating on a 
macro-level. There is another approach to the analysis of the workings of power 
which throws a different light on its relation to practice. Foucault (1980 ) 
analyses power at the level of the actual mechanisms of power - where it actually 
happens. At this micro-level power resides in the concrete ability of each 
individual to hold power, and by partially or totally ceding it, enabling political 
power or sovereignty to be established. In this sense power only exists in action or 
practice. This analysis puts a different complexion on the relation between power 
and practice. Power is not exerted over practice [as discussed above], but rather it 
operates through practice, since it is only in actual activities that power is able to 
be exerted. This places practice in a powerful, rather than a dominated position.
This analysis of power concurs with Bourdieu's ideas of symbolic power, which he 
sees as existing, not in the domain of ideology, but rather within the domain of 
practice itself. A trivial example of this is the power residing in the cultural 
practice of queuing which is needed to subtly control a group of anonymous 
individuals boarding a bus if any of them are actually to get on the bus (Marker et al, 
1990). Gatens (1992) also moves the debate to the micro-level of the operations 
of power in her critique of gender dichotomies. In arguing for human bodies to be
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seen in their historical contexts, she shows that it is through cultural practices that 
bodies become powerful: female bodies, associated with and defined by the cultural 
practices of domesticity, are less powerful than male bodies which are associated, 
historically and currently, with public practices. She sees power as not reducible 
to what is imposed from above on biologically differentiated male and female bodies, 
but rather as being constitutive of those bodies, which become male or female as a 
result of various practices, both current and historic.
Stevenson (1976) gives an illustration of this power in practice in his examination 
of social relations in production. He suggests that in service occupations consumers 
must enter into a subservient relationship with service workers in order to receive 
the service - they must become the "client" to the "professional", as seen in the 
relationship of the patient to the doctor or nurse, the student to the teacher, the 
civilian to the policeman.
The power of practice has been identified in the nursing literature. Henderson 
(1994) demonstrates how the nursing practice of recording particular information 
on a chart - such as the 24 hour observations flow chart, located near the patient in 
an Intensive Care Unit - becomes the pivotal point for generating knowledge about 
the patient and shaping further activity by determining the priority of needs 
requiring attention. This practice of recording data carries a significant amount of 
power at the micro-level. Hewison (1995) demonstrates the power contained in 
the nursing practice of using terms of endearment in addressing patients - the nurse 
becomes the "parent figure" reinforcing control over the "childlike patient", and 
Taylor (1992b) recounts that nurses in one unit, recognising the power and 
authority that the practice of wearing uniforms gave them over the patients, 
desisted from this practice.
A more subtle account of the power of practice is given by Rocheron (1991) in her 
analysis of the Asian Mother and Baby Campaign. Her analysis shows how the 
practices of the health workers define the needs of the clients in terms of dominant 
professional ideologies and structures rather than the actual needs of the clients 
themselves, thereby reinforcing rather than challenging the normative and racist 
conceptions of the family and health care.
Nursing narratives provide two contrasting demonstrations of how power is 
embodied in the actual activity is being carried out - practice itself. In the first, 
the nurse, through her practice, exerts power over a patient in an overt manner.
- 171 -
•  Paul was transferred to my children's plastic surgery ward from the unit that 
had cared for him since he lost a leg in a car accident in Scotland several weeks 
before. Paul was almost totally unresponsive to all my efforts and his mother 
was tearful and concerned about being in a strange environment, having got to 
know the Scottish unit quite well. I felt that Paul needed to be active again as 
soon as possible and spent the rest of the day racking my brains as to how to 
achieve this. He had lost a lot of skin on his sacrum, which had been grafted but 
was not yet healed, and his stump was red and sore. He had spent several weeks 
being nursed on his side or tummy and was very stiff. The following day I 
discussed with the physiotherapists the possibility of using a modified 
skateboard for Paul to get around on. They found me a low trolley, which was 
padded and low enough for Paul to propel himself around using his arms and 
hands, which needed to be exercised before he progressed to using crutches. The 
'skateboard' was shown to Paul - who refused point blank to try it. We showed 
it to him frequently, even getting another child to demonstrate its use, but it 
stayed unused for several days. I was convinced that Paul needed to be a normal 
little boy again and felt that, in spite of his mother's protestations and tears, he 
needed that 'skateboard'. That afternoon I lifted him, screaming, on to the 
trolley, watched anxiously by his mother, and then wheeled him into the 
playroom. Several interesting toys were placed within his reach, although he 
refused to play with any of them - but he did show a marked interest in his 
surroundings. The following day I went straight to Paul's bed - to find his 
mother sitting alone and the bed empty. I asked where he was. 'He's in the 
playroom, playing with the nursery nurse,' she said. I knew then that I had been 
right to force Paul to go to the playroom on the previous day, and felt convinced 
that he had 'turned the corner' and would make a far speedier recovery. 
(Friedman, 1992:37)
While it could be argued that the nurse in this narrative was wielding power 
institutionally vested in her by her position on the ward, it must be pointed out that 
the patient was young enough not to recognise that power and thus not to be 
influenced by it - in fact he refuses initially to do as required - he refuses to be 
subjected. It is in the actual practice itself that the power was eventually exerted.
In the second narrative power remains in the practice itself, but it is exerted by the 
patient over the nurse.
•  He ignited the spark that changed my life. He, at 96, a being from another 
century, and I, met. I did everything I could to change his life and failed. He did 
nothing and radically changed my life. His reputation was that of a cantankerous 
old professor. He didn't like strangers but tolerated those in the blue uniform
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worn by sisters in the nursing home in which he had elected to end his days. I 
looked at him nervously. Here was an intensely private man, lying to attention 
in his neat bed in his private room. 'I hope you know what you're doing,' he 
said. We progressed through the washing, shaving, hair-brushing. When his 
thin frame was once again covered with clean, blue and white striped, flannelette 
pyjamas, it was time for him to return to bed. He closed his eyes, I was 
dismissed. Before leaving his room I glanced round it. It contained nothing of 
the man who occupied it except one big old-fashioned desk and a chair bearing the 
arms of a Cambridge college. There were no photographs, no newspapers, 
pictures, books. At home that evening my thoughts were full of the professor 
and how unacceptable I found it that he should spend his declining years with 
such a meagre quality of life. How did one go about improving a life such as his? 
My knowledge and experience widened as I sought the means to help the professor 
and prepared to 'do him good'. Then came the day I realised I must fail. I sat on 
his bed that afternoon in his seasonless world and said, 'There's astonishing 
news in the world today. Professor. Are you never curious about what is going 
on outside?' 'No,' he replied. 'There's nothing happening in the world today that 
can possibly be of any interest to me.' I wasn't going to give up. 'Professor, 
today the Berlin Wall was breached by ordinary people.' There was silence. He 
lay still and straight, thin pale fingers threaded across barely moving chest. 
'My dear,' he said, 'life is over for me. I have lived too long. I came here 
because I recognised that life was over for me.' I felt myself becoming 
unforgivably exasperated. 'Whatever do you think about all day?' I asked. 'You 
must thing about something.' He turned his head towards me. 'I left school as a 
boy of 18. They trained me as a soldier. I spent the whole of that war in the 
trenches. I went in a schoolboy and witnessed things you cannot imagine. I 
came out a lieutenant and I regard that as the greatest achievement of my life. 
What I saw then, the best of it and the worst of it, has been with me all my life 
and is with me now. There is nothing that can happen today that can possibly be 
of interest to me.' He closed his eyes. I accepted failure. We still know each 
other, the Professor and I. I am the matron now, but I wouldn't be if it hadn't 
been for him. His steadfast refusal to allow me to decide what would 'do him 
good' taught me to respect the individual, preserve individual dignity and protect 
the right of the individual to choose and refuse. From his seasonless, timeless 
room, he still chooses and refuses. (Fieldhouse, 1992:40)
In both these contrasting narratives the power is not generated by institutions, 
knowledge or time, but through the practices themselves.
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9 .6 . CONCLUSION
While the latter discussion of a powerful practice seems to oppose the previous ideas 
regarding a dominated practice, both serve to illustrate the contrast between the 
theory and practice with respect to power: practice, whether exerting power or 
being dominated, has a direct, immediate relation to power whereas the relation 
between theory and power is oblique and remote.
Many issues of power have of necessity been left unexplored. Writers have debated 
whether it would be in the best interest of practice to emulate theory in order to 
obtain this remote yet socially valued, unassailable power of theory (Gatens, 
1992), and some point to nursing care plans and other academic and bureaucratic 
inventions as attempts to do this (Bishop & Scudder, 1991). Others (Benner, 
1984; Bishop & Scudder, 1991) argue that power should stem from excellent and 
innovative practice rather than from theoretical prescription or bureaucratic 
authority. These are pertinent and interesting issues related to power in practice, 
and could extend the debate laterally.
However, it is possible to conclude from the above discussion that the relation in 
which theory and practice stand to power is radically different. Theory is detached 
whereas practice is directly involved. Theory externalises power, makes it 
visible, whereas practice - whether being subjected to power or exercising it, 
dominated and dominating - is a vehicle for power.
This chapter has considered the difference between theory and practice in relation to 
power as another facet of the conceptual framework which seeks to distinguish 
theory from practice.
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CHAPTER 10 
MODALITY
10 .1 . INTRODUCTION
Theory and practice differ in the manner in which they operate. Theory functions 
in a systematic and well-regulated mode. It follows clear rules and set procedures. 
The methodologies employed are structured and well-articulated.
This is not necessarily the case in practice. The mode of nursing practice is fluid 
and changeable as it adapts to cope with local circumstances and unpredictable 
events. This fluidity facilitates the ability to be responsive to need.
Nursing practice operates in a way which enables the work of others: it is a medium 
or milieu which allows other activities and health care practices to take place - a 
cytoplasmic mode. It provides the conditions which capacitate other health care 
workers, and integrates various strands into a meaningful whole. As Lara describes 
it in this study:
•  I suppose you can think of nursing as being the glue between them all. You 
bring it all together and make it cohesive.
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Although guidelines and policies exist, there are no specific rules which govern 
practice, as it would be impossible to furnish rules for every practical eventuality. 
It therefore functions in an undifferentiated manner which enables it to assume the 
appropriate conformation in each particular situation, as a response to that 
particular situation. This could be referred to as a common-sense mode of working, 
in that no specific laws, other than everyday wisdom, govern each individual 
situation.
A narrative illuminates this. The narrator describes how the common-sense 
modality of her working with a patient suffering from Alzheimer's disease was fluid 
enough to adapt to his needs in a way that enabled him cope.
•  I had been running a day centre for frail elderly people. Mrs Stevens telephoned 
me and said that she had been talking to her GP about her husband, a 67-year- 
old man with Alzheimer's disease, and he had suggested that now was the time to  
lay the foundations for the support that she would require in the future. Mr 
Stevens had been a bank manger, a well-read and widely travelled man who loved 
music. He had been slowly deteriorating for about 10 years although it had been 
recognised for only seven of these. Mrs Stevens felt very guilty about the three 
years when the disease had gone undiagnosed, as she felt she had been impatient 
and unsympathetic to her husband. She was now inclined to be over-protective 
towards him and did not see her needs as a carer as being important. I spent the 
day as I did with all new patients, trying to establish his likes and dislikes. It 
was difficult to communicate with Mr Stevens; his powers of concentration were 
very poor and he was confused by his surroundings. He constantly looked for his 
wife and his restlessness disturbed the other patients. His wife came to collect 
him early, to the obvious relief of all concerned. The following week Mrs 
Stevens was more relaxed about leaving her husband. However, Mr Stevens was 
just as restless. That afternoon the patients got together to sing old-time songs. 
Mr Stevens put back his head and closed his eyes. Did he like it or was he trying 
to shut it out? The following week I obtained a selection of tapes from the 
library - some classical music and a talking book. I sat Mr Stevens in a quiet 
corner and played the music during the morning. The effect was wonderful. He 
appeared relaxed and contented and was no longer restless. In the afternoon he 
and another patient listened to the talking book. Remarkably, he even laughed in 
the appropriate places. Although I could not communicate with Mr Stevens, I 
had found a way in. Over the years I had to change my approach to helping Mr 
Stevens, but it still centred on music. He became unable to concentrate on the 
spoken word, but could look at picture travel books if someone sat and turned the 
pages for him and discussed the content with him. The music we selected had to
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be modified as his condition deteriorated. It was no longer possible to make him 
happy by playing rousing or choral music. However, quiet, gentle music had the 
power to calm him until he was unable to come to the centre any more. (Lloyd, 
1992:48)
This narrative gives some indication of the modality of nursing practice in one 
situation - no specific rules guide the practice, and the stance is fluid to enable the 
practitioner to react in an enabling manner to the needs of the patient. Various 
aspects of this modality will now be discussed.
10 .2 . FLUID
The fluidity of practice refers to its ability to change as necessitated by situations. 
Because it is not distilled to set configurations, it can adapt to meet demand. 
Without a fluent way of functioning, practice would become rigid and sterile and 
consequently inadequate. A flexible modality allows practice to be shaped diversely 
and from this it derives its effectiveness.
Oakeshott (1962) captures the essence of this when he describes cultural traditions 
as being pre-eminently fluid, but interpreted as fixed and rigid to a foreigner who 
sees things superficially and does not understand the subtleties. In the same way 
practice might be interpreted by the observer as comprising certain established 
procedures, which are in fact in a state of flux to the practitioner.
Castell (1989) develops this idea in her comparison between teachers' practice - 
spoken discourse and practical activity - and written text. Following Ricoeur, she 
maintains that written text 'fixes meanings' thus dissociating actions and meanings 
from the particular understandings and intentions of their agents, in that text is 
addressed in principle to anyone who can read. Actions thus become objective, 
making generalisations possible, whereas the practice itself remains embedded in 
the situation of the agent who created it. The liquidity and changeability of practice 
is replaced by the formality of theory.
Whitehead (1962) gives another sense of this fluidity in his use of the concept of 
fluid vagueness to describe sense-perceptions. These are our fundamental 
perceptions of the world arising directly from sense experiences of the world, and
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exist as part of the environment from which they emerge in an unabstracted way. 
He suggests that these common-sense perceptions exist as fluid vagueness in our 
consciousness - the mew and the feel of the cat; the colour, texture and taste of an 
orange. When given expression, they become thought-objects - a cat, an orange. 
He contrasts the fluency of these sense-perceptions with the exact definition of the 
thought-objects and suggests that for the development of scientific theory these 
unfixed sense-perceptions need to be replaced by the exact definition of the thought- 
objects of science - since the changeability inherent in the fluidity would make the 
formulation of theory impossible. In this the contrast between theory and practice 
can be clearly seen, since this changeability is vital to practice and any attempt to 
replace it with exact definition would fossilise it, rendering it ineffective.
Another use of the notion of a fluid modality is employed by Zerubavel (1991) in 
his discussion of how individuals perceive themselves. He suggests that a flowing 
reality exists where people experience themselves collectively - such as families, 
political parties, football fans, nations. They are part of their environment - the 
child is part the family, the fan part of the totality of the football match. However, 
when the experience of self is separate - a Muslim in a Jewish community - then 
the perception changes and the self appears as having firm and sharp contours, 
which merge into discrete entities that are clearly separated from their 
environment.
Zerubavel (1991) finds this fluidity additionally in the traditional practices of 
women. He suggests that women working at home traditionally have a less 
compartmentalised life than men, who experience a sharp split between home and 
work worlds. Women thus experience reality in more fluxile manner and are less 
likely to want to separate entities from their surrounding context. The same point 
is made by Davies (1990) who argues that because care and its demands cannot be 
constrained within certain time or space boundaries, and it is traditionally women 
who are involved in caring practices, women have difficulty in delineating their 
private and work lives. They develop a disposition which does not neatly divide one 
area off from another, and thus have a fluid approach to their life. This fluidity is 
also described by Smith (1979a) in terms of the traditional lives of women. She 
describes it as an openness and attentiveness to the needs of others in the mode of 
working of housewives: holding together and co-ordinating the strands of several 
lines of action and endeavour of others, while pursuing none of her own; being the 
means to the enterprises of others, holding a 'piece of the action' [often an essential 
piece] but not being central to it - being there for others. A fluid approach is 
necessary in order to 'be there for others' in a way which would most benefit them.
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The modality of nursing practice is recognised in the literature as being in a state of 
flux. MacLeod's (1990) study of ward sisters found that their practice used a 
flowing modality which operated in a complex way linking the moment by moment 
meaningful activities of the practitioners. MacLeod (1994) also suggests that 
although it is possible to extract rules for monitoring care from the practice of 
nurses, their actual care of individual patients reveals a much more changeable and 
subtle process than the textbooks describe. She describes the postoperative nursing 
care given by nurses: they recognise the normal patterns of recovery, but use a 
fluid approach to this in their care of individual patients by linking the particular 
abilities of the patient to what might be expected normally, and thereby helping each 
patient to find a way to recovery most suited to their individual needs. As Ben 
rather amusingly put it in this study:
•  You are not all starched people walking around following this book of ' How To 
Give A Bedbath' by whoever, I mean!
A nursing narrative demonstrates the fluid mode of care. Moving from an analytic 
basis of theoretical knowledge of disease, the narrator changes between routine 
activity and a supportive stance which relies on instinct to find the right care to 
help the mother of a dying child:
•  A six-year-old boy with a learning disability was admitted. He had a severe 
chest infection which was not responding to antibiotic therapy. His condition 
gave great cause for concern and after 24 hours the outlook was bleak. The 
decision was made to withdraw treatment, and the doctors arranged to speak to 
the mother and tell her that there was no hope. As time went on the child's 
condition worsened, but his mother seemed blissfully unaware of the probable 
outcome. She said how her child would enjoy the presents she had bought him 
for Christmas, but I knew this would never be. How could I help her realise the 
truth? Several attempts were made by nursing and medical staff to inform her 
about her son's condition. The message that he was dying never seemed to get 
across. A few days later I was talking to the mother and could see that she had 
shut out what was happening. Later, as I was making her bed, I looked across 
and saw a change in her face. I walked over and could see that the child was 
dying. I did not know what to do. His mother said nothing, but her face revealed 
all: she had realised that this was the end. I picked her child up and gave him to 
her. She held him tight and just said: 'Good-bye.' I held them both. The child 
died quickly, but we held him for a good while. Neither of us could speak. Some 
10 years later I met the woman again. She thanked me for helping her say good­
bye to her first son. (Ledington, 1992:41 )
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1 0 .3 . UNDIFFERENTIATED
The undifferentiated attribute of the modality refers to practice as acting in a 
manner which provides the milieu for other practices or therapies to take place - in 
this sense it can be referred to as cytoplasmic. Hence, like cytoplasm, it is also 
amorphous in that it takes on the required format in response to various needs. 
This modality of nursing practice is perhaps the oldest one recognised, being 
epitomised in the famous words of Florence Nightingale:
And what nursing has to do in either case, is to put the patient in the best possible 
condition for nature to act upon him. Nightingale, 1970 (1859 :75)
This component of the modality of nursing practice has been expressed as being 
fuzzy, because is constituted mainly by experience rather than clear-cut theoretical 
categories (Greenwood, 1993a).
There are both negative and positive aspects to this attribute of modality. Because 
the negative connotations are so strong and potentially damaging, professionally, due 
to its powerlessness, the modality as a whole is often ignored rather than risk being 
tainted by the negative components. This discussion will treat both aspects 
together.
In describing this aspect of modality as a medium, the idea of background is implied. 
This is found in the work of Schütz (1962) who suggests that in the common-sense 
world, what is familiar and ordinary provides the background against which the 
unusual can be recognised. It is this familiarity which enables day-to-day living to 
occur, so that each ordinary situation does not have to be approached as new. 
Zerubavel (1991) also uses the idea of background as a means of showing how sense 
is made of daily living. He suggests that, however essential this background is for 
conceiving the foreground, it is usually perceived as empty or void, like the spaces 
between buildings.
Another perception of this attribute of modality is that of the 'mediation' which 
women traditionally do - both at home and at the workplace - which gives concrete 
form to conceptual activities (Smith, 1987). An example of this is the work of 
secretaries, computer programmers, clerical workers and nurses, who provide the 
concrete conditions in which conceptual and abstract activities can be realised.
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Elsewhere Smith (1979a) describes the results of this mediation in the daily 
routines of women's lives as leading to a loose, episodic structure of their lives 
which reflects the ways in which their lives are organised and determined 
externally to themselves. This is often a consequence of caring practices, and 
Graham (1983:26) emphasises this point by describing care in this mediated 
manner. She maintains that care is experienced as an "unspecific and unspecified 
kind of labour, the contours of which shift constantly."
The points being made by these various writers is that, while this cytoplasmic 
attribute of modality is essential in the functioning of various aspects of life, and 
particularly in caring practices, because of its nature in providing background it 
receives little recognition. There are issues of power here which have been 
addressed in Chapter 9.
The nursing literature has addressed this attribute of modality obliquely, but some 
references to it can be found. In Miller's (1985) description of the real world of 
nursing as being "messy" - to distinguish it from the idealised perfection of the 
world of theory - can be seen the amorphous, cytoplasmic aspect of modality. 
Visintainer (1986) describes nursing as amorphous in its knowledge base in that it 
uses ideas and vocabulary from a variety of sources to create something different, 
and she argues that this eclectic approach is nursing's strength.
Maeve (1994) describes the cytoplasmic modality of nursing practice as the "in- 
between" stance - nurses mediate in-between patients and their physicians, the 
hospital systems, bureaucrats and other health care personnel as well as the family, 
friends and the community. She likens it to a web of connections between all those 
involved in the health care situation.
This in-between stance was recognised by the participants in this study. Ben 
described it thus:
•  Without nurses the doctors wouldn't know half of what's going on. Yea, the 
nurses are in-between aren't they - in-between patient and vice versa - you're 
in the middle so to speak, so you're working enabling both sides to work 
properly - the patient gets better, the doctor knows what's going on and can 
prescribe the right drugs and things like that.
Lara suggested:
•  In a sense you're in-between the patient and the doctor, and the patient and the 
hospital system, the patient and the family, and often you're acting as an advocate 
for them in those situations.
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Karin:
•  That nursing is the cytoplasm in which others can function is very much true. 
You're sort of the background. Without you it couldn't all happen, but no one 
recognises you as being an important element.
Bishop & Scudder (1991:18) give a detailed description of this in-between stance, 
showing how it is essential to the practice of nursing which is often
constituted by bringing together medical contributions, regulative control and 
permissions, and the personal aspirations of patients into systematic and personal 
daily care.
They indicate the negative aspects of this as being the lack of control that it gives 
nurses over their practice, but also stress the positive aspects: as nurses work 
much more closely with the patient than any other health care worker, they are in 
the best position to promote the patient's well-being by acting as advocate, as well 
as by bringing all aspects of care and care workers together is a systematic way. 
Bishop & Scudder (1991:20) illustrate this with a nursing narrative:
•  A physician was in a quandary concerning whether to aspirate the lungs of a 
patient who was in an advanced state of metastatic cancer. The patient suffered 
from hallucinations, and he often experienced severe pain. In addition, due to 
heavy smoking, the alveoli no longer functioned adequately. The physician 
believed that the right medical decision was to let the patient die. He did not 
discuss this with the patient; in fact, he rarely discussed treatment with anyone 
including nurses. He was a very technically competent surgeon who believed 
that he alone should determine the medically correct form of treatment. The 
nurse knew that the patient was weary of his struggle, felt hopeless and was 
ready to die. But she also knew that for some reason the patient had struggled to 
remain alive more valiantly than most other patients for whom she had cared. 
When she complimented him on his remarkable courage, he responded that he 
was not remarkably courageous at all. He merely wished to remain alive to 
celebrate Christmas with his family. The patient had a large family with strong 
attachments to their father and to each other. The family had a tradition of 
celebrating Christmas together, and Christmas was a few weeks away. In spite 
of the fact that the nurse knew that this physician did not receive suggestions 
concerning treatment from nurses "graciously", she shared her knowledge of the 
patient's wishes with the physician, and he aspirated the lungs. When the 
patient's loquacious family arrived to celebrate Christmas, there was much 
confusion and noise in the Oncology Unit. Complaints were made by other 
patients, some of whom were also near the end of their lives and felt they should 
have peace and quiet during that time and, of course, their wishes were
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supported by hospital policy. The nurse, knowing of another patient unit where 
the census was very low due to Christmas, arranged for the patient to be 
transferred to an isolation room on that unit where other patients would not be 
disturbed. She even allowed his two-year-old great granddaughter to be 
"smuggled" into the hospital, which at the time was against hospital policy.
This illustrates the in-between stance between the nurse, patient, physician, 
family, other patients, hospital administration and the nurse's knowledge of the 
local situation, and provides a good elucidation of the cytoplasmic nature of this 
aspect of modality.
10 .4 . ENABLING
Of all the aspects of modality, the one that elicited the strongest response from the 
participants in this study was the enabling attribute. This refers to the mode of 
working of nursing practice as supporting, assisting and sustaining others in 
whatever way they define their need for help. The 'others' are predominately 
patients or clients, but as important are other health care workers and the families 
and friends of the patient.
This phenomenon has been identified in the literature dealing with the lives of 
women. Davies (1990:107) refers to it as a nurturing rationality, found 
especially among women. A basic characteristic of this rationality is its "other 
orientation which takes the needs and reality of others into account," and its 
imperative of response to human need. It is a 'being there for others' (Smith, 
1979a).
Graham's (1983:18) analysis of caring describes the qualities of caring as a 
"sensitivity to the needs of others, an ability to wait, watch and adapt as these needs 
change". An important discriminator in this analysis is that of 'being' rather than 
'doing'. 'Being' is other-directed and contains an element of passivity in the 
positive sense [like waiting for the harvest to ripen or for a wound to heal] rather 
than the self-directed, active nature of 'doing'. It is through this 'being' that the 
enabling of others is possible - and this is an important aspect of this attribute of 
modality.
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Another slant is provided by Kaluzynska (1980) who addresses it from within the 
framework of the domestic labour debate where an attempt is made to assess the 
value of women's housework. This evaluation is difficult because there is no 
'product' at the end of it to appraise - probably because of its other-orientation. 
Kaluzynska argues that domestic labour transfers value rather than producing it - 
the housewife enables the production of workers' labour power rather than 
producing it herself. There is a correspondence between this and nurses' work in 
enabling the work of doctors, therapists and others.
Thus the feature of this enabling aspect of the modality of nursing practice is its 
responsiveness to the needs of others which implies: accepting the other's
definition of the need ; transferring control to the other; a positive passivity; an 
accomplishment of a 'product' of the work in terms of what is produced by the other, 
rather than by the self.
In this study this enabling aspect of modality received a lot of attention. Lara 
describes one enabling activity:
•  Sometimes the doctor might come to the patient and tell him about something and 
they'd [the patient] say 'Yeah, that's fine,' and when the doctor's gone you go 
back and say 'Did you understand that?' and he'd say 'No, I didn't, I didn't 
understand a word of it.' So in that way you're helping the doctor by explaining 
what needs to be said in ways the patient can understand it, and you're helping 
the patient obviously because they need that information to make their decisions.
Kathryn gives a more obvious example:
•  I think nurses are in a sort of enabling role. If you're a scrub nurse you're 
handing the surgeon the instruments enabling him to do the operation.
The selfless aspect is referred to by Karin:
•  You're like everybody else's dogsbody - you the doctor's dogsbody, you're the 
patient's dogsbody sometimes. You're never really sort of do anything as a nurse 
- you're always doing something - you're either carrying out somebody else's 
decisions, or you're doing something because the patient asks you to do it - I 
mean that is your job as a nurse. Everything that you do has to be regulated by 
other people. You know a patient needs a drug, but you can't give it to them 
because the doctor hasn't prescribed it. And you know that things need doing but 
you can't do them because the patient doesn't want you to do them, or the family 
might be being obstructive. So I think that you are continually there for other 
people, but you're not really there for yourself.
Ben identifies the enabling aspect as a consequence of teamwork which widens the 
scope to practices beyond nursing alone:
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•  The mode that nurses work in not only enables patients to get well but enables 
doctors to work and enables physios to work - yea definitely, because you're 
part of a massive team - you're all enabling.
10 .5 . COMMON-SENSICAL
Another attribute of this fluid, undifferentiated and enabling modality of practice is 
that it is regarded as a common-sense mode of working, in that it is related to 
everyday health activities, which are dealt with in an ordinary practical way as 
appropriate to the particular circumstances. Practitioners often do not refer to 
grand theory for guidance, but to their common stock of knowledge about the 
everyday circumstances affecting the situation.
In describing this common-sense modality Whitehead (1962:185) suggests it is an 
inherited method of working, and is part of the socio-cultural environment which 
gives rise to it. He maintains it is
the way we find ourselves thinking, a way which can only be fundamentally laid 
aside by an immense effort, and then only for isolated short periods of time. This 
is what I have called the "whole apparatus of common-sense thought".
Schütz (1962) calls it the "natural attitude", comprised of that which is typical and 
taken-for-granted without needing to be formally recognised. Nursing practice, in 
dealing with every-day, common-sense matters regarding health, is dealing with 
the ordinary and the familiar, and using commonly apprehended approaches - hence 
working in a common-sense mode.
These everyday, taken-for-granted practices are identified by MacLeod (1994) as 
the fundamental components of nursing practice, and as being complex and important 
in the care of patients - requiring, as she puts it "uncommonly common sense". The 
same point is recognised by McIntosh (1994). She describes a scenario where a 
district nurse adapts her approach to two different clients in similar circumstances 
according to the demands of each situation. When McIntosh attempts to understand 
how the decision to vary the approach was made, she is informed that it was simply 
common-sense. McIntosh's difficulty with this explanation stems from what she 
describes as her suspicion that her own store of common-sense would not have been 
sufficient in the circumstance.
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The point of these two examples is that while the modality of working is that of 
common-sense, the knowledge required is experiential and thus not available 
commonly to those who do not share the experiences.
This common-sense mode was recognised in this study by Lara when she described 
how she determined what assistance a semi-conscious patient needed in managing his 
toiletting needs:
•  It's not something that you would necessarily read in a book, but because its 
there in front of you its obvious to you. It's common-sense, I suppose.
Karin recognised the general nature of this common-sense modality:
•  I think in a way that is one of the problems with nursing - it doesn't have its 
own sort of domain really. As a nurse you're expected to have knowledge of 
things but you get the impression that people don't like you to have too much 
knowledge of things because then you're crossing over into their field of 
expertise.
Kathryn suggests:
•  As a general nurse on the ward you're not really considered to be an expert in 
any particular field.
10 .6 . CONCLUSION
This discussion has endeavoured to show a modality of functioning of practice which 
differs from the modes of function of theory - where the formal and systematic 
operations of theory are replaced by a more fluid, enabling, common-sense mode of 
working in practice. While there has been some reference to the literature outside 
nursing, the discussion has fundamentally concerned nursing practice, as the 
concept is particularly intricately connected to the specific caring and mediating 
practices of nursing.
Attempting to analyse the modality of nursing practice is not easy. The attributes 
mentioned give some indication of this, but raise many issues which are only touched 
upon - such as the 'invisibility' caused by the fluidity of such a mode of working, 
and issues of loss of power because the importance of background work is not widely 
recognised or rewarded.
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This discussion of modality does, however, provide some good pointers for the 
comparison of theory and practice. The easily visible, hard-edged, neatly defined, 
powerful foreground nature of theory contrasts with the fluid, undifferentiated 
enabling of others and common-sense aspects of nursing practice, furnishing a 
further dimension of the conceptual framework which distinguishes theory from 
practice.
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CHAPTER 11
INTENTIO NALITY
11.1 . INTRODUCTION
Theory and practice differ in respect to their deployment of aims. Theoretical aims 
give purpose and direction to theoretical work. They can be determined in advance 
and are used in a specific way to direct theoretical deliberation. They are 
constituted in a convergent and proactive manner. It is possible for them to be 
stated explicitly, as, for instance, Whitehead (1962) does when he declares the 
general aims for all scientific theory as the explanation of common-sense concepts 
of nature which consists in the preservation of these concepts in a theory of 
harmonised thought which agrees with experience.
The aims associated with practice, on the other hand, are construed differently. 
While a very broad aim or a general indication of purpose can be identified, anything 
more specific cannot always determined in advance, being dependent on particular 
situations or even nuances within situations. These aims are more divergent, 
complex and implicit, and only become clearer through the actual interventions and 
practices themselves. Consequently they are not deployed in the specific direction
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of actual practices, but rather as a general guide or sign of intent, and combine the 
notions of aims, purposes, ends and intent.
A nursing narrative illustrates this. The narrator had no specific aim in mind 
when approaching the patient, other than a general idea of attempting to help her. 
The aim developed as the interaction progressed.
•  It had been four days since Maggie's laparotomy and division of adhesions when I 
first met her. She was prominent on the ward because she attracted attention to 
herself. While administering the medicines to all the patients, I was 
interrupted nine times by Maggie either calling or ringing the bell. None of the 
calls were urgent, and I told her each time I would help her to get comfortable 
when I had finished. I moved her tissues, I poured her a drink; yes I would give 
her a sleeping tablet. In the end I had to speak calmly and firmly to her or I 
would not have got anything done. The more I saw of Maggie and her attitude to 
staff and other patients, the more I felt sorry for her despite my own 
frustration. I made up my mind to speak to her quietly on her own. It would be 
hard as she seemed to put up a barrier in front of everyone who approached her. 
The ward was busy. All the time I could hear Maggie's grating voice grumbling 
and groaning to anyone who would listen. It was nearly midnight when I sat 
down beside her. She seemed surprised: she was used to people doing the 
minimum then rushing away. At first the conversation was difficult. After 
several minutes, though, it all came out - she was self-pitying and totally 
negative. I did not say a word, just listened. Her medical history was 
comprehensive and she did not appear to have gone a few months without seeing 
her GP or being admitted to hospital over the past few years. This had all taken 
its toll on family and social life. She was divorced and her two grown-up sons 
had left home and did not visit her. It emerged that one of her main problems 
was being unable to sleep. Maggie said she had not slept properly for weeks and 
felt desperately weary. I did not profess to be able to solve her problems 
overnight but I thought I could help her to sleep by getting her to relax totally.
I explained to her what I would like to try. I made sure she was comfortable and 
began talking through the programme. Gradually, over a period of 20 minutes, 
Maggie calmed down and did seem to relax. Before long she had slipped into a 
peaceful sleep. Maggie appeared at the desk at 4 am after having slept for 3 i /z 
hours. My first reaction was, oh no, that didn't last long, but I soon discovered 
that the time did not matter, it was quality that counted and, according to Maggie, 
it was the best sleep she had had in weeks. I did not expect Maggie to have 
changed her personality overnight, but for a short time I had helped her achieve 
what she called a 'blessed relief. (Walsh, 1992:55)
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There are various attributes of the nature of the aims of practice, some of which 
will be discussed in order to demonstrate how they differ from the directed aims of 
theory.
n .2 .  REACTIVE
It can be argued that the aims of practice can be referred to as reactive, being 
dependent on, intrinsic to and implicit within particular situations. They are 
initiated by the specific circumstances of the context from which they derive. This 
contrasts with the proactive aims of theory.
Toulmin (1976) discusses this distinction between different types of aims in his 
discussion of the kinds of knowledge used by physicians. He suggests that knowledge 
of particulars [situations, events, people] can either be sought for its own sake - 
where a proactive aim guides the quest - or in the service of advice and advocacy - 
where the aim will depend on the need of the one for whom the advice or advocacy is 
sought, and hence be reactive. An example of the former is the biographer who has 
a predetermined aim in researching particular knowledge, whereas the aim of a 
friend in seeking the knowledge would depend on the expressed need of the person for 
whom the advice or advocacy is sought.
Glynn (1993) recognised this reactivity of aims in his analysis of the epistemology 
of design. He suggests that a design problem is more accurately referred to as a 
design complex, comprising various elements and aspects, and just as the nature of 
the problem depends upon the point of view or perspective from which it is 
observed, so too will the solutions offered. Therefore the aims are derived from the 
perspective of the observer.
In the field of education Peters (1972) expresses this notion succinctly. He argues 
that aims cannot be extrinsic to the activity, and questions about the aims of 
education are a way of getting people to be clear about what is worthwhile achieving 
in education. It is not to ask for the production of ends extrinsic to education.
Ferguson & Jinks (1994) find the aims of nursing practice are reactive, but add 
another angle to the reactivity - that of the hegemony of the values of the particular
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clinical setting. Thus while practitioners derive their aims from the needs of their 
patients or clients, these aims are also responsive to the prevailing norms and 
values of the institutions and contexts in which they are situated, much as the hidden 
curriculum influences the aims of individual teachers.
All these arguments give substance to the claim that in practice, aims are reactive. 
Further indications of the reactivity of the aims of nursing practice come from the 
respondents in this study, who readily identified this attribute. Lara described it 
thus:
•  Quite often the aims change half way through somebody's care because another 
problem which was more serious was discovered. I suppose the general aim is 
always the same but the objectives might change on the way, like when you get 
more information about their condition, or perhaps a social problem might arise 
that you didn't know about before. You might have been trying to get somebody 
back home but then you realise that since they've been in hospital they'll be 
unable to cope alone, so your aim is then to get the help they would then require.
Kathryn suggested:
•  I think that normally aims are reactive to a situation. The general aim is 
always to improve a given situation - so if its a wound, to try to heal the wound. 
But that might be the long term goal, but then you might have to change your 
short term aims to achieve the long term goal.
Karin gave an example of reactive aims:
•  Say someone's got a pressure sore. You want to heal it so you might originally 
intend to nurse the patient from side to side in the bed, but if the patient is 
elderly and their mobility is decreasing because they haven't been able to get up, 
you might have to change your aim to get them up so that they sit in a chair and 
mobilise from the chair, for a couple of hours a day, which probably wouldn't be 
what you originally intended to do, but might be something you had to do to 
prevent other problems from occurring, so its responsive to the situation. 
With elderly people you try to rehabilitate them say from a hip replacement - 
your aim is to get them self-caring so that they can go home, so you push them to 
do as much as they can. But then they might fall, so you might have to modify 
your goal so that perhaps instead of letting them walk with the frame 
independently, you have a nurse with them.
Ben remarked:
•  You're continually monitoring progress and changing your aims according to how 
things are going.
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1 1 .3 . MULTI-LAYERED
The aims of practice can be described as divergent in that there is a variety of 
possible endpoints associated with practices, any of which could be the desired 
outcome, depending on the particular situation. Additionally, these several 
outcomes can operate on various levels. Thus the aims of practice could be referred 
to as multi-faceted and multi-layered.
This is illustrated by a nursing narrative, where the overall purpose is to meet the 
health care needs of a patient dying of AIDS in his own home. During the practice 
interactions multiple aims emerge from the complexities of the situation, and these 
exist at various levels: from short term to longer term; aims associated with 
incidental minor needs to persistent major needs; aims related to physical needs as 
well as those on social and psychological levels.
•  John was discharged from hospital 15 weeks before his actual death. Owing to 
his perception of public attitudes towards AIDS he was ashamed of his illness and 
initially found it difficult to discuss it. The community nurses were asked to 
visit John in hospital to help build up a relationship with him and his mother, as 
both hoped he would be able to die at home. John was able to continue a 
restricted 'normal life' - he was able to return to work and the gardening he 
enjoyed. Returning to work was by no means an easy decision. John very much 
wanted to be 'normal' but was very distressed as to how his colleagues would 
respond to his illness and concerned that they might even shun him. After hours 
of talking this over with us, John decided that he would not tell his colleagues the 
true nature of his illness. I felt very sad that this decision had to be made as 
none of his colleagues would have been at risk, but I understood his reasons for 
it. On discharge John was self-caring, receiving intravenous drugs via a 
Hickman line. This was connected day and night for seven days, then daily for 
the remaining weeks of John's life. As John became more debilitated the 
nursing input became more than social calls. John found it increasingly 
difficult to maintain his own personal hygiene, so daily help was offered and 
accepted. John's mobility had become severely restricted, and the community 
physiotherapist was asked to visit and give her advice on passive and active 
physiotherapy. At this stage John developed a chest infection which was treated 
with antibiotics and physiotherapy to which the infection responded. John also 
had a problem with incontinence during the night for which pads were supplied. 
He found this aspect of his illness very difficult to deal with. Owing to his
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immobility his sacrum became slightly discoloured. A special mattress and a 
sheepskin were provided and a dressing applied. As John became less able to 
maintain his drug therapy, his mother, in conjunction with his GPs, who were 
very supportive towards the family, continued the therapy. John's disease 
progressed rapidly, but his trust in the nursing team increased considerably. 
When his muscle pain became intolerable we started him on analgesia supplied 
via a syringe driver after discussion with him. John died peacefully one night 
with all his family present. It was when I visited the following day to talk and 
try to answer any questions that I was greeted with 'Thank you, I didn't think 
anyone would want to nurse my son'. Nursing care does not finish when the 
patient dies. After visiting John's mother and discussing his death I realised 
that, by just being there and being able to offer professional and friendly help, 
John and his family had been able to accept his condition and death more easily. 
(Anon. 1992b:47)
This narrative demonstrates the multiple layering of the aims of the practice of 
these community nurses. At times several layers presented - the physical care and 
emotional support, or providing information, contacts and support - and at other 
times friendly help was all that was needed. On occasion various aims would be 
accomplished by single acts [supplying incontinence pads deals with the physical 
problems and reinforces his self-worth, enhancing his dignity in the face of 
degradation], yet in all these the aims would arise from the situation itself.
This idea of multi-layered goals resonates with Berger's & Luckman's (1971 ) 
theory of the construction of the practical everyday world. They suggest that the 
everyday world consists of multiple realities, in that objects are presented to the 
conscience as constituents of different spheres of reality [e.g. an awareness of the 
Empire State Building is different from the awareness of pain, or a state of anxiety, 
or a dream]. These multiple realities are integrated into a meaningful whole, and 
are dominated by a pragmatic motive which determines the relative prominence of 
each reality at any one time. Similarly, aims in nursing practice operate on 
multiple levels and the dominant level is determined by the situation at hand.
MacLeod (1990) identified these multi-layered goals in her analysis of nursing 
practice. Her argument submits that nursing practice has hidden complexities - 
that is, apparently simple actions have composite outcomes and significances - and 
because of the this, the goals are complex, implicit and multi-layered, and usually 
only become clear through the actions of the practitioner.
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In her comprehensive view of nursing, Henderson (1991) implies multi-layered 
aims. Against a background of viewing a hospitalised patient as deprived of the 
normal freedoms of life, such as privacy, choosing what to eat or be clothed in, etc. 
she sees the aim of nursing as keeping the patient in the "stream of life" - keeping 
the individual's day as normal as possible to the extent that it is consistent with the 
physician's therapeutic plan. This would be impossible without multi-layered aims 
reflecting the complexities of those in 'normal' life.
In this study Ben recognised the multi-layering as a consequence of the complexity 
of health care, as it addresses the totality of the person and the context:
•  Yes, the aims are multi-layered, yea - you're aiming for all aspects of life and 
basically your aims are, in any person, to improve them in whatever way you 
can.
n.4. INDETERMINATE
This attribute is a consequence of the reactive and multi-layered nature of aims. 
Because aims in practice are responsive to situations, changeable according to 
circumstances, exist on multiple levels and usually incorporate many layers of 
meaning, it could be argued that they can be regarded as indeterminate or not fixed 
in their focus, and therefore diffracted.
However, to argue that aims in practice are indeterminate could be construed as a 
contradiction in terms - and would necessitate a recognition that in practice aims 
are merely guidance measures, rather than the specific aims of theory which would 
have a stated endpoint to which the theoretical work is directed.
Glynn (1993) recognises this indeterminate nature of aims in the practice of 
design. He argues that the end product of design practice can often not be known 
initially. For this reason it is often difficult to know exactly which theoretical 
principles would apply in any given situation, and therefore rigid adherence to 
formulae is not always productive.
Ushers (1989) support for the notion of indeterminate aims in practice derives 
from his suggestion that the purpose of practical knowledge is to inform action [or, 
as Pellegrino (1979) suggests, the aim is to get enough information to take
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decisive, prudent and judicious action]. Therefore his implication is that with the 
practical, the aim is not predetermined.
From a slightly different angle Carr & Kemmis (1986) support the notion of
indeterminate aims by arguing that educational aims are not descriptions of some
desirable end state, but rather they are attempts to specify the sort of values to
which educational practice must conform if it is to be considered educational. In
that sense they are not specifically predetermined. In the same vein Peters
(1972) suggests that it is absurd to ask what the aim of education is, since the only
answer that can be given is to point to something intrinsic to education that is
regarded as valuable, such as the training of intellect or character - which is like
saying that reform does not lead to a person being better, but 'better' is the
criterion which must be satisfied in order for the change to be called 'reform'. Both
these arguments suggest that in the practice of education the aims can be construed 
as indeterminate.
Dewey (1958) recognises the undetermined nature of aims in his notion of "ends- 
in-view". He uses this in the context of the philosophy of science to describe the 
conscious aims which provide direction to achieve certain intended conclusions. He 
makes this distinction to explain the difference between the study of terminal state 
objects [a notion used by the ancient Greek philosophers who held that terminal 
objects were the proper focus of study because changing things were not capable of 
being known in relation to each other, but only in relation to objects beyond change 
- the terminal objects, which lent the changing objects the characteristics which 
made them knowable] and the study of things in their developing or changing state. 
Since terminal objects were already known, study of these could be regulated by 
stated aims or ends, but as changing objects could not be completely known, the 
study of these can only be directed by "ends-in-view". Similarly in practice which 
is not a static or terminal entity, the ends cannot be foreordained, but only 
expressed in terms of an ongoing process.
In this study Kathryn expressed this idea thus:
•  You are never doing one thing independently of everything else. You have always 
got other things which are influencing the particular problem that you're trying 
to solve and as these things change then you might have to change your aims.
Ben suggested:
•  Its hard to determine the aim with nursing isn't it. You try setting a nursing 
goal, and then doing a nursing intervention to achieve the goal, but not always 
can it be achieved, so it is undetermined.
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n.5. CONCLUSION
The aims used in practice have been depicted as intrinsic to the situation and 
therefore responsive to it, as having potentially multiple outcomes at various levels 
and as being indeterminate initially. This contrasts with the proactive, purposive 
and well-defined aims of theoretical work, where the aims are easily articulated.
It has been shown that, particularly in nursing practice, aims conform to a looser 
definition which suggests guidance and indication of general purpose rather than a 
specifically directed outcome.
In this sense, then, the aims of theory can be distinguished from those of practice. 
This provides another dimension of the conceptual framework of practice which 
enables it to be juxtaposed with theory.
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CHAPTER 12
NATURE OF ACTIVITY
12 .1 . INTRODUCTION
Theoretical work is characteristically deliberate, preplanned and intentional. It is 
convergent in that it is unified and directed toward a specific outcome in a roughly 
sequential manner. Control rests with the theoretician, and objectivity is a key 
influencing feature.
Practical activities, on the other hand, are diverse and fragmented. They are often 
dictated by the prevailing circumstances, and therefore have a loose cohesion only. 
Objectivity is not an overriding principle, and at times the use of a subjective 
perspective is an advantage.
A nursing narrative illustrates this. A community nurse visits an old woman and 
the nursing practice that emerges from the situation is diverse and reactive, based 
initially upon the routine activities which would normally be undertaken in such a 
situation, but changeable in response to the local need, and always driven by a caring 
imperative.
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•  A functionally blind 76-year-old insulin-dependent diabetic with congestive 
cardiac failure, Mrs Clark had been bedridden for seven years. Her primary 
care giver was an 11-year-old granddaughter. The house's condition was 
deplorable - no heat, no electricity, no hot water, no running water in the toilet. 
Mrs Clark agreed to let me in three times a week for 30 minutes to check her 
vital signs and measure her ankles. Collecting this data took 5 minutes at the 
most. Then I'd settle onto a pile of newspapers to listen to her. One afternoon 
Mrs Clarke's sister met me at the door. Mrs Clark had refused to be bathed and 
wouldn't touch her lunch. "She's funny that way. Moody, you know." Sure 
enough, Mrs Clark cursed at me and refused to let me check her blood pressure. 
She smacked my hand as I touched her cheek, but the cold, clammy skin I felt 
confirmed my suspicions. She was having an insulin reaction. Once I explained 
the problem to Mrs Clark's sister, she pitched in. We concocted a mixture of 
cream and wheat and plenty of sugar, and Mrs Clark came round. The next day 
we sorted through Mrs Clark's symptoms. After taking insulin for 20 years, 
Mrs Clark was surprised to hear that feeling "woozy, jittery, mean and cold all 
over" was her way of manifesting hypoglycaemia. All along she thought she was 
possessed by a demon. I started making extra visits to make sure the 
granddaughter was measuring the insulin correctly. We planned ways to 
stimulate Mrs Clark's appetite. Mouth-watering wishes yielded one incredible 
exchange list. I still hadn't quite understood why Mrs Clark couldn't walk until 
one day a granddaughter whispered the family secret. "Gran'mama was lying on 
her daybed when the police came to tell us my brother had been killed. That was 
seven years ago, and she hasn't been out of bed since." "Tell me about your 
grandson," I ventured one day. "I know you loved him very much and that's what 
I want to hear about." I lost track of time that day. Family came and went, 
gathering around her in shifts as she cried and talked and remembered. The air 
was thick with grief and healing. On my next visit we began weight-bearing 
exercises. Confinement had taken its toll on her legs and I suspected some 
peripheral neuropathy from her diabetes had made matters worse. 
Nevertheless, after two weeks of exercise Mrs Clark could get from bed to chair 
with help and take lunch out of bed. On my last visit, I went through my usual 
routine. "Can I help you into your chair?" I offered. "Don't need your help. 
You ain't coming back no more anyway. Just hand me my walker." In 
amazement I watched Mrs Clark pull herself up with the walker, shuffle through 
the most magnificent pivot I'd ever seen, and sit down in her chair. (Magnan, 
1 9 8 9 :2 1 9 -2 2 1 )
This narrative depicts many of the attributes of the nature of practice activities,
which will be elucidated through further analysis.
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12 .2 . HETEROGENEOUS
Theory contrasts with the heterogeneity of practical activity. Whereas theory is 
purposive and convergent, being focused by an explicit outcome, the activities of 
practice are frequently collections of various tasks and roles, combined under a 
general umbrella of the intentions of the practice - what Schütz refers to as a 
loosely organised system of interests which changes from situation to situation 
(Heeren, 1971). Although this compositeness of practice could be considered as 
fragmented, it does not infer that practice activities are disjointed, but rather that 
they are aggregations of tasks loosely bounded.
This phenomenon has been noted by various analysts of women's traditional work. 
In her investigation into housework, Oakley (1985) found that it was not a single 
activity, but a collection of heterogeneous tasks demanding a variety of skills and 
actions. While the stereotypical image of housework is that of a single activity, the 
women in her study see it as consisting of many disparate activities. She argues 
that this is necessarily so, and that therefore in this context fragmentation does not 
have the negative connotations normally associated with it, such as dissatisfaction. 
Similarly Kaluzynska (1980) analysed housework in terms of a collection tasks 
related to the needs, wants and maintenance of others. Smith (1979a) describes 
the housewife as being skilled at holding together and co-ordinating the threads of 
several lines of action which are the projects of others, not her own. In all these 
cases, the general umbrella binding the miscellany of tasks is the sustenance and 
support of others.
Caring practices have also been examined in terms of their disparate nature. Davies
(1990 ) uses this concept of fragmentation as central to her argument that 
institutionalised caring is controlled and made efficient as a result of its 
fragmentation. Graham (1983) observed the fragmentary nature of caring 
practices, describing it as an unspecific and unspecifiable kind of labour, 
fragmentary and disintegrating, and only visible when it is not done. Following 
Rich (1980), she characterises this fragmentation as an unending, diffuse and 
unbounded form of labour, consisting of many small chores and errands, and work 
that others constantly undo.
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This heterogeneity has been noted in clinical practices. Argyris & Schon (1974) 
suggest this fragmentation in their discussion on the differences between the 
espoused theories and the theories-in-use of clinicians. Fragmentation occurs 
when there is no reflective thinking about the clinical behaviour, and the practice 
consists in "getting certain jobs done". Schwartz & Wiggins (1985) suggest that 
this heterogeneity derives from the fact that clinical practice assembles a vast 
array of concepts, techniques and approaches that have their origins in other 
domains, and this precludes uniformity.
Historically, heterogeneity has been identified in nursing practice in terms of the 
many tasks that make up nursing work, to the extent that until fairly recently this 
work was organised around task allocation. Although the organising principle has 
changed, the heterogeneity of tasks remains, and is still critiqued by many writers. 
Visintainer (1986) suggests that the complexity of nursing practice stems from the 
myriad of tasks that nurses perform. Dennerley (1991) acknowledges the variety 
of nursing activities in Intensive Care Nursing and attempts to list some of these 
tasks. A position paper by the Royal College of Nursing (1992a & 1992b) 
recognises this heterogeneity by defining some of the various activities included in 
nursing practice. Greenwood (1993a) comments that nursing practice still 
involves a collection of tasks - nurses still 'do obs' and 'do beds', even if 'primary 
nursing' or 'total patient care' means that these tasks are done by a smaller group of 
nurses or one nurse for a smaller group of patients. Walters (1994) analysed the 
clinical practice of critical care nurses, and found that, amongst other things, their 
nursing practice involves 'being busy' - performing a collection of complex 
technical tasks. He does, however, stress the holistic manner in which these are 
performed, emphasising the loose bonding between these activities.
MacLeod's (1994 :362) findings are similar to that of Walters in that she 
recognises this heterogeneity in the sense of a multiplicity of little tasks - what she 
describes as a "compendium of tasks, functions and circumscribed processes" - but 
suggests that these tasks are important and complex in that they operate on a 
multifaceted level to promote the intricate processes of the recovery of patients. 
Taylor (1992b) gives an account of this the multidimensional nature of the 
collection of tasks relating to daily activities, which form part of nursing practice: 
a nurse runs a bath for a patient, helps her undress, makes her a cup of tea, 
comforts her when she gets upset and weeps, and although this is a collection of 
tasks, it all contributes to the healing process.
In this study Emma referred to the heterogeneous nature of her practice:
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•  There are always other things to do and you remember that somebody is supposed 
to have their blood pressure taken at certain times so you have to leave 
something else to go and do that.
Ben recognised his practice as a combination of heterogeneous roles and tasks:
•  A nurse has many roles. They can be the patient's advocate, they can be social 
worker one minute, they can be a friend the next, they can be a nurse, they can 
be a health care professional giving their advice through their knowledge, yet 
that might not be appropriate so they might just say well its up to you and just 
be a friend. So it is multidimensional.
Lara noted the fragmentary aspects of her practice:
•  Its not very often that you can start a task and go straight through to the end 
without anything interrupting - whether it be just that the patient needs more 
time. For example we've got a little boy who's having three lots of eye drops, so 
he can cope with it if you do one then you go away and come back five minutes 
later and do the next one, whereas if you were to do three eye drops in succession 
then he couldn't tolerate it.
12.3  RESPONSIVE
Another attribute of the nature of the activities of practice is its enabling 
responsiveness, where the needs of the recipients of the practice have precedence 
over the practices, which are adapted if they do not fulfil these wants. This 
contrasts with theory, where the theory itself is considered the focal point, rather 
than the needs of those contributing to it.
Kaluzynska (1980) finds this responsiveness in housework. She suggests that 
much of this type of activity is associated with the servicing of others' needs and in 
maintenance and enabling tasks, and that these activities are poorly described for 
want of suitable words to articulate this responsive nature of practice activities.
A similar point is made by Noddings (1984) in relation to caring behaviours. She 
suggests that these are reactive, responsive and receptive; they cannot be specified 
and certainly cannot be prespecified. Graham (1983:27) detects this in other 
caring occupations traditionally associated with women: secretarial and clerical 
work, nursing, teaching, social work. These are characterised as "an unending, 
unspecific task of helping, nurturing, educating and supporting".
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This responsiveness is demonstrated by a nursing narrative, where the treatment 
room nurse responds to a subliminal cue from the patient, and changes her activity 
to meet the needs of her client in an enabling way:
•  The other day a woman came in for a blood test. 'The doctor should get the 
results of these blood tests in about a week. Has he told you when he wants to see 
you again?' I asked. 'No,' said the woman in the flat, emotionless voice she had 
used to answer all my routine questions. I felt uneasy obtaining blood from this 
sad-looking lady and was uncomfortable with her silence. The woman made no 
attempt to move, but instead of prompting her by saying 'That's all, you can go 
now,' I glanced at the blood-test card and saw that the doctor had put: diagnosis - 
loss of weight. 'Have you lost a lot of weight?' I asked. The woman's eyes filled 
with tears, and she seemed to crumple in front of me as the tears began to flow.
I put my arm around her and literally offered her a shoulder to cry on. After a 
while the tears subsided. 'I'm sorry' said the woman. 'My husband died of a 
heart attack two months ago .' Her eyes began to fill with tears again, but this 
time her face looked angry. 'He died of a massive heart attack two days after he'd 
been for a medical. Two days! The doctor said he was fit, A1, with no 
problems, a healthy specimen. He didn't even smoke.' 'I don't know what to 
say,' I said after a few moments. 'What an awful thing to happen. It must have 
been an awful shock for you. How sad.' 'Yes it is,' she said. 'I'm only just 
beginning to take it all in; sometimes I think I'm going mad. Anyway, I suppose 
I'll survive; they say the first year is the worst. I do feel better now. Thanks 
for letting me get it off my chest.' As she walked out of the room I understood 
what 'being with' a patient meant. All I had to do was to allow them to express 
their feelings. (Shepherdson, 1992:35)
This responsiveness of nursing practice is recognised in Intensive Care Nursing in 
Dennerley's (1991) analysis. Not only is practice responsive to the needs of the 
patient, but to other factors as well, such as the environment, the organisation of 
the work of health care professionals and available resources. In a statement on 
issues in nursing, the Royal College of Nursing (1992a & 1992b) identifies the 
responsive nature of nursing practice by declaring that nursing helps, supports, 
assists and cares for people when their health is threatened, and enhances their 
ability to cope with the effects of illness and disability.
In this study this responsiveness is identified by Ben:
•  So what you're doing in practice is responsive to the demands of your patients or 
whoever, all the time, because you get asked to do this, that and the other, and
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you prioritise the demands. Or you say I'm specifically going to go into Room 1 
and do all the patients in Room 1 so that they're going to have everything up to 
date or whatever, and something happens in Room 6 and you have to go and help, 
or the doctor wants to speak to you, or there's a ward round, the relatives come 
in and they're upset, the phone goes etc.
Emma describes it thus:
•  You get used to planning your care around all the disturbances, but to a certain 
extent you can't because you never know what is going to happen - someone gets 
upset, or something.
Through this responsiveness the practitioner enables the patient or client. This 
enabling is also a feature of other traditional occupations of women. Housework is 
seen as enabling of others, keeping them in good order (Kaluzynska, 1980). 
Molyneux (1979) views housework as enabling in that it does not produce values 
for exchange, but rather enables others to do so.
No less part of the enabling responsiveness of practice activity is that of not 'doing' 
anything at all, but rather 'letting it happen' (Castillejo, 1990). This sense of 
'passive activity' is integral to practice. Graham (1983) identifies this in all 
caring practices, describing the qualities of caring as a sensitivity to the needs of 
others, an ability to wait, watch and adapt as these needs change. It is a sense of 
'being', that is, other-directed and passive, rather than 'doing' which she describes 
as self-directed and active. Connell (1985) claims the historic essence of nursing 
is to wait - on the sick, on nature to heal - and since nature heals, the place of the 
nurse is in tending this reparative process, tending the flow of life in the direction 
of health, all of which includes a sense of positive passivity.
A nursing narrative illustrates this enabling, responsive passiveness:
•  One evening just before I left for home, I went back to Steve's room. I wanted to  
say good-bye and offer his wife some support. Lorna, who was 29, sat quietly 
with 33-year-old Steve sharing what would be the last two hours of his life. 
During Steve's six weeks at the hospice Lorna had cared for him devotedly. As 
we sat together Steve was obviously very weak. He did not even respond when 
Lorna spoke to him. 'I would give anything to keep him here, even like this,' she
said. I searched for something to say, something to 'make it better' and take the
pain away. But there were no words that could erase the nightmare and restore 
things to the way they were two months ago. There were many long silences 
when neither of us felt the need to say anything. These silences were for feeling 
rather than for thinking. 'I know it is a terrible thing to say, but I wish God
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would take someone else and let him live. I just want few more days together. 
He's very warm and his heart is beating strongly.' Lorna asked the same 
questions she had been asking since they had been told Steve had cancer and was 
going to die. 'Why didn't I make him go to the doctor at Christmas? Why 
couldn't they try an operation? It could just be the drugs making him like this, 
couldn't it?' Lorna knew she could not find the answers but she needed to keep 
asking . I could not give her any answers, nor did I feel the need to try. All I 
could do was listen. It was time for me to go home. I told Lorna I had to go and 
that I wanted to say good-bye to Steve. 'He didn't say much to anyone, but he 
really liked you,' she said. After I said good-bye I went to a quiet area of the 
hospice and reflected on the events of the day which I will always remember as 
the day I learned the importance of listening. (Gamlin, 1992:46)
12 .4 . HAPHAZARD
Linked to the responsiveness of practice activities, is the their haphazardness in the 
sense of lack of strict sequential control. As opposed to the methodical and 
consequential approach of theory, practice activities can be non-sequential and non­
linear. This does not infer a randomness which is purposeless, but rather that the 
connection between activities is much looser than it is in theoretical activities, and 
that spontaneity and unplanned and impulsive action are accommodated.
A nursing narrative, where a paediatric nurse seeks to support her young patient, 
illustrates this.
•  Jo was 14 when she was admitted to the children's ward with leg weakness. 
Investigations revealed a brain tumour. Her condition deteriorated rapidly and 
she was taken to theatre. Jo recovered well, but her parents and younger sister 
Kay were devastated; it all happened so fast. The few staff involved tried to 
support them, but they were not a family who easily accepted outside help. It 
was very painful for us to watch them try to cope on their own, as if they were 
trapped in a glass box, out of reach. Jo's life revolved around animals and most 
of her pain seemed to stem from the absence of her pets and the idea that she 
might never ride again. Being a city girl myself, the world of horses, dogs and 
farm animals was entirely foreign. I tried hard to talk about bridles, bits and 
dressage, but Jo sensed my lack of kindred spirit and our relationship grew 
superficially only. Jo was to start a six-week course of radiotherapy as an in-
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patient and I realised that in order to support her I needed to build a bridge, but 
how? I spent time cooing over horsey pictures, and watching wildlife 
programmes with her, but I wasn't being real. My apparent inability to click 
with Jo was undermining my confidence, as years of youthwork had shown me 
that I was generally good at communicating with teenagers. Then one afternoon 
we were sitting talking about nothing in particular, when I had a sudden urge to 
put on her huge 'piggy' slippers and dance around the room. Jo stared at me; I 
suddenly felt vulnerable and foolish, but then she laughed and to my intense 
relief, started to roll around her bed laughing. Her sister got the giggles, and 
our conversation degenerated into silliness. From that moment on we were firm 
friends. Seeing this enabled her parents to trust me, and I was then able to 
support Jo and her family through the next six weeks. Jo certainly used play as 
a big part of her strategy for dealing with stress, and it was the key to my 
connecting with her and breaking down barriers. Within our frameworks of 
carefully planned care, there's a place for spontaneous fun - it's powerful and 
it's healing. (White, 1992:39)
On a formal level, this notion of spontaneous haphazardness has been incorporated 
within the idea of a pragmatic approach in everyday activity by various writers. 
The central argument is that in daily activities, the person is guided by a sense of 
the pragmatic, rather than by some pre-set sequence or required order that would 
be used to deal with the abstraction of theory. Because of this, there is not 
necessarily a predetermined pattern to activities, as a responsive pragmatism 
allows for the unpremeditated. Jarvis (1992b & 1995) refers to this as action 
having a pragmatic relation to knowledge, rather than a deterministic one, while 
Berger & Luckman (1971) and Heller (1984) maintain that everyday activity is 
dominated by the pragmatic motive which is so pervasive that it is understood in a 
taken-for-granted manner.
Nursing practice activities have been identified as having this responsive haphazard 
nature. Gendron (1994) describes nursing activities as not always of a calculated 
construction, as they are sensitive to interaction with others. They display "ebb 
and flow qualities" as the nurse matches her activities to the values, needs and 
interests of the patient. Ashworth & Longmate (1993) refer to the "piecemeal" 
nature of activities, and MacLeod (1994 ) found that nursing practices were 
inextricably intertwined and non-linear and non-sequential manner.
The participants in this study identified the haphazard nature of their practice. 
Lara suggested:
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•  You don't sort of strictly follow the rules every time that you do something. You
pick up verbal cues and non-verbal cues from the people that you're with.
Emma:
•  Its just things all over the place that you've got to remember - different patients 
need different things at different times. Sometime its quite hard to remember 
everything you've got to do because there are so many different patients.
Elizabeth:
•  In doing a dressing you don't follow procedures step by step, you just get on with
it in the way that you know how to fit into your time.
Ben:
•  It is haphazard, not all laid out in straight lines, especially with low staffing 
levels.
12 .5 . UNSTABLE
Another consequence of the responsive nature of practical activities is that they have 
a changeable character and their boundaries are not fixed or necessarily stable. 
This contrasts with the distinct and clear-cut nature of theory, where definition of 
boundaries and terms is essential.
Castell's (1989) gives a sense of this in her criticism that written text 'fixes 
meanings' and thereby dissociates them from practice. The implication is that the 
practice was fluid and changeable in the first place.
Oakeshott's (1933:263) succinct articulation of this changeability in his discussion 
on the nature of practical experience shows it to be an essential and characteristic 
aspect of practical activity:
Scientific and historical experience presuppose a world of fact which does not 
change or move; practical activity assumes a world of facts which is not merely 
susceptible of alteration, but which has change and instability as the very principle 
of its existence.
Cervero (1988) suggests professional practice is characterised by uncertainty, and 
the ability to cope with this is the mark of a professional. Schwartz & Wiggins 
(1985:353) trace this changeability in the clinical practice of medicine to the 
composite nature of its underpinnings, claiming that as a result, medicine remains 
"a multiplicity-in-unity that is forever fluid and subject to change and extension."
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The changeable boundaries of practice activities are especially prevalent in caring 
activities. Graham (1983) described caring practices as unspecified, unbounded 
labour, the contours of which shift constantly. Noddings (1984) argues that caring 
actions are varied rather than rule-bound, and, while being predictable in a global 
sense, they are unpredictable in detail, since variation must be expected if the 
actions are genuinely caring - that is, being performed in response to the other and 
to the particular set of circumstances. Davies (1990) traces this boundary 
instability to the ability of the carer to form empathetic ties with the one being 
cared for. In terms of her argument, clear and fixed boundaries preclude the 
reciprocity necessary in caring activities.
This boundary instability has been noted in nursing practice, both as a result of 
caring and as a consequence of developing technology. Dennerley (1991) argues 
that in Intensive Care Nursing the boundaries of nursing care are being extended as a 
result of technical advances which increases the scope of these activities. In this 
study a more prosaic view is given of the non-stability of practice by the 
participants. Ben suggested:
•  Yea, its changeable because it depends on the situation. The person in Bed A you 
can admit really quickly, 'cos its just take down the facts and they're quite 
happy, they know what's going on. The person in Bed B might be a bit more 
distraught, a bit upset, so it changes because you have to adapt.
Kathryn:
•  You do things most properly and in a most ideal way when you first learn it. 
Over the years you change to a way that is easiest. Say for example if you're 
doing a dressing. I would do it to try and strictly observe an aseptic technique, 
and that to me would be one of the most important aspects of doing a dressing, and 
I'd make sure I wash my hands when I'm supposed to wash my hands and things 
like that, whereas somebody who'd been nursing for five or ten years would 
probably do it differently to make it easier for her to do it, but probably do it 
just as effectively, yet not exactly as we're told to do it. Also sometimes things 
change because of the situation - sometimes you do things because the situation 
dictates that you do that.
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12 .6 . VALUE-DRIVEN
Chisholm (1988) argues that intentional attitudes determine the way that a person 
acts upon the world, and this marks the point where theory [defined as constituted 
by our beliefs] and practice [our endeavours] come together. These intentional 
attitudes are underpinned by a value structure. In nursing activities, the central 
value is recognised as that of caring, and this distinguishes nursing activities from 
most other practice activities.
This is illustrated by a nursing narrative where an occupational health nurse 
demonstrates caring as the essence of nursing.
•  I met Mandy four years ago in the student health service where I worked. Our 
college was an upgrading institution for immigrants, refugees and the 
undereducated members of the community. Mandy had a background of family 
problems, educational deprivation and consequently unemployment as well as a 
lack of self-confidence. She walked into my office one day asking for an aspirin 
for a headache. We chatted and Mandy seemed to enjoy the attention so I left her 
with an open invitation to return anytime if she wanted to talk. Before I knew 
it, Mandy was visiting me two or three times a day. I began to know Mandy as a 
naïve, self-loathing scared young woman. She had periods of sadness or anxiety 
and no skills to cope with her many problems. As trust developed I learned that 
Mandy abused aspirin; sometimes taking 50 to 100 tablets at a time in moments 
of extreme anxiety. She said she would see no other health professional but me 
and that I probably could not help her anyway. I felt trapped and angry at being 
manipulated into dealing with a problem for which I felt ill-prepared. After 
discussing my concerns with our physician and the psychologist, I evolved a plan 
that would help Mandy. I started by meeting with her and explaining to her the 
role that I felt I could take in this relationship. I would always be honest with 
her because I valued her trust. I told her that I had faith that she could work 
her way through these bad times and that I was available to help. I agreed also to 
take on a mother-type role to listen and advise her as a mother might. Mandy 
desperately wanted someone to believe in her value as a person. But Mandy had 
to understand that there must be a place in our relationship for the clinical 
aspects of my nursing role. Whenever she was aspirin-intoxicated I would 
assess her physical status and vital signs. Mandy agreed to my taking on the 
trusted friend/mother/nurse role. For her part in this relationship I asked 
very little. She was to visit me daily and always let me know if she had abused
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aspirin. An end-of-session ritual was developed to help Mandy learn to believe 
in herself. I would always say: M believe in you. I like you. I want you to go 
home and look in the mirror and say "Mandy, you're OK", because you are.' We 
spent countless hours together. Slowly the meetings became more peaceful and 
the aspirin overdoses became less frequent. Mandy became less labile and 
stronger. One day she walked into my office and said: 'Thank you for
everything, but I just can't cope with school. I've dropped out.' She hugged me 
and left. I felt a failure. Then I wrote Mandy a letter. I told her all the things 
I usually said. Then I felt I had done all I could. It was up to Mandy now. A few 
months later a Christmas card with a wedding invitation arrived. We talked on 
the phone. A new Mandy had taken control of her life and moved forward. I 
went to the wedding. Last Christmas, as I opened a card, a small photo fluttered 
onto my desk. I turned it over to see a smiling, healthy little boy about one year 
old. The picture was affirmation of how a life can turn round. I see hope for 
the future. I know that the essence of nursing is caring, even when we don't 
know what our care has meant to our patients. (Reaburn, 1992:36)
Caring has traditionally been associated with the activities of women, and this has 
had an impact on social and cultural perceptions of care as well as on the values 
attached to caring work. Colliere (1986) shows how historically caring has been 
the basis of women's practices in society and associated with women's status in 
society - and hence she shows how caring came to be undervalued and thus invisible. 
A similar point is made by Radsma (1994) when she argues that caring is central to 
women's traditional work, and is most evident by its absence. Hughes (1990) 
continues this analysis by suggesting that nursing activities were driven by the 
ideology of domesticity - looking after the comforts and needs of husband and family 
for women became looking after the needs and comforts of physicians and patients, 
caring for the family became caring for the sick - and therefore, as women 
possessed innate qualities or their domestic role, nurses possessed innate qualities 
for their occupational role. From this there developed a difficulty in reconciling 
the ideology of professionalism with nursing, and the undervaluing of nursing as a 
profession. In her analysis of women healers in English history, Versluysen 
(1980) develops a similar argument, demonstrating the link between women's 
domestic activities, caring and nursing.
Much has been written in the nursing literature over the past decade about the 
centrality of caring in nursing, mostly upholding caring as an essential value in 
nursing, but on occasion demonstrating the conflicts that exist as caring activities 
clash with institutional values. Radsma (1994) presents an overview. Cook
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(1991), for instance, suggests some of the values that underlie some nursing 
activities are those of the efficient functioning of the institution, and not what would 
necessarily benefit the patient, producing a conflict for the nurse, and Menzies 
(1970) demonstrates that some nursing activities have more to do with coping 
strategies for institutionally-produced anxiety than with the care that nurses would 
like to give. However, even with these detractors, few nurses would deny that 
caring formed the basic value of nursing activity.
Yet what is of interest to this study is Hughes's (1992) argument that the caring 
which comprises nursing behaviours can be learned only in practice. Walters
(1 9 9 4 ) found similarly that the nursing practices involving 'comforting' - 
providing care to the patients, family, friends and other staff - are learned in the 
clinical situation.
In this study Jo demonstrated this in her discussion about how she cared for the 
father of the child she was admitting as a patient, and how she learned this in the 
clinical situation:
•  Well I wanted him to think of me as being fully able to care for his son while he's 
in hospital, while he's placed in our care. I wanted the father to feel 
comfortable that we could nurse his son, which I think is very important. On 
this ward in particular we do take care to look after the parents as well. Later 
the parents also say, 'We really feel as if you looked after us as well.' You see 
the parent and the child relationship, and you see the parents are sometimes so 
much more anxious than the child themselves, and the parents are so concerned, 
and you take on some of that concern for them then while you look after them 
then. Being told or learning that the parents are going to be anxious doesn't 
mean anything, but when you see the parents and they're so upset and stroking 
the child's hand, you just become aware of how sensitive the situation is and how 
there is so much feeling all wrapped up in it, and so you take care of them both. 
They don't ask for it, but they just want some reassurance.
On a more mundane level, Lara gives a telling example of how caring affects her 
practice:
You tend to put others before yourself. It might be that at times during your 
practice you're dying to go to the toilet, but if your patient wants to go to the 
toilet, you would put them on the toilet first before going yourself. I know I 
have done that.
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12 .7 . ROUTINISED
Another attribute of practice activities, particularly nursing activities, is that they 
are strongly influenced by routines and habits. This contrasts with practice, 
which, although it uses set procedures and strategies, routine thinking would be 
counter-productive.
Some substantiation for this is found in Berger's & Luckman's (1971) suggestion 
that as everyday life is dominated by the pragmatic motive, recipe knowledge, 
pragmatic competence and routine performances occupy a prominent place in the 
stockpile of social knowledge. Life would be unliveable if this were not the case and 
each situation had to be encountered afresh. This is linked to the taken-for-granted 
attitude necessary for day to day living.
Eraut (1985) concurs with this notion in his submission that when action is "cool", 
there is time for experimentation, deliberation and the consideration of new ideas, 
but when action is "hot", habits and routines have to developed in order to enable 
practitioners to cope. Since clinical activity is frequently "hot", it is not 
surprising to find routines and habits in abundance.
In her study on housework, Oakley (1985) found that there was what she termed a 
"psychological dependence" on routines and rules, which the housewife herself 
specified, but then felt to be "objectified", that is, external to her as worker. These 
routines helped to provide order and unity for the heterogeneous work tasks which 
made up housework.
Routines have historically been identified in nursing activity - not always in a 
positive way. Davies's (1990) study identified some negative aspects of routines in 
caring work - the straight-jacketing of inflexible routines which prevented caring 
on an individual basis, the temporal pressures to get things done, but in contrast to 
that Little & Carnevali (1976) argues that patterned thinking and behaving allows 
speedy behaviour and automatic awareness in situations when it is essential to 
behave instantaneously.
Greenwood (1993a) points to some positive aspects of routines in nursing. She 
submits that nursing routines are used to maintain order and to structure diverse 
practical activities. They are also an efficient means of communication on both a
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temporal and a motor basis, telling a nurse when and how to do a task, and as a means 
of transmitting practical knowledge.
In this study the participants found both positive and negative routine aspects to 
their care. Some negative aspects were mentioned:
Lara:
•  From everybody that comes in we need a urine sample so that we can dipstick it 
and I don't think that's necessary all the time, but you do it. If you start 
questioning it you'd just put everybody's backs up.
Jo:
•  Often they're so used to doing things in a traditional way that it's very difficult to 
change.
Lucy:
•  I think sometimes you do things you don't fully understand, but you do them 
because somebody has told you to do them, or its always been done that way and 
perhaps it hasn't been researched as to whether it is beneficial or not - you do 
it, I suppose, to fit in.
The positive aspects of the use of routines were equally obvious to the participants, 
who were aware of the causes of the routines, and the beneficial effect they had on 
their care-giving. Karin:
•  You plan the things you've got to do in a shift around the ward routine. You 
might say I'll try to get these things done before lunch. After lunch the 
afternoon staff will be here, so I'll get them to help me do this. You might 
always plan to work in that sort of way then that becomes your routine.
Becky:
•  Nursing is routine, yea, because say your certain routine works best for you and 
the way you like to give your nursing care, so you do it the way you like to, a 
routine, really. Oh that doesn't mean its not changeable, but its influenced by 
your routine.
The favourable outcomes of having routine in their practice was also commented on 
by the participants. Ben:
•  There are routines to every ward because without it, it would just be complete 
mayhem, so you've got this routine which you work towards, yet that routine 
changes all the time because of demand, or whatever influences it.
Kathryn:
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•  I think ward life is generally routine. I mean you have to have some sort of
routine in order to be able to plan the care that you're going to give. It's a way
to be able to work efficiently really.
Lara:
•  Doing the observations is very influenced by routine, but at the same time as
you're doing the obs. you're there with the patient and can ask them how they're
feeling and you're looking for signs that something might be wrong, so in that 
way you're looking after them as well.
12 .8 . SELF UTILISING
Whereas theory strives for objectivity, and any subjective element is regarded as a 
weakness, practical activities include the use of self as a valid part of practice. The 
personality of practitioners has a substantial influence on their professional 
behaviour, shaping the delivery of the practice and affecting the choices that are 
made. Heeren (1971) suggests that this is typical of everyday life - one chooses an 
"interest at hand" as the basic organisational factor which channels action. In 
nursing the self is used as part of the therapeutic milieu to aid in the healing 
process on one level, and more prosaically the abilities and interests of 
practitioners contribute to nursing activities. Equally the character of the 
practitioner influences the style or mode in which procedures and other activities 
are carried out, which affects both the patient and the environmental ambience.
Two nursing narratives serve to illustrate this. The first is an obvious example of 
the nurse using her talents and interests to help a patient:
•  It was as a first-year student nurse on my first ward that I looked after a patient 
with Alzheimer's disease. I had no idea how I was going to cope. Nothing could 
have prepared me for what this condition involves. Mrs Smith was loud and it 
was impossible to have a conversation with her. She had a tendency to be 
violent, and, as a consequence, was often incontinent. Then, she refused to let 
staff near her to clean her up. Looking after her took a lot of time and energy. 
Trying to feed her, wash her and clothe her was a mammoth task. I tried to 
initiate conversation. Mrs Smith answered back, but with senseless replies. I 
became desperate to communicate with Mrs Smith. She was a widow and her 
family did not come to visit her. The only stimulation she got was from the 
nursing staff. Then I had an idea. As a hobby I go to an amateur dramatic
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society. Every year we perform an old-time music hall. I thought that singing 
some of the old songs might be of benefit to Mrs Smith. So I started singing to 
her. At first she did no respond at all, but after a short time, she began to join 
in. No only did she know the words to all the songs, but she also had a wonderful 
singing voice. This woman, who could not speak a coherent sentence, could sing 
perfectly. As she sang she began to appear less agitated. Her facial expression 
changed and she looked generally more calm. For a short while after singing, 
she seemed more peaceful. The effect did not last very long but Mrs Smith had 
those few moments where she appeared calm. (Braben, 1992:54)
In the second narrative a more subtle use of self is demonstrated:
•  I was a newly qualified midwife working on a busy post-natal ward. Susan's 
baby had been born at 'term' but was being cared for in the special nursery. 
Robert had been born with an incurable disorder and the outlook for him was 
bleak; he was expected to die very soon. Susan was in her early twenties and he 
was her first child. Everything had appeared to be well. She and her husband 
James had been delighted to have a son, but very soon after the birth congenital 
defects were noted. Robert was diagnosed with a very rare condition affecting 
his bones. Susan and James had been counselled. Their heads were reeling 
from all the information being supplied. James was supportive, but at the end 
of visiting time he went home to give his wife time to rest. It was at moments 
like these that Susan was most upset; alone in a hospital environment with a 
dying baby along the corridor; in a helpless situation. On this particular 
evening I could see Susan sitting alone. The paediatrician had seen both her and 
James and said that little could be done. I knocked gently on the door and Susan 
invited me in. She spoke about many things that evening; how she had met 
James, their hopes for the future, their desire to have children, the nursery 
ready for their new baby which would remain empty. As we sat there Susan 
slowly began to break down the barrier; she began to ask 'Why me?' She 
became angry and then started to cry. I touched her hand, she took mine and 
began to sob. She clung to me and we cried together. We sat and grieved 
together. For a long time we sat talking, even managing a small laugh. The 
barrier was totally broken down: we were now communicating. She said it had 
meant more to her that I had cried with her than the many other well-intended 
statements from other people. (Walker, 1992:27)
In both theses narratives the activities and outcome might have been different had
other practitioners been involved.
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Cervero (1988) identified this use of self in the practice of teachers. He shows 
that teachers' activities are dynamic and shaped by their use their own 
personalities. For this reason, it is not possible for teachers to acquire practical 
knowledge vicariously, since a total involvement of the whole personality is entailed 
in developing individual practice.
This use of self, as defined by the emotional component of the personality, is taken a 
step further in Hochschild's (1983) analysis of certain occupational groups, 
notably airline stewards and debt collectors. She shows how emotions are used in 
selling - a product, a service - and as such is an integral part of their work, which 
she calls emotional labour. Emotions thus become a commercial product and 
marketable commodity.
While there is no direct correspondence between these occupations and nursing. 
Smith (1992), drawing on Hochschild's work, shows that emotional labour is 
involved in nursing practice. Although it is not commercialised, it forms an 
integral part of caring work. In this way the self is intimately involved in the 
activities of nursing.
This use of self has been documented in the nursing literature in other ways as well. 
Appleton's (1993) phenomenological analysis of nursing identifies the nurse's 
"giving of herself" as one of the important elements of care which promotes the 
well-being of the patient. Benoit (1989) documents how 'granny midwives' - or 
traditional lay midwives - considered that one of the primary requisites of the job 
of midwifery was warmth and expressiveness, with a sympathetic understanding, 
which involved using the self. MacLeod (1990) shows that nursing involves being 
attuned to the experiences of the patients and this is only possible through a stance 
of personal involvement. Taylor (1992b) details a variety of ways in which the 
self is used in practical nursing activities: building up a trusting relationship; 
using sense of humour; using her own humanity in healing; sharing of the self with 
others - in short relating to the patient as a human being rather than a distant 
professional, all of which was considered essential to the healing process. She 
offers the illustration of an encounter with a midwife: when asked to describe the 
midwives who were most effective, a patient described those who were "just 
themselves" (Taylor, 1993a).
There were no shortages of comments on this from the participants in this study, 
and the variety of views is noted below indicates how strikingly the notion of using
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the self in practice resonated with the participants, who offered distinctive
commentary on this concept. Karin gave a vivid example:
•  Today I was helping with a delivery, and this lady was pushing really hard and 
one of the midwives said, 'This is where we all go red as well because we are all 
pushing with you,' and I was, I was like really holding my breath as this lady 
was pushing. You become personally involved in the thing that you're doing, 
partly because you're doing quite intimate and personal things sometimes. 
You're sharing personal things with somebody else, which can be quite a strain. 
Sometimes you do react in the same way, with the same amount of feeling as the 
patient has. So its quite tiring, and you do use a lot of your own personality in 
what you're doing.
Ben suggested:
•  In nursing I use myself. I can't do it without using myself. You've got to take 
yourself to work. You can't go along and follow strict guidelines - the way you 
should properly behave on the ward - you go along, and you take yourself to 
work, don't you.
Lara:
•  You do need to give a bit of yourself, but I wouldn't say that its detrimental to 
yourself to do it because I quite enjoy that - I think that's why most people 
become nurses, because they enjoy doing that.
Jo:
•  So far I've noticed everybody nurses differently. I mean they all might carry 
out the same procedure in the same way, but in a lot of ways in everyone you can 
pick out slightly really good bits that they've incorporated into the way they do it 
and probably not so good bit, or average bits! It's just to do with personality I 
think and style, just their own way of carrying out things. It does all come down 
to personality - we have the same knowledge, but we use it differently.
Kathryn:
•  I think that the biggest thing for me that affects how I practice is myself,
really.
Lois:
•  I usually just put myself in the position of the patient and think what I would 
want from me, and if I can imagine it in that way then you know what to do then.
Karin:
•  I think that nursing is a combination of tasks, but then how you carry them out 
depends on other things, like your personal preference in the way you do them or 
your own personality and the timing, and who you're working with then dictates 
the way in which you carry out the tasks that you've got to do.
Kate:
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•  I think that in nursing you do use a lot of yourself - 1 think that's why it can be 
mentally tiring - interacting with other people and responding to the demands of 
other people you do use a lot of yourself up.
Jane:
•  I suppose you could see all the nursing procedures all written down on how to be 
a nurse, but at the end of the day, its going to be your personality that's going to 
influence how you do that. I think everybody nurses with their personality in a 
way. I know I do. You change things yourself. You change your technique. I'm 
constantly doing that.
12 .9 . CONCLUSION
From these various attributes, the diversity of the activities of nursing practice can 
be discerned. While there is a loose bonding of the activities under the general 
umbrella of promoting healing - whatever meaning that has for the patient or 
client, and in whatever way is possible - the activities are disparate because they 
are responsive to various differing situations, because they are constantly changing 
and are not necessarily preplanned, because they are influenced by locally 
determined routines and habits and because they are carried out by nurses using 
their various personalities. The commitment to the central value of caring 
contributes to the loose connection of these heterogeneous activities, and an essential 
factor in their disparity is individual practitioners' use of their own personality.
In contrast to this is the convergent, planned, objective and detached nature of 
theory. The purpose in juxtaposing these notions is an attempt to present the 
nature of activities as a discriminator between theory and practice. While theory 
is cognate, interlinked and channelled, practice activities are disparate and loosely 
bound. Some attributes of the nature of practice activities have been discussed to 
give some indication of the nature of their differentiation from theory.
This distinction between theory and practice contributes a further feature of the 
conceptual framework of practice against which the contrasts between theory and 
practice can be seen.
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CHAPTER 13
SCALE OF ACTIVITY
13 .1 . Introduction
This discussion on the scale of activities could be subsumed within the discussion of 
the attributes of the nature of activities, since the scale of these activities is 
manifestly an attribute of that nature. However, it is treated separately as it 
proved to be more substantial that the other attributes of the nature of activities, 
having it own distinctive attributes.
Theory and practice differ regarding the scale of their associated activities. 
Because theory deals with that which is abstracted, it is necessarily distanced from 
the minutiae which make up the uniqueness of the particular, and thus operates on a 
scale which is concerned with that which is general and comprehensive - the overall 
picture. Practical activities, however, dealing with the concrete, are associated 
with the details of particular events, and consequently the scale is concerned with 
the immediate environment, and with commonplace and basic occurrences. Thus the 
global scale of theory contrasts with the local scale of practice, where the activities 
are concerned with ordinary events.
- 2 18  -
A nursing narrative illustrates this:
•  John was a 24-year-old young man who, following a diving accident six years 
earlier, had suffered a cervical fracture and head injury that resulted in a 
profound quadriplegia; it was considered that he was unable to comprehend what 
was going on around him, and had no means of communicating. Following the 
acute stages of the trauma, John was cared for by his parents in the family home 
and was only admitted to hospital for short periods of medical and nursing 
intervention. This present admission followed a diagnosis of pneumonia, which 
had made John's parents fearful for their son's future. They decided that they 
did not want him to be subjected to further suffering or aggressive medical 
treatment. It was decided to allow John to pass away peacefully. When I first 
visited John the amount of care he had needed throughout his illness soon became 
apparent. His head was supported in a halo traction. His only means of 
nutrition was feeding though a naso-gastric tube; breathing was by means of a 
tracheostomy and urine was voided by a catheter. I did, however, become 
conscious of a presence about John, a sensation that I was aware of, but unable to 
identify. I spoke to John whenever I was in his company. I did not find it easy 
talking to someone from whom I got no response, but I tried. A little later I 
wondered whether John was able to hear and understand, but not to communicate 
and had become lost in time. I looked into his eyes and said: 'John, can you hear 
me? Blink twice if you can.' John blinked twice. Was I seeing things? I 
thought nervously. 'John, can you hear me? Blink three times if you can.' 
John blinked three times. I was stunned but excited. For the first time since 
his accident six years earlier John had demonstrated that he could hear, 
understand and was able to communicate, albeit in a basic manner. That evening 
John indicated through a simple code of blinks that he wanted to watch TV and 
that he wanted to sleep sitting up. The following morning John was much 
weaker but continued to make simple decisions for himself. His parents visited 
early that morning and were amazed when they saw for themselves his 
capabilities. This was the first occasion since his accident that he had 
acknowledged them and it was a great solace to the family who had given so much. 
John died peacefully early that evening surrounded and cared for by his family. 
This difficult and distressing time had been made easier for his parents by John 
being able to indicate his recognition of them. (Hodges, 1992:41 )
This narrative demonstrates the scale on which practice activities usually operate - 
a little activity of devising a blinking system to enable communication. While it is 
not always possible to determine the significance of the activity, the scale is 
concerned with unpretentious actions and 'little things' associated with the execution
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of ordinary, daily living. The attributes of such a scale will be discussed to indicate 
the contrast with the scale of theory.
13.2 . EVERYDAY
As opposed to the universalised scale of theory, practice is concerned with the 
everyday world. On this scale, actions concern day to day matters, common-sense 
undertakings and face-to-face interactions and situations, rather than the refined 
and conceptual endeavours of theory. Not only is there is a sense of direct impact of 
activities on this scale, but also of immediacy and close proximity, and of the 
importance of shared, common experiences.
Schütz (1962) captures the essence of this scale when he refers to the everyday as 
occurring within the co-ordinates of the Here and Now for each individual, 
indicating the subjectivity of the time and space perspective of everyday experience 
for each individual. Yet in order for one individual to encounter another in their 
different perspectives [all having their own Here and Now] there is a taken-for- 
granted reciprocity of perspectives. This creates an intersubjectivity which is 
typical of everyday experiences, together with the common-sense world which is 
constructed by the taken-for-granted attitude.
In discussing their understanding of the everyday, Berger & Luckman (1971 ) 
suggest the scale of such encounters relates to this common-sense world and to that 
which is shared with others, rather than to the ideal of theoretical enterprises. For 
them everyday activity is flexible, pragmatic and taken-for-granted. This sense of 
the everyday as being direct and immediate experience is shared by Heeren (1971), 
who argues that it is this immediacy which gives it its validity - as opposed to the 
validity of theory, which is derived by other means. For Douglas (1971), the scale 
of the everyday involves face-to-face relationships with contemporaries in 
immediate situations - similar to Schutz's notions of 'Here and Now'. This 
immediacy is also important for Heller (1984). Basic to her examination of 
everyday life is her assertion that it takes place in and relates to the immediate 
environment of the person, even though its effects extend well beyond the person. 
None of these writers deny the role of past experience or future projection in 
influencing the everyday, but the essence of the scale of everyday activities for them 
is its immediacy in space and time.
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Sayer (1992) holds a similar position. He suggests that in everyday life, the 
taken-for-granted attitude, or as he calls it, "characteristically unexamined" 
common sense, allows objects to be known in an immediate fashion, and that this is 
an essential attribute of everyday practice as too much examination would interfere 
with execution of practical acts. In a similar vein Jarvis (1995 ) claims that 
mixtures of knowledges are used to inform everyday action, but that people do not 
consciously decide that they will use a bit more psychology or a bit less philosophy 
in constituting their practices. This indicates that practice activity operates on a 
different scale from that of carefully examined theory.
The importance of this scale of activity to medical practice is argued by Schwartz & 
Wiggins (1985) in their phenomenological analysis of medical practice. Such an 
analysis necessarily starts from practice as experienced, and as such they ground 
medical practice in the everyday world, maintaining that it is the everyday that 
gives medical science its meaning and within which medical understanding can 
emerge.
This is equally important in nursing, where the everyday scale of nursing activities 
is recognised in nursing's most popular 'model' for structuring care plans - 
Roper's, Logan's & Tierney's (1985) Activities of Daily Living. This model derives 
originally from the ideas of Henderson (1991), who conceives the aim of nursing to 
be to keeping individuals in the "stream of life", that is, attending to their normal 
everyday needs.
The everyday scale of nursing is recognised by a various writers. Maeve (1994) 
argues that the core of nursing practice is about the everyday practice of bedside 
nursing. Wright & Dolan (1991) suggest that it is the commonplace activities 
accepted by all nurses as their day-to-day practice which are seen as the most 
relevant for meaningful nursing practice. MacLeod (1994) found the everyday 
practices to be the essence of patient-centred nursing care, and the arena in which 
patients are helped towards recovery. Greenwood (1993a) refers to the theories- 
in-use in nursing as being fuzzy, everyday concepts which are heavily dependent on 
the everyday context of nursing practices, as opposed to the clear-cut categorisation 
of theory.
The participants in this study recognised that the scale of the nursing activities was 
of the order of the everyday. Ben suggested:
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•  In practice there are the everyday things that you have to do: the bedbaths, basic 
observations and the little things.
A more astute observation came from Kathryn, who acknowledged the scale of the 
activities as being on the everyday level, but with a subtle difference:
•  The activities are everyday, but because of the setting they're in, they're not. 
Everyone makes their bed at home, but if you put someone into a ward, they'd be 
completely lost. The first time I made a hospital bed - 1 make my bed everyday 
at home - I was really slow at making that bed and to me it was completely 
different. So they are everyday things, but because of the situation that you're 
in doing them, they're not.
13 .3 . LITTLE
Another attribute of the scale of practical activities is its concern with little things. 
It is important to state that this refers to the scale rather than the significance of 
the activity, as all those who mention this attribute as well as the study participants 
are quick to point out. For all of these, the little things are of great import.
Eraut (1985) found this in his study of teachers. He discovered that in teaching 
practices information about individual children was stored in the memory of little 
incidents and brief encounters, and that this was important in contextualising 
contact with the children and guiding interaction with them.
In the nursing context MacLeod (1990) articulated this as one of the major findings 
in her research. Small practices were fundamental to patient recovery and to the 
quality of care. Little things were crucial to patients in regaining their 
independence after surgery and in aiding their recovery. For instance, 
repositioning a bath mat so that a patient could get out of the bath on her own, and 
thus restoring her independence and privacy, was of greater importance than the 
simple act implies as it enabled her to regain her dignity and self worth after a 
gynaecological operation, which was important to her recovery. She goes on to  
argue that although the scale of these practices is of modest proportions, they make a 
crucial difference to patients because they are imbued with nursing knowledge and 
skill. It is in these little things that nursing's practical knowledge is made visible.
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In this study the respondents were voluble on this aspect of the scale of activities.
Lara recounted:
•  The parents of children often say its the little things that make the difference - 
like them being allowed to take teddy down to theatre with them, or taking the 
teddy's temperature under his arm before you do the child's - just little things 
like that.
Kathryn suggested:
•  I think that the little things go to make up the total care of the patient. 
Everything that you do for a patient is a nursing activity and every little thing 
that you do does make a difference - sometimes that can be the difference 
between a good nurse and a not so good nurse. They are little and everyday 
things to nurses, but they're not to patients. Little things that you do to 
improve nursing care then become big things as far as the patient is concerned.
Karin:
•  Unless you know the little things, the small details about the patient, you can't 
adjust the sort of finer things about their care and I think it is those finer things 
that you do that make the difference.
For Jo the little things were of great importance in nursing children:
•  What is going to help us nurse this child better are the little things, like the 
details - a special toy, for instance.
13 .4 . ORDINARY
A further attribute of the scale of practice activities is its ordinariness. This 
implies practical activities operate on the level of normal, customary and usual 
events, rather than the rarefied, abstract and ideal.
The importance of the ordinariness of the scale of practical activities is discussed by 
Douglas (1971), who suggests that humans cannot live without co-operating with 
other humans. This sharing is fundamental to practical activity and is only made 
possible by the common ordinariness of the members of the social group. It is 
because of this commonality that practice is possible. It is thus essential for 
practice to operate on the scale of the ordinary.
This ordinariness of the scale of nursing practice activities has been extensively 
researched by Taylor (1992a) who suggests that nurses are more therapeutically
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effective if they are in touch with the ordinariness of their day-to-day lives. She 
discusses the effects of ordinariness as having creative potential, and enumerates 
various aspects of the creative ordinariness. She demonstrates how the 
ordinariness of human commonality is part of the practice of nursing, but has 
extraordinary outcomes by giving the example of a nurse bathing a patient who has 
fractures due to osteoporosis and is depressed as a result of her domestic situation. 
During the bath - an ordinary activity - the nurse has an opportunity to talk to the 
patient in a relaxed environment, and the outcomes for the patient are pain relief, 
anxiety reduction, and a resolve to change her pattern of living (Taylor 1992b).
Elsewhere Taylor (1993b) suggests that this ordinariness stems from common 
humanity between patients and nurses and is achieved by straightforward acceptance 
and the recognition of the personhood of each other. Ordinariness is revealed in the 
day-to-day realities of nurses and patients, but it is because of skilled nursing that 
the 'ordinary' tasks flow seemingly effortlessly - as her example indicates.
A nursing narrative illustrates the ordinariness of nursing practice that can make a 
significant difference to a patient. This nurse simply agreed with what the patient 
expressed, and that was all that the patient needed to help her through a special day.
•  Mrs Maddocks, a 77 year old widow suffering from rheumatoid arthritis had 
been admitted for assessment of drugs, physiotherapy and hydrotherapy. She 
greeted me with a warm smile and told me everything was fine. I reminded her 
that in a day her birthday would be upon her. Other patients commented and 
smiled knowingly to each other. Mrs Maddocks's birthday had become something 
for them all to look forward to. As I looked down a large tear slid from Mrs 
Maddocks's cheek. After pulling the curtains I quietly sat on her bedside chair, 
handed her a tissue and held her hand. After a.few moments she apologised. I 
explained that there really was no need and asked her if she would like to talk 
about it. She explained that her coming birthday made the recent loss of her 
husband more intense. This would be her first birthday without him. She went 
on to recall details from what had obviously been a very long and happy 
marriage. Sadly her godchild had been killed in the same week in which her 
husband had died. She felt they were now company for each other in heaven. 
'Silly, isn't it, nurse?' she said. 'I always think that James knows everything 
that I do and that when my turn comes he will be there waiting for me.' I 
explained that I certainly didn't think it silly and told her that my own belief was 
that one day I would also be reunited with my loved ones. A large river now 
streamed down her face. 'Oh nurse' she said, 'you are the first person ever to 
have said that to me, and it means such a lot to know that someone else feels the
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same.' On the surface, things had looked good for Mrs Haddocks. Her joints 
were improving slowly and she was getting more mobile, yet inside she was full 
of uncertainty, hurt and sorrow. Just waiting for someone to listen to her story. 
(Soper, 1992:49)
In this study this aspect of ordinariness was mentioned by the participants. Lara:
•  That's your aim, really, in nursing - to make things as normal as possible for 
the patient - to make them comfortable.
The ordinariness with extraordinary outcomes is alluded to by Kathryn:
•  It depends on who is doing the activity, because to a nurse it is ordinary, but to 
somebody else it so not ordinary.
1 3 .5 . PARTICULAR
A further attribute of the scale of practical activities is that it is concerned with 
concrete particularities. Practical activity is concerned with a particular 
procedure at a particular time - it makes no sense to undertake practice in the 
abstract. This contrasts with the scale of theory which is based on and aimed at 
generalisation.
Heller (1984 ) found this was fundamental to her interpretation of everyday 
existence, which she maintains is derived from and based upon particularities, 
without which everyday life would not be possible. In the arena of professional 
practice Jarvis (1992b) suggests that practice is about conscious action in a 
specific field - particularity thus being as important to professional activities.
Toulmin (1976) has similar notions. He suggests that in theory, individual data 
are significant only when revealing corresponding general facts, but in practice, 
general relationships merge into the background and knowledge of particularities 
are more significant. This accords with Eraut's (1985 ) assertion that 
practitioners' knowledge creation is particularistic, being derived from case 
experience, and is transferred from one case to another by association. Similarly 
Cervero (1988 ) suggests that most situations of professional practice are 
characterised by a uniqueness.
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This scale of particularity has been suggested by writers on nursing. Kosowski
(1995) found that in order to learn caring in clinical practice, specific details had 
to be recounted - the caring was in the detail, the particularities, rather than in 
the general theory of caring and of practice. Ferguson & Jinks (1994) refer to the 
importance of particularity in nursing practice activities by emphasising the 
uniqueness of the individual patient and the untidiness of reality, and suggesting that 
theory, being a generalisation, will always be an imperfect representation of 
nursing practice as real situations are always more complex than any theoretical 
description. Similarly Miller (1985) points to the significance of the concrete 
particularities and imperfect, messy realities of nursing practice.
In this study Kathryn spoke of the importance of particularistic scale of nursing 
practice:
•  In order to work effectively on the ward or in a particular situation, you need to 
know the particular details.
13 .6 . CONCLUSION
In this analysis it has been shown that the scale of practical activities operates on 
the level of the specific and the concrete. It concerns the little things, the 
immediacy and directness of the everyday, the commonality of ordinariness and the 
specificities of the particular. All of these contrast with the abstractness and 
generality of theory.
While this indicates a scale that is unpretentious and modest, it does not suggest that 
the significance of the practice activities is accordingly diminished, but rather that 
consequence and import can be demonstrated in different and unusual ways.
This discussion serves to indicate further points of comparison of theory and 
practice. The broad, general and abstract scale of theory contrasts with the 
everyday, ordinary and particular scale of practical activities, providing another 
dimension of the conceptual framework which distinguishes theory from practice.
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SECTION 4
SYNTHESIS
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CHAPTER 14
PATTERNING THE FRAMEWORK OF PRACTICE
14 .1 . INTRODUCTION
Some aspects of the nature of practice have been discussed in Section 3 in terms of a 
detailed analysis of the some primary concepts and their attributes. It is suggested 
that these concepts form the central structures of a framework of the nature of 
practice, which distinguish it from theory, and by so doing, the nature of each 
becomes apparent, and the relationship between them is clearer. The concepts of 
practice and the discussion on how these concepts interrelate contribute to the 
articulation of practice.
The concepts and attributes of the framework are not discrete or mutually exclusive. 
Links and overlays occur between them. The framework is linked together and thus 
given a cohesiveness by these overlappings, which produce various patterns of 
practice. This patterning - or lack of discreteness between the concepts - is an 
essential feature of the nature of practice, and some of the linkages which could form 
these patterns will be discussed.
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The aim of the formulation of the framework is to create an articulation of the 
nature of practice. This is not unproblematic, and the issues surrounding this are 
discussed. Finally, practice itself is discussed.
14 .2 . PATTERNING
14.1. RATIONALE
The concepts of the nature of practice do not exist as isolated entities. To establish 
some coherence and order, it is necessary to show the links between the concepts. 
This linking is more meaningfully presented as patterning, rather than a linear 
relationship between the various concepts, for several reasons. Patterning enables 
the non-discrete, non-abstractable nature of practice to be discussed. Since 
practice is not static, but varies between practitioners and contexts, patterning 
accommodates this variety. Moreover, patterns offers a coherent environment in 
which both the overlapping and the distinctiveness of the concepts can be understood.
Precedents have been set for the interpretation of the practices of professionals in 
terms of patterns. Collins & Fielder (1981) argue that much of the knowledge that 
nurses use in practice consists of empirical patterns, formed from a variety of 
different types of knowledges. This patterning enables the clarification of what 
practitioners need to know and guides their actions. Diekelmann's (1992 )  
research supports this argument in the field of educational practice. Eraut (1985) 
has a similar understanding - that the semi-conscious patterning of previous 
experience forms part of the knowledge that professionals use, and Walker & Kerr 
(1994) suggest that it is this patterning of categories of events, experiences, 
patients and objects which distinguishes the developed practice of senior nurses 
from that of students.
Fleller's (1984) contentions go beyond practice to the functioning of society itself. 
She maintains that society is reproduced by individuals appropriating the systems of 
habits, objects and institutions of the society through acquiring the patterning of 
these, and the more intricate the pattern, the more complex the society, the longer 
it takes to assimilate.
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In all these discussions, patterning is used as a mental construct to convey the 
notions of coherency and complexity, rather than to suggest a particular pattern - 
as is used in some explanations [e.g. the double helix of DNA]. These writers have 
not attempted to present the patterning visually, as the complexity of the pattern 
precludes that.
While accepting that any visual presentation of the patterns formed by the concepts 
of this study is merely a partial representation, illustrations of some possible 
forms which the patterns could take will be discussed in the interests of a greater 
clarity of the totality of practice.
14 .2 .2 . FORMS OF PATTERNS
At a simplistic level, a linear relationship between theory and practice can be 
produced by contrasting them as polarities around each concept. To achieve this 
each concept is represented by a summative attribute, and while this is crudely 
reductionist, it has an advantage of visual clarity and immediate intelligibility.
t h e o r y CONCEPT p r a c t i c e
focused < AWARENESS > diffuse
linear < TEMPORALITY > relational
extracted < CONTEXTUALITY > embedded
prepositional < KNOWLEDGE > pragmatic
structured < MODALITY > adaptive
directive < INTENTIONALITY > emergent
convergent <- NATURE > diverse
grand < SCALE > intimate
syllogistic < REASONING > perspicacious
oblique < POWER > direct
TABLE 1: THEORY VS. PRACTICE
Such polarities have been used as intellectual tools and frameworks for inquiry 
throughout history, but, as Carlson (1972 ) points out, the usefulness of this 
approach is limited as mounting evidence has forced the abandonment one after 
another of these dichotomies. For example, not only are 'dependence' and 
'independence' opposite ends on a scale, they also co-exist within the individual. 
Equally, in this study for instance, diffuse and focused awareness are not only
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opposite polarities, but they, too, co-exist in practice. While theoretical 
relationships value uniformity, the complexity of practice militates against this, 
and if uniformity is sought the result is simplicity at the cost of distortion. As 
Pring (1970) suggests, in practical matters aggregation of the concepts is not 
enough, and some patterning is necessary to give the flavour of the complexity which 
derives from recurrences, overlappings and cross linkages of the concepts.
Several models of patterning are put forward in the literature. Diesing (1972; 
Reason, 1981 b) suggests a holistic model which is built by discovering a network of 
connecting themes empirically, rather than inferring them logically. Further 
empirical work allows the patterns to be expanded and consolidated as knowledge and 
experience is extended. The patterns are formed dialectically and are concatenated 
rather than hierarchical.
Conversely, Schwartz & Wiggins (1983) suggest hierarchical patterning to create 
unifying linkages. Their rationale is that hierarchical linkages preclude 
theoretical anarchy as the hierarchical dependency ensures that changes in one 
system affect other systems - as in the biopsychosocio model in medicine. Yet they 
do not envisage the hierarchy as strictly linear, claiming that in the human 
sciences, subject matters spill over into one another and admit no precise 
delineation - facets of one reality mix and interweave in ambiguous ways with facets 
of another.
The ideas of patterning as a web or weave is common in the literature (Berger et al, 
1974:; Davies, 1990; Gendron, 1994) and has similarities with loop systems 
which suggest that ideologies and notions concerning practice loop back to affect the 
practice itself, which in turn affects the notions about practice (Usher, 1989b). 
Other notions on patternings include the rejection of grand theory analysis in favour 
of local analysis, where the analysis is constructed around patterns derived from the 
local interplay of ideas, for example gender, race, class (Barrett & Phillips,
1992) - as well as that of a central concept being used as a linking feature for other 
concepts (Meighan, 1986).
The ideas of the patterning of practice exist to indicate the coherency and meanings 
in practice, and not to demonstrate causal or other types of relationships, as is 
common in theoretical systems. Patterns change as insights and practice develop, 
and include the general understandings of the body of practitioners as well as those 
of individuals. It is therefore helpful to envisage the patterning of the concepts of
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this study as kaleidoscopic, with the changing patterns formed through various 
linkages which will now be discussed.
14 .3 . LINKING THE CONCEPTS
Several possible patterns emerge as a means of making sense of the nature of 
practice. Some possible links between concepts and their attributes are presented 
here, based on the discussion in Section 3. The linkages are not definitive and could 
be construed differently according to the idiosyncratic interpretations of each 
practitioner. They do, however, provide a sense of coherency between the concepts 
and their attributes. (For quick reference, a compendium of the concepts and their 
various attributes is given in Appendix 6.)
14 .3 .1 . ORGANISING CONCEPTS
One possibility is to determine the linkages using one of the concepts as a central 
organising concept. For example. Knowledge could be used in this way (Diagram 3).
Knowledge is linked with Contextuality. It has already been demonstrated that 
practical knowledge is contextual - complex entities need to be understood in their 
contexts in order for meaningful knowledge to be generated, and practical knowledge, 
unlike technical knowledge, is situationally dependent, being derived from, amongst 
other things, the background of beliefs, customs and habits of those participating in 
the practice situation.
The Knowledge of practitioners shares with Awareness the notion that intuitive 
knowing and the perception of the peripheral entities of knowledge require a diffuse, 
holistic and non-analytic awareness. This intuitiveness accounts for the 
perceptions and sensitivities used in practical knowledge, and is similar to diffuse 
awareness. As Polanyi (1967) and Argyris & Schon (1974 ) argue, focusing 
attention on the particular disables awareness of the whole, and it is the awareness 
of the whole which is necessary for the performance of complex skills and for 
practical knowledge.
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I temporality
knowledge[power
I nature
modality
reasoning
awareness
contextuality
intentionality
DIAGRAM 3: ORGANISING CONCEPTS
Knowledge and Temporality share a subjective element - in practice the meanings 
and uses of time are negotiated between practitioners, and an aspect of the knowledge 
that practitioners use is that it is created by them in an interpretive manner during 
their practice. A further link is the time-bound nature of knowledge of 
practitioners.
The uncodifiable aspects of the Knowledge used in practice - that knowledge which 
can only be expressed in practice and learned through experience - overlaps with 
the fluid, undifferentiated aspects of Modality, where the practitioner cannot 
precisely articulate what informs practice, other than that it is obvious, common- 
sense and taken-for-granted.
Knowledge and Reasoning have a shared interest in intuition and intersubjectivity. 
The judgements made in practice by expert practitioners are based largely on 
intuitive knowledge. The knowledge which is used in practice is generated by the 
community of practitioners, and shares this intersubjectivity and communality 
with the practical judgements of practitioners. As Kirkevold (1993) suggests, 
practical knowledge encompasses values, assumptions and contexts integrated into 
practical decision making.
Knowledge and Intentionality have a straightforward link, in that the purpose of 
practical knowledge is informed and committed action - the praxis, which is the 
subject of the Intentionality used in practice.
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Knowledge and the Nature of practice are connected through the practitioners 
themselves. The use of self is integral to both the nature of practice and to the 
subjective and expressive elements of practical knowledge. It is in the individual 
practice of each practitioner that these elements of Knowledge and Nature are 
communicated. Other connections are the routinised aspects of the nature of 
practice which form part of the constructed, organic aspects of knowledge used in 
practice, and the concrete, particularistic scale of the nature of practice which 
links with the knowledge of particulars - unique and particular facts of individual 
situations, rather than the generalisations - which is part of the knowledge of 
practice.
The link between Knowledge and Power is another direct link: power is derived 
through knowledge, and in practice knowledge is used as a means of both dominating 
and domination.
Because the linking is so dense, any of the other primary concepts could equally be 
used as the organising concept to show how the links occur. While the use of an 
organising concept has the advantage of visual clarity and intelligibility, it is 
problematic in that the links between other concepts are not simultaneously made.
14 .3 .2 . ORGANISING THEMES
It is also possible to show the links between the concepts through themes which are 
common to certain concepts. For example. Diagram 4 illustrates that the notion of 
subjectivity is a common theme in Temporality, Knowledge and Reasoning (see 5.7, 
7.2 and 8.3), while intuitiveness features in attributes of Beyond reflection and 
Open in Awareness, and the Intuitive attributes of both Knowledge and Reasoning 
(see 4.6 & 4.8, 7.5 and 8.2).
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Temporality
Knowledge
subjectivity
Reasoning
DIAGRAM 4: ORGANISING THEMES I.
Interconnected relationality is shared by Awareness, Contextuality and Knowledge 
(see 4.9, 6.5 and 7.4), while Diagram 5 represents heterogeneous complexity as 
common to Awareness, Contextuality, Nature and Reasoning (see 4.5, 6.7, 12.2 and 
8 .6).
Awareness Contextuality
heterogeneoui 
complexity y
Reasoning
Nature
DIAGRAM 5: ORGANISING THEMES II.
Further conjectures are then possible concerning the fact that some concepts seem 
strongly linked, while the links between other concepts are more tangential, and 
from that it would be possible to surmise that some concepts are more important in 
the articulation of the nature of practice than others. While this would prove
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interesting, it would not be possible to draw meaningful conclusions from this 
because of the interpretive nature of the analysis precludes any claims to objective 
certainty - analysed another way it would be possible to make stronger links where 
there are currently weak links, and vice versa. Therefore secondary deductions 
could be construed as somewhat spurious.
14.3.3. LINKING THROUGH COMMON ATTRIBUTES
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DIAGRAM 6: COMMON ATTRIBUTES
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Another strategy for displaying the relationships between concepts would be a 
diagram showing the connecting links between the attributes, as illustrated in 
Diagram 6. This is visually more complex, and has the advantage of presenting 
more of the associations, thus giving a sense of some of the complexities of practice. 
Yet, for the sake of clarity, even this type of representation must necessarily omit 
much of the richness which is created by the dense interlinking and overlapping 
between the concepts.
1 4 .4 . ISSUES REGARDING THE ARTICULATION OF PRACTICE
From the above discussion it is clear that a variety of patterns could express some of 
the relationships between the concepts, but that no one pattern can represent the 
totality of practice. A diagrammatic presentation of the relationships between the 
concepts is ultimately a simplistic abstraction, excluding more than is included and 
leaving unsaid much of what is most important in actual practice. This does not 
imply that there is no unity, but rather that the interweavings of the relationships 
are too complex to be expressed in this manner - a stance firmly within the holist 
tradition which identifies an intrinsic unity that might not have a focal point, but 
consist merely of a myriad of interweavings of themes and subsystems in a complex 
pattern (Diesing, 1972). This, essentially, supports the ideas expressed by the 
concepts concerning the nature of practice, that the complexity of practice defies 
simple codification - practice is irreducible to the component parts or rules of 
relationships. This ultimately represents the essential difference between theory 
and practice, and supports the contention that theory and practice bespeak different 
realms.
There are consequences of this for practice: (i) it contributes to the invisibility of 
practice and therefore the downgrading of practice in theoretical [and hence 
academic] terms; (ii) it encourages the templating of theory onto practice since 
theory is privileged over practice, and (iii) it gives rise to difficulties in the 
articulation of practices.
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1 4 . 4 . 1 .  INVISIBILITY
Invisibility is created by a number of factors, several of which were discussed in 
Chapter 7 on Knowledge, such as non-sanctioning by socially dominant groups; 
dispossession by being associated with women's traditions; subjugation by being 
disguised and submerged within more powerful forms of representation; 
disqualification by being concerned with local and common-sensical matters. The 
uncodifiability demonstrated above contributes to this invisibility by denying the 
abstraction necessary for any form of articulation.
Attempts have been made to circumnavigate this recently by the use of narrative in 
discussing aspects of practice (Derbyshire, 1992; Baker & Diekelmann, 1994). 
Another way of creating visibility for practice is to contrast it against a background, 
and in a sense the creation of this framework of concepts which contrasts theory and 
practice contributes to that. Yet even these are abstractions, and the reality 
remains that practice can only be known by participating in it.
There are significant consequences of this for nursing, in terms of both the academic 
study and the practice of nursing, and hence for the education and training of future 
practitioners. These will be discussed in Section 5.
14 .4 .2 . CINDERELLA'S SHOE SYNDROME
Because of this indefinable nature of practice and its consequent invisibility in 
theoretical terms, there has been a tendency for theory to dominate practice 
ideologically, for theory to be regarded as a template of how practice ought to be 
carried out. The framework of concepts indicates the inappropriateness of this, 
since theory and practice essentially address different domains. Ryle (1990) has 
discussed this in a different context as a Category Mistake, where events from one 
logical order are pressed into the mould of a different mental order [one may meet 
John Doe on the street, but not the Average Taxpayer]. In the same way, theories 
cannot be directly transposed onto practice, and practice cannot be pressed into 
theoretical constructs without causing some sort of alienation - a 'Cinderella's shoe' 
syndrome.
In this manner, attempting to articulate practice in theoretical terms causes it to 
become invisible because the structures and measures of one do not fit the other. A 
case in point is that discussed by Skeet & Thompson (1985), where students denied
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their knowledge obtained experientially and intuitively because it did not fit the 
academic pattern as they saw it.
Conversely, practitioners are pressed into using theoretical constructs within their 
practice when they are clearly inappropriate, and nursing practice abounds with 
such instances: the idea of holistic care in a service predicated on fragmentation; 
the notion of a named nurse, or primary nursing, which is pragmatically impossible 
to sustain across shift changes and other pressing practical priorities; care plans 
which are constructed retrospectively. Again, these problems arise essentially 
because the nature of nursing practice itself is not clearly understood - its diffuse 
responsiveness (discussed in Section 3) militates against being pressed into 
theoretical constructs. This phenomenon persists, however, because of the 
privileging of theory over practice and the greater status available when practice is 
closely aligned with theory. This is further exemplified in the current interest in 
reflective practice - yet another ploy to theorise practice, another attempted fitting 
of Cinderella's shoe.
14 .4 .3 . THE PROBLEM OF CREATING VISIBILITY
The ultimate conundrum in attempting to articulate the nature of practice is that the 
only methods available necessitate abstraction. So, for instance, it becomes 
meaningless to articulate embedded knowledge because it immediately becomes 
decontextualised, more is left out than can be included and it is therefore incomplete 
and insubstantial. Embedded knowledge cannot be described or articulated. A case 
can be made for its existence, which can then only be acknowledged, not proved; it 
becomes visible only through practice. As Foucault (1980) suggests, practice is 
based on immediate experience which escapes encapsulation in knowledge, or, in 
Dreyfus's (1980) terms, practices have a flexibility which is lost when they are 
converted into propositional knowledge.
This discussion on the nature of practice is an attempt to provide some redress for 
this, for while it cannot provide an articulation of practice itself, it can provide 
some concepts through which the inarticulability of practice can be made explicit, 
and the nature of practice understood in relation to theory, which could prevent the 
generation of inappropriate relationships between theory and practice.
Ultimately practice can only exist in the field: it cannot be separated from the 
practitioner or the physical, social and cultural environment, and when it is
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abstracted to the theoretical and ideological academic world, the accompanying 
distortion and incompletion render it imperceptible and devalued.
1 4 .5 . PRACTICE REVISITED
Section 3 presented a demonstration of some of the aspects of the nature of practice 
which enabled it to be seen as distinct from theory. It has been argued that on the 
several dimensions discussed in Section 3 practice exists differently from theory, 
and therefore total integration between theory and practice is inappropriate and 
there is inevitably a theory-practice gap if this is attempted.
This section has demonstrated the difficulty in attempting a definitive link or 
pattern between the concepts, and pointed up the indeterminate, essentially non- 
abstractable, inexact nature of the totality of practice.
What both of these discussions demonstrate are the difficulties in defining practice. 
Attempts have been made to do so - for example, this definition given by MacIntyre 
(1981 :17 5 ):
By a 'practice' I am going to mean any coherent and complex form of socially 
established co-operative human activity through which goods internal to  that form 
of activity are realised in the course of trying to achieve those standards of 
excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of 
activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human 
conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended.
Practice is seen as whole systems of meanings, not just particular skills. Thus, 
MacIntyre maintains, farming is a practice, but planting turnips is not.
While this provides a good general notion of practice, it also encapsulates the 
essential problem of articulating practice, namely, that the general terms needed 
for this are so broad that they have little relevance and meaning for individual 
practitioners in the pursuit of their practice, since, as shown in Section 3, practice 
is essentially concerned with specific contexts and details.
In addition to this, practice is in a constant state of flux, comprising, as Whitbeck
(1992) suggests, a body of developing and decaying interpretations and strategies 
created by those engaging in practice itself.
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Practice, then, cannot be entirely understood by describing or articulating it, since 
any form of language is an abstraction. As Bourdieu (1977) suggests, practice is 
understood and develops through specific cases, and not through expressly 
formulating the fundamental principles explicitly. Equally G randy (1983 ), 
following Kuhn, reaches the same conclusions in terms of scientific practice: that it 
is necessarily based on exemplars [shared examples which illustrate and direct the 
work of research scientists] rather than explicit rules, since the full articulation 
and precision of rules is the endpoint occurring only after theory and its 
applications and assumptions have been thoroughly worked out. In this sense, 
practice uses theory on a post-hoc basis - to theorise about certain aspects of 
practice after their occurrence. An example of this from nursing practice is the 
use of nursing care plans, which are either constructed or modified from pre­
formulated stock plans only after the practice has been engaged in.
Therefore, to understand practice in its entirety it is necessary to engage in it. 
This is crucial in the education of future practitioners, and must be a consideration 
in any theoretical discussion about nursing practice. While this had always been 
known by practitioners, albeit usually on a subliminal level, there has been a 
reluctance to acknowledge this by those peripheral to practice. What this study has 
attempted to contribute are some concepts, the dimensions of which make explicit 
this essential nature of practice which cannot be known through abstracted 
theoretical discussion.
14 .6 . CONCLUSION
While the concepts have attempted to give some idea of the nature of practice, in the 
final analysis they represent only a partial picture of the total, and can only provide 
a limited means of understanding practice.
This then is the ultimate difference between theory and practice, that while theory 
is a delineated, circumscribed, articulate system of descriptions, explanations and 
predictions, practice is indeterminate, unstable and relatively unpredictable. This 
supports the contention, set out in Section 1 and developed throughout the study, that 
theory and practice bespeak different realms, and there is no analogous relationship
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between them. This impacts on the real world of practice, and the implications of 
this for the practice of nursing is discussed in the final section.
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DISCUSSION
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CHAPTER 15
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
15 .1 . INTRODUCTION
The aim of this study was to support the contention that theory and practice 
essentially address different domains. To this end the nature of practice was 
examined using concepts whose attributes were then juxtaposed with their 
theoretical counterparts, and the fundamental differences between theory and 
practice were thereby pointed up.
As a result of this analysis, practice and theory are held to bespeak different 
realms, and the conclusions which can be drawn from this impact on theory, 
practice and the interplay between them. This has implications for the education of 
practitioners, the management of practice and for practitioners themselves. These 
will now be discussed.
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15 .2 . CONCLUSIONS
15 .2 .1 . PRACTICE IS ESSENTIALLY INARTICULABLE
The first conclusion, derived from the study and the discussion in Section 4, 
concerns the basic inarticulable nature of practice. While specific and limited 
aspects of practice have been discussed by the student participants, the total nature 
is essentially inarticulable in that it is both greater and more ineffable that the sum 
of these articulated aspects, as the discussion around the concepts of the nature of 
practice have attempted to show. It was suggested that the analysis of the nature of 
practice could not provide an articulation of practice, but could provide concepts 
through which the inarticulability of practice could be made explicit. The question 
which might then be posed is: if practice is essentially inarticulable, what can be 
achieved by attempting the articulations presented in Section 3?
The response exists on several levels. Firstly, the concepts provide some verbal 
representation which can be used in the discussion about the nature of practice. An 
attempt has not been made to enunciate practice itself, but rather to provide a 
vocabulary with which the dimensions of practice can be mapped out, by which its 
inexpressive nature becomes distinguishable and through which its uniqueness 
becomes discernible.
Secondly, the concepts enable theory and practice to be viewed from the same 
reference point, so that they can be discussed using common terminology which 
allows equivalent comparisons to be made. This contributes to the academic debate 
on the relation of theory to practice, the nature of the theory-practice gap and the 
extent to which correspondence between the two should be pursued.
Thirdly, on an educational level, it enables some of the essential differences between 
propositional knowledge and experiential knowledge to be evidenced, which has 
implications for learning, and provides a starting point from which evaluations of 
experiential learning can be attempted.
Fourthly, and arguably most importantly, the articulation of the nature of practice 
provides some vocabulary for practitioners to use in the discussion of particular 
aspects of their practice. This creates a visibility for aspects of practice which are 
commonly ignored or downgraded because theoretical terms are not available with
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which to conduct a debate. It therefore valorises the position of practice, and this 
has implications for the status of practitioners and the management of practice, 
which will be discussed below.
15.2 .2 . PRACTICE CAN ONLY BE LEARNED IN PRACTICE
The second conclusion of this analysis of the nature of practice concerns the 
subtleties of practice which only became apparent during practice itself. It is clear 
that substantial learning takes place in practice, concerned directly with the nature 
of practice itself and involving, amongst other things, the various attributes 
discussed in Section 3, and that this learning cannot be had in academic settings. 
Nursing theory does not teach one how to nurse - it is only in clinical settings, the 
context in which nursing practice occurs, that nurses learn how to nurse, as Section 
3 has demonstrated.
It has been suggested (Bishop & Scudder, 1991; Benner, 1984) that nursing is 
learned primarily through clinical experience because it is not a technology - it 
relies on personal qualities, and requires the creativity of the individual 
practitioner in the use of both craft and scientific technologies. Another 
interpretation for this is that practice relies on whole systems of meaning 
(MacIntyre 1 9 8 1 )-as  discussed in Section 4 - which form part of the goods which 
are internal to the practice, and which cannot be had in any way but by participating 
in the practice. These are a variety of understandings, rather than knowledge, and 
are considered internal because they can only be specified in terms of the practice, 
and because they can only be recognised and identified by the experience of 
participating in the practice. Therefore, the acquisition of these goods as part of 
learning to be a practitioner can only be gained by participating in practice. 
Similarly Heller (1984 ) holds that is only in practice that things acquire 
significance.
The importance of learning through practice has long been recognised, and many 
modern professions implicitly acknowledge this by the system of internship which 
transmits the intuitive aspects of professional knowledge - professional "right- 
mindedness" which is necessary if practitioners are to apply their knowledge 
successfully in the best interests of their clients (Tripp, 1993). Put another way, 
clinical expertise comes from knowledge-in-action which can only be revealed in 
action (Dowie & Elstein, 1988).
- 2 46  -
Another aspect of learning in practice is the exposure to the practice over time 
which this affords the practitioner. The importance of various interpretations of 
time to practice has been discussed in Section 3. It was shown that in order to 
understand practice in all its distinctiveness and subtleties, it is necessary to  
experience it over time (Gorovitz & MacIntyre, 1976; Lauder 1994), since time 
contributes to and changes the contexts of practice.
Fundamentally what this amounts to, as shown in Section 4, is that practice cannot 
be separated from the practitioner. Hence the only way to become proficient in any 
form of practice is to participate in it.
15.2 .3 . THEORY RELATES VARIOUSLY TO PRACTICE
The third conclusion concerns the relation of theory to practice. It has been shown 
(Section 4) that a direct correlation between theory and practice is inappropriate. 
Practice is too broad and all-encompassing to be reduced to theories. As Collins & 
Fielder (1981) point out, nursing practice concerns whole individuals in their 
total contexts and therefore needs the input of the full range of physical sciences, 
human and social sciences, and even that cannot provide a complete picture of 
practice. Put another way, where the field of inquiry is sufficiently complex, 
everything cannot be learned explicitly, and therefore an indirect assault on the 
object of inquiry is needed: the practitioner absorbs the theory indirectly by 
participating in the practice on which the theory is based (Sober, 1979).
The fact that this leads to a paradox in nursing (Chapman 1983), where the nobility 
of research and propositional knowledge is extolled, yet anyone who engages in this 
is deemed to be of lesser value in a practice setting, is an interesting notion which 
could be the subject of another study.
Since a direct equivalence between theory and practice is thus dismissed as 
unsuitable, several other possible relationships can be suggested: Firstly, theory
can be used on a post-hoc basis in the construction of theoretical rationales for what 
occurs in practice, and in the dissemination and evaluation of certain aspects of 
practice. Eraut (1985) argues that this is precisely how new knowledge is created 
- it is invented and developed in practice by practitioners, with the role of the 
academics being that of observation and articulation and consequent theory 
construction. This position is similar to that adopted by Rafferty et al (1996 ) in 
the nursing context, who argue that clinical creativity is developed from the tension
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generated by the unsealable theory-practice gap, and that the role of theory is the 
testing of this new knowledge.
Secondly, theory can be seen as forming part of the general heuristic on which 
practitioners draw in the pursuit of their practice. Toulmin (1976) refers to this 
as the continuous background of standing conditions which support practice. 
Relevant knowledge, laws, correlations and general relationships merge, along with 
much else, to become a 'melting pot' which practitioners use to inform practice in a 
general manner.
A third possible relationship between theory and practice centres on the 
practitioners themselves. Nursing theory does not teach one how to nurse - while 
teaching background information and propositional knowledge, it equally 
importantly develops the personality and the intellectual functioning of the person, 
so that when nurses "take their total selves to work" [in the words of one of the 
students], that self is a better equipped one.
Fourthly, theory could be seen as having an analytic relationship to practice. As 
Polanyi (1967:39) describes in relation to machines:
Machines are defined by their operational principles, which tell us how the machine
works a complete physical and chemical topography of an object would not tell
us whether it is a machine, and if so, how it works, and for what purpose .... But 
there is an important feature of the machine which its operational principles do not 
reveal; they can never account for the failure and ultimate breakdown of the  
machine. And here physics and chemistry effectively come in. Only the  
physical-chemical structure of a machine can explain its failures.
Similarly, while theory cannot comprehensively encompass practice, it is effective 
in analysing and explaining certain aspects of practice.
Fifthly, there is another rather oblique relationship possible between theory and 
practice, concerning the visibility of practice. In opposition to the way in which 
theory contributes to the invisibility of practice when a direct correlation is 
supposed between them and theory and practice are assumed to blend together, 
theory can contribute to the visibility of practice by providing a background - a 
contrast medium - against which it is possible to 'see' practice. As Zerubavel 
(1991) has extensively discussed, to be visible objects need to be 'framed' - seen 
against another background. The discussion in Section 3 showed that by contrasting 
theory and practice, it was possible for certain aspects of practice to become 
evident.
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1 5 .3 . IMPLICATIONS
The conclusions of this study impact across a broad range of interests, affecting 
areas which are related in some way to practice. The foremost of these is in the 
education of practitioners, since this is where practice and theory are most 
conspicuously juxtaposed, but other areas include the interests of practitioners 
themselves, and the management of practice.
15 .3 .1 . EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS
The implications of the analysis of this study are significant for nursing education. 
The academic field of Nursing Studies, being a practice-based discipline, purports to 
examine in theoretical terms a practice which is largely invisible in those terms, 
and therefore relies largely on relating other theoretical disciplines [e.g. anatomy, 
physiology, psychology, sociology etc.] to the understanding of the care of people in 
health and ill-health. Academics engaging in this soon lose practice credibility, and 
students learn quickly that academic pursuits cannot teach them how to practice 
nursing. In spite of this, practical components of academic courses are being 
increasingly minimised, and are still struggling for recognition as valuable sources 
of learning in academic terms.
On the other hand, nursing practitioners are inclined to regard the academic study of 
nursing as of peripheral interest, and to put greater value on experientially derived 
knowledge than on the theoretical construction of it. This chasm can be ascribed to 
the failure to acknowledge that theory and practice do represent fundamentally 
different realms, whereby the language, understandings and activities of one are 
essentially invisible in terms of the other. Attempts to forge closer relationships 
between them is bound to be continually problematic, if not to fail entirely.
Thus in the educational arena there are implications on several levels. Firstly, 
there is the effect on the teaching of practice. With the distinction between theory 
and practice having been made, an understanding of exactly what is being taught will 
prevent concepts from one framework being directly and inappropriately transposed 
into another. An awareness of the relationship between theory and practice would
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assist in avoiding the error of attempting to template theory directly onto clinical 
practice, and the subsequent confusion and disillusionment this creates for students 
who soon discover that what happens in the 'real world' of practice is somewhat 
different to what they have been taught. In relation to this, Bennett & Hokenstad 
(1973) suggest that education will have to become increasingly particularistic, but 
even such an education would not address the problem, since the totality of practice 
cannot possibly be taught. It is rather a question of having regard for the nature of 
the framework within which one is working, and responding accordingly, or, as 
Rafferty et al (1996) suggest, making students aware of the debates around the 
origin and generation of nursing knowledge - what counts as nursing knowledge and 
the politics of the legitimation of knowledge - so that what is learned in each context 
can be dealt with appropriately.
Secondly, there are implications for curriculum planning. Courses which prepare 
students to participate in a field of practice normally incorporate some element of 
that practice as a placement within the course. In the light of the theory-practice 
distinction, such placements become increasingly important, and adjustments to 
their standing within the structure of the course might be necessitated. The 
importance of being exposed to practice over expanses of time as an essential 
element of learning the intricacies, nuances and distinctiveness of practice has also 
been discussed. In nursing this would require the incorporation of substantial 
periods of clinical experience, which bucks the current trend of reducing clinical 
experience or acquiring it vicariously, because clinical placements are difficult to 
obtain. Not only does this affect the structuring of courses, but it also has 
significant budgetary implications.
Thirdly, the implications for teachers centre on the thorny problem of credibility. 
Much recent nursing literature has debated the acceptability of teachers who are 
removed from the practice arena teaching nursing practice, and the question of 
whether is it possible to maintain practically proficiency without spending 
considerable time in clinical areas. Miller (1985) goes so far as to suggest that 
the theory-practice gap is caused because theorists, who have not been in close 
contact with reality of practice for years, teach nursing practice, and concentrate on 
theoretical relationships, when in practice it is the context which largely 
determines how practitioners nurse. Moves are currently afoot to require teachers 
to spend time in clinical areas to maintain their practical proficiency, and the study 
by Lathlean (1995) showed that the Lecturer Practitioners, who have both an 
educational and a practice remit at a credible status level, are able to maintain their 
authority in both arenas through their significant understanding of both, and
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thereby to promote the dialectic between theory and practice. However, a different 
angle is suggested by this study: because theory and practice bespeak different 
realms, teachers are working within a different framework to that of practitioners. 
Their remit of theoretical competency must be seen as distinct from a practitioner's 
remit to be practically proficient, and it would not necessarily be appropriate to 
require practical proficiency from a theoretician, or vice versa. Even though 
Lecturer Practitioners straddle both realms credibly, they are still either 
operating in one or other mode at any given time. What is necessary is to be clear 
about what is being taught and learned in each context and framework, as discussed 
above.
The fourth implication concerns the examining and assessment of practice-based 
courses. While the theoretical components of such courses are quite properly 
examined using various theoretical strategies within the theoretical framework, the 
practical components are usually also assessed within a theoretical framework. For 
the purposes of comparable assessments, practice is shoe-horned into the 
theoretical framework which, as is demonstrated in Section 3, differs from what is 
experienced practically. While (1994) establishes the inadequacy of this type of 
assessment, and goes on to suggest that performance in real-life settings should be 
the focus of nursing registration, not the assessment of competencies. What While 
is alluding to is the need to assess practice within a practice framework. The 
discussion in Sections 3 and 4 give some notion of what this might be, and how it 
might differ from assessment within a theoretical framework.
Fifthly, the implications for students concerns their learning and expectations. It 
has been demonstrated (e.g. by Burnard, 1992; Ingram, 1994) that students 
perceive that meaningful learning is only to be had in clinical settings, and 
consequently theoretical learning is relegated. This misconception can be 
understood in terms of the differences between the frameworks of theory and 
practice - the distortion could be interpreted as an expectation by the students to 
acquire practical learning in a theoretical setting. If this difference were to be 
made apparent to students, so that they were aware of what to expect from each mode 
of learning, and of the relationship between theoretical and practical learning - as 
discussed above - meaningful and appropriate learning could be achieved in all 
settings.
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1 5 .3 .2 .  IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTITIONERS
The implications for practitioners concern a reappraisal and appreciation of their 
importance, and the consequences of this, on two levels - as teachers and as 
knowledgeable practitioners.
Firstly, their significance as teachers of practice has been informally recognised. 
Terms such as 'role modelling', 'mentoring' and 'sitting next to Nellie' have long 
been used in relation to the learning that occurs in practice settings, implicitly 
acknowledging that there is a form of teaching to be had in practice which cannot be 
obtained from theoretical settings. Formal recognition of this teaching is rarely 
found, and consequently formal recognition of the significance of the teachers of this 
learning - the practitioners themselves - is unrecognised.
By recognising that practice learning is significantly different from theoretical 
learning and having some concepts with which to express this difference, that it can 
only occur in practice settings and that it is fundamentally important in the 
education of practitioners, a formal recognition of practitioners as teachers could be 
made. This would have significant implications for the conducting of practice-based 
courses, such as the formal recognition of their role and effort as teachers [with the 
managerial, structural and political implication of this for both the academic and the 
practice institutions], the inclusion of these practice-based teachers in discussions 
on the planning, design, implementation and assessment of such courses, and 
importantly, the financial recognition of their input.
On the second level, in terms of the analyses of Sections 3 and 4, the vast store of 
knowledge that practitioners have in relation to a given situation and the importance 
of this in the delivery of their practice, becomes evident, and their often 
undervalued experiential knowledge is enhanced. The acknowledgement of this 
enables them to be recognised as eminently knowledgeable practitioners, restoring 
the balance between the commonly more highly prized theoretical knowers and the 
practical knowers, and reappraising the hierarchy within the health care system. 
Theoretical and practical knowledges can then be seen as different, but equal in 
status.
The recognition of the importance of practical knowledge in the execution of 
practice, and the practitioners' ability to generate this knowledge during practice, 
would impact on the status of practitioners both in the workplace and in the 
academic arena. Their ability to direct and control the management of care - a
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control which is currently in the hands of those with greater theoretical knowledge, 
this being the more overtly powerful mode of knowledge - would be recognised. 
This would strengthen the political muscle of practitioners in managerial terms and 
their bargaining power in financial terms. In the academic field, the recognition of 
this practical knowledge would have a bearing on the substance of practice-based 
courses in addition to the delivery discussed above.
15.3 .3 . IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF PRACTICE
In addition to the above comments, there are also several implications for the 
management of practice in those areas where students are accommodated for clinical 
placements. Firstly, as discussed above, practitioners in these situations are 
necessarily teachers. This impacts on the delivery of practice in terms of the time 
and effort spent by the practitioners with the student and therefore away from 
practice. There are consequently several implications for the resource management 
of the clinical areas. Not only is the clinical work of the practitioners thereby 
necessarily affected, but there are cost effectiveness issues as well as issues 
concerning practitioners' use of time which need to be addressed by practice 
managers. A realistic evaluation of this teaching in terms of clinical practice 
expenditure is pertinent for nurse managers. This is relevant not only for clinical 
practice management, but also for the managers of practice-based educational 
courses, as it would contribute towards a rational assessment of the real cost of 
educating student nurses.
Secondly, as part of their own learning, student nurses make a contribution to the 
clinical workload - albeit only in a novice manner. While this has been addressed 
traditionally in nursing by the salarying of [most] student nurses, and currently by 
the granting of student bursaries [both of these taken from the practice rather than 
the academic budget], in light of the above comments this needs to be reassessed as 
part of the total picture of the cost of clinical education.
Following directly from this is the third implication: the need for close co­
operation between educators, practice managers and practitioners concerning the 
education of student nurses. The current position relies heavily on goodwill 
between these parties, and an implicit professional understanding of a moral 
imperative for practitioners to be involved in educating the next generation of 
practitioners. Given - from the analysis in Section 3 - the significance and 
extensiveness of the learning that occurs in practice, the relationship between
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theses parties would benefit from being placed on an explicit and mutually agreeable 
footing which would include, amongst other things, appropriate formal structural 
and financial arrangements.
15 .4 . CRITIQUE OF THE STUDY
This study set out to determine the nature of practice in the nursing context, in 
support of the contention that theory and practice essentially address different 
domains. The research approach adopted was that of generating concepts concerning 
the nature of practice to form a conceptual framework within which the essential 
qualities of practice could be understood, and the fundamental differences between 
the natures of theory and practice could thereby be made explicit. In retrospect, 
this approach has been successful in achieving the aim of the study. However, some 
substantive and methodological points concerning the nature of the study merit 
examination.
15.4 .1 . THE COMPLEXITY OF THE PHENOMENA
The major difficulty concerned accessing the phenomena regarding the nature of 
practice, because of their complexity. This was evident on several fronts.
Firstly, the phenomena being discussed were not available on a direct or immediate 
basis, in that the study involved a meta-analysis [or second-order examination] of 
the data derived from the various sources used. For instance, it was not possible to 
observe directly the interconnected relationality or the heterogeneous complexity of 
the nature of practice - these had to be inferred from the comments and scenarios 
related by the students and the details of the narratives. The analysis was therefore 
intricate, and cannot be regarded as definitive, since meta-analyses are largely 
interpretive.
Secondly, the phenomena were multi-faceted. Consequently no one particular 
approach could encompass the complexity of the phenomena. Ideas from several 
fields of study, having a major bearing on the topic, have been incorporated. 
Epistemological, sociological, psychological and educational issues, as well as 
notions derived from women' studies, informed various aspects of the study, but
- 2 5 4  -
other fields of study, which are more peripherally involved [for example 
Organisational Theory], could equally have been incorporated. While this has been 
discussed elsewhere (2.3.), the point worth stressing is that the multi-faceted 
nature of the phenomena precluded a completely comprehensive coverage. This was 
a consequence of the nature of the subject being studied, rather than an indictment of 
the approach taken, and retrospective assessment of the breadth of the outcome 
would probably indicate that the approach was justified.
Thirdly, the phenomena were largely esoteric, and were not wholly available to 
those who had not invested much thought and energy in them. This had two 
consequences: firstly, there was a tendency for those less experienced to agree with 
suggestions put forward during the discussion, rather than volunteer their own 
ideas (see 2.4.3.5.). Awareness of this was needed to ensure that the students' own 
notions were advanced so that the data could be enriched. Secondly, the articulation 
needed to progress the development of the concepts was not immediately forthcoming 
from the participants (see 2.4.2.4.). As mentioned, various strategic adjustments 
were made to accommodate this. The observation sessions were abandoned - as the 
students found these counter-productive - in favour of greater scope and intensity 
during the discussion sessions, and at a certain point a résumé of the analysis of the 
ideas to date was posted to each student for their consideration prior to the next 
meeting (see 2.5.2.2 and Appendix 4.). These strategies were successful and 
greatly assisted in the articulation of the concepts, but the accessing of such 
phenomena remains a consideration in any study of this nature.
15.4 .2 . THE NATURE OF THE SUBJECT
A second difficulty in accessing the phenomena concerned the essential character of 
the subject being studied. Practice - as this study has attempted to indicate - is 
essentially different from the abstraction, precise definition and codification 
employed to describe it in this study, and much of its essential character is lost 
during the isolating processes of abstraction. Practice cannot be completely 
described in theoretical terms. This has been alluded to elsewhere (14.4 .3) as a 
contributing factor of the position of practice vis-a-vis theory.
It could be argued that if this was seen to be the case, other more creative methods of 
investigation should have been employed [for example visual analysis via video tapes 
or other means of representing real life encounters], rather than a formal 
linguistic analysis. Even these, however, would only have been partial
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representations of a complex whole. In retrospect, the complexity of the subject 
must be acknowledged as militating against definitive or even comprehensive 
analysis, and any study seen as an approach towards understanding this complexity. 
In this respect the methods and outcomes of this study have hopefully made some 
meaningful contribution towards making this complexity explicit.
15 .4 .3 . THE LIMITATIONS OF THE METHODOLOGY
The eclectic approach used in this study enabled access to a wide variety of data 
sources. This, together with the meta-analysis used regarding the data, resulted in 
the production of rich and varied concepts. The approach was thus successful in 
meeting the aim of the study. However, as mentioned above, this stance is largely 
interpretive, and the insights of the researcher have significant influence on the 
final outcome. This could be construed as a major limitation of this study [to 
juxtapose with the advantages, both of which are discussed in 2.4.3.4.].
If this were to be considered a shortcoming, an alternative approach to limit this 
could have been attempted, such as a Delphi study, which would have incorporated 
the insights of other experts in this field, and allowed several rounds of checking and 
rechecking of the notions. This could provide further interesting ideas on practice 
from another perspective. However, this would have been primarily an academic 
exercise, necessarily using experts who would be somewhat removed from 
immediate practice [by nature of the hierarchy of the health care system] and the 
direct contact with practice - and essential feature of the study, provided by the 
type of data used and the involvement of the participants - would have been lost. 
Whatever limitations might be conceived from the interpretations of a single 
researcher assisted by participants, is compensated by the grounded quality of the 
data produced.
Critical reflection on this choice of methodology indicates that a more direct, focused 
approach (as opposed to the eclectic stance of this study) would have produced more 
convergent data, capable of verification via recognised methods and of more obvious 
transferability, rather than the approach that this methodology requires - that of 
the cognizant reader establishing generalisability, reliability and application. The 
choice appears to be between established research procedures which result in 
clearly recognisable, articulate and useful research results, or an indirect, oblique 
approaches which create different modes of thinking about the topic, but have less 
obvious immediate usage. While both of these approaches further the aims of the
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academic community in different ways, but it could be argued that the former has 
greater immediacy of application for those involved in practice.
15 .5 . SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
This study presents a qualitative analysis of the nature of practice. The conclusions 
that have been drawn and the implications consequently derived are based on an 
analysis of concepts. As such it represents a starting point for further study which 
can be taken forward in several ways.
Firstly, as already alluded to above, an interesting juxtaposition of ideas could be 
obtained by examining the phenomena of practice from another perspective, for 
instance using experts on practice [academics] and experts in practice [clinical 
specialists, who have an advisory rather than a practical role]. This would furnish 
additional information and extend generalisability through triangulation, which 
could strengthen the analysis of practice and add weight to the conclusions and 
implications. This would contribute to the academic debate on the theory-practice 
relationship, and on epistemological issues such as practical knowledge and 
knowing-in-action, as well as support practitioners in their articulation of their 
practice.
Secondly, the empirical data in this study were based on nursing practice, and the 
conclusions have been directed towards the nursing profession. To discover 
whether these concepts pertain in other fields of practice, a study could be 
constructed, using the concepts of the study, and conducted amongst other 
professionals to determine the extent of any reciprocatory notions. This could 
extend to collaborative, inter-disciplinary research which could impact on other 
academic debates as well as other fields of practice.
Thirdly, the analysis given in this study has indicated that an inappropriate 
relationship between theory and practice is commonly implied. More theoretical 
and empirical research is needed to suggest different relationships. Some 
indications of what these might be have been given above, and each of these could be 
developed into a substantial study which could impact on both teaching and practice 
in all practice-based disciplines.
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The relationship between theory and practice could be further researched using 
these concepts of the nature of practice as a basis for comparing theory and practice, 
so as to take fonA/ard the debate on the theory-practice gap. Several comparative 
studies on various levels could be developed, so that a more sophisticated 
arrangement of the relationship than that of simply applying theory to practice is 
made explicit. This could have implications for more creative educational 
strategies for all practice-based courses.
1 5 .6 . CONCLUSION
The aim of this study was to demonstrate that theory and practice essentially 
bespeak different realms. This was achieved by articulating a framework of the 
nature of practice and comparing theory and practice on these dimensions. Several 
conclusions were drawn from this, and their impact on both practice and theory was 
discussed.
The interesting conundrum was pointed up: that in order to valorise practice it has 
had to be expressed in theoretical terms - a form of abstraction which has been 
shown to be anathema to practice and the cause of its subjugation with respect to 
theory. The ultimate conclusion is that the only way to know practice is to 
participate in it.
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APPENDIX 1
IN IT IA L BRAINSTORMING
reactive/responsive
risk-taking
unscientific
undefined endpoint
unquestioned pattern of response
constraints through humanistic concerns
vulnerability of patients
expressive
atheoretical
empowerment of client
INTEGRATION
holism
PRACTICE
SOCIAL CONTEXT
socialisation
varied contexts /  areas
role modelling
submission to  the system
expressive
interaction
ward-based
attitudes
influence of educational environment
action
one-to-one
time apart 
extended periods of exposure 
time consuming
specified task 
competency 
technical skills 
reality  
saturation 
locus of experience 
expertise
STAKEHOLDERS
patients
doctors
clinicians
paramedics
relatives
academics
teaching
learning
process
TACIT KNOWLEDGE 
embedded knowledge 
knowing how 
current knowledge 
traditions 
uncritical imitation 
'unused' scientific knowledge 
practice-based knowledge
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APPENDIX 2
The Royal Surrey 
County Hospital
Egerton Road Guildford 
Surrey GU2 5XX 
Telephone (0483) 571122 
Minicom (0483) 571122
Patron: Her Majesty The Queen
24/01/95
Ms C Tongue 
Research Fellow
Department o f Educational Studies
University o f Surrey
Guildford
Surrey
Dear Ms Tongue
Re: Access to student nurses and their mentors during
clinical placement
Following our recent discussions I confirm I am in support o f your conducting the above 
research at the Royal Surrey County and St Lukes Hospitals.
I wish you well with this work and look forward to reading the outcome. If I can help you 
further please do not hesitate to let me know.
Yours sincerely
Iris Orr
Director of Nursing & Quality
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APPENDIX 3
EXCERPT OF DISCUSSIONS LEADING TO DEVELOPMENT OF IDEAS AROUND 'CONTEXT'
In te rv ie w  1 .5 .E .2 9
CT
Is it possible for you to tell me just in your own words 
something that you have learned here in the hospital which has 
only been possible for you to learn here and not in lectures? 
Em m a
Just generally talking to patients, communicating. You can 
learn the principles of communication in lectures but you can't 
actually do it unless you're with patients.
CT
Can you say why you can't do it after having had lectures on it? 
Em ma
We had practice things and we had lectures and we had a pretend 
patient that we had to communicate with, but it's not the same, 
it's not real. When you are actually here [in the hospital] the 
patients have real problems.
CT
So what is the difference?
Em m a
I was talking to a patient who had a real breathing problem 
today. I was more worried that he was out of breath, I was 
very concerned that he was having problems breathing and it 
was harder to  talk to him, and he was having problems in 
talking to me. I could have imagined [from the lectures] that it 
would have been difficult, but I didn't think that I would be so 
worried about him.
theory = principles - 
decontextualise
practice - real
particular patient, 
details specific to  this 
patient
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I was constantly worrying about whether he was going to  
collapse or something because he couldn't breathe properly, but 
you can't really appreciate that if it is not a real problem - 
like what the patient was going through, and how it must feel to
them. I had to  change the way I spoke to him - just get the •  practice: differs to
basics, no chatting, so as not to exhaust him. I was really theoretical input
worried.
In te rv ie w  1 .9 .E .6 4  
CT
You told me before about communicating with a breathless 
patient. Can I suggest the work "context"? Were you 
practising in response to the context in which you were 
communicating?
Em m a
Yea, yea definitely. It becomes much more real when you're 
doing it in context, and there is a real risk - it's not just 
pretend, so you do change how you do things.
context
- 263 -
APPENDIX 4
L e tte r sent to  students prior to  second tranche of interviews
19 March 1996.
Dear
A few months ago you kindly volunteered to help me in my research into clinical learning and the 
nature of practice, and I was able to  carry out some preliminary interviews with some of the 
group. I am now writing to  you to check whether you would be prepared to continue to help me in 
this research. I am about to embark on the in-depth interviews, and as this will be an iterative 
process, I might need to speak with you on more than one occasion to clarify ideas.
What I am proposing is this: that you share with me an incident or incidents which illustrates 
something that you learned about nursing practice. To give you some indication of the direction of 
my thinking, I have enclosed a very brief overview of the concepts which have emerged so far and 
which I am currently using in my analysis. I am seeking to develop and modify these through 
your contributions.
As far as the practicalities are concerned, we can meet at any time or place which is mutually 
convenient, and if you would prefer it, we could meet in small groups of two or three.
I am writing to you so that you can have some time to consider all this. I shall be in touch soon, 
so that you can let me know what you think.
Many thanks for you willingness to be involved so far.
With kind regards.
Chelsia Tongue
Dept, of Educational Studies, Senate House, Surrey University 
(or contact at home, as above)
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THE NATURE OF NURSING PRACTICE
This thesis proposes that, while we definitely need academic preparation as a background to  
nursing, nursing practice itself is fundamentally different from theory and as such can only be 
learned in practice. In trying to make this difference visible, I am attempting to  draw a 
framework of practice. Here are some of the ways in which practice appears to differ from 
theory so far:
Focus
During practice, our focus is diffuse so that we can be aware of the many aspects (multiple 
realities) which make up the wholeness (gestalt) of our nursing care. We are not just carrying 
out the technicality of doing a dressing, for example, but are, at the same time, open to  everything 
else which affects our patient.
T e m p o ra lity
Although a shift has a fixed beginning and end, the timing of our nursing care does not proceed in 
such a linear way. There are times when it is cyclic - we come back to the patient when she is 
more able to cope with, say, new information. Sometimes we wait for the right moment - there is 
a passivity in the timing. Timings are dictated by the process/task, rather than by schedule - for 
example, the time it takes to bedbath a patient is dictated by the patient/her condition (the 
subjectivity of timing), and all bedbaths do not take the same amount of time.
C o n te x tu a lity
Our nursing care is not ideal or abstract - as it is described in nursing text books, but it changes 
and adapts according to the context or the situation in which we practice. Our practice is 
interconnected with and influenced by the context - for example, such things as hospital policy, 
individual preferences of both colleagues and patients, social acceptability, influence our 
practice.
Knowledge
The knowledge we use in practice is not only formal, propositional knowledge. We also use our 
intuition, our emotions/expressiveness, our basic common sense and know-how in our practice.
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Judgem ents and reasoning processes
In practice, our clinical judgements are not always based on theories and rules. At times we use 
gut feelings, as well as 'wisdom'. Our reasoning is perhaps less analytic and more responsive to  
the situation than is abstracted theoretical reasoning.
M o d a lity
During practice, the way in which we work is fluid. We are 'there for the patient' -  and also for 
other members of the interdisciplinary team. We fit our practice around them and are responsive 
to  them. One writer calls this the 'in-between stance' of nursing - in-between the patient and 
the doctor, the patient and hospital system, the patient and her family. We form the 'cytoplasm' 
in which the others can function.
A im s
In practice, the aims of our nursing care are determined by others - the patient's needs, the 
medical treatment. Although we know the general aim - (to  improve health/ peaceful death) the 
specific outcomes for each patient and for specific nursing practice is often not known in advance, 
or are re-active, rather than pro-active. As such, the aims are usually multi-layered goals.
N ature  o f nursing ac tiv ity
Our practice is often a combination of heterogeneous and multi-dimensional 
roles and tasks, concerned with the enabling of our patients (to do things, to get better), and often 
value-driven - particularly by the value of caring. Practice is strongly influenced by routines 
and habits which have often developed for good reasons and can embody our 'tacit knowledge'.
Scale o f nursing a c tiv ity
The scale of our practice is often concerned with the everyday, ordinary needs of our patients - 
the 'little things' that make a difference. It is concerned with particularities (an admission, an 
injection, a dressing of particular patients) rather than with large scale/global activity.
P o w e r
Our nursing practice is shaped by power relations - our power in relation to the patient - we 
sometime persuade patients to do things they are reluctant to do - and medical/hospital power - 
where we at times act as the patient's advocate.
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APPENDIX 5
The Ite ra tiv e  Process o f data co llection  and analysis
Example o f the  developm ent of one concept:
T im e and a ttrib u tes : s im u ltane ity /im m ed iacy  & pass iv ity /w a itin g
EXTRACTS FROM IDEAS DIARY
5 .1 0 .9 4
cf. Davies (1 9 9 0 ) - time was an important factor - 
overarching, regulating, controlling - in the everyday 
practices of the people in her study.
2 9 .1 1 .9 4
cf. Thompson (19 67 ) - suggests that time used to be 
task-oriented and is not clock-oriented. Are there 
parallels between that and Davies's cyclic and linear 
time, and between nursing's changing focus /  organisation 
(task-orientation to holism)? Check this because 
Davies suggest Thompson's statement comes from a male 
view of society where life appears to be equated with paid 
work and the public sphere, but Davies is aware of how 
much of women's work is task-oriented.
time is an important 
theme in practice
time has various 
aspects:
task/clock, cyclic 
linear,
male/female 
? what others
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EXTRACTS FROM INTERVIEWS (APRIL 9 5 )
18.3.K .181
Nursing is a special case, really, because people, when 
they're ill, they need a bit more care and attention. If 
someone was not feeling very well you need to be a bit 
more sensitive. You've got to have a trusting and good 
relationship with the patient and a good rapport, and one 
of the ways to build that up is by spending time with the 
patient.
9 .1 .8 .6 6
It isn't really you're just focusing on one problem, but 
some times you're so busy that it's a case of you've got 
this dressing to do, or something else, and you go in there 
and you do the dressing and straight away you rush off and 
do something else. I mean to look after the whole person 
you've got to spend more time, really, doing it, and that's 
something that nurses definitely don't have at the X 
hospital, is a lot of time.
1.4.E.76
There are all sorts of things that you have to think about 
when you are doing a dressing. [CT Could you say more 
about those things?] Well, like how often they need 
their dressing changed and whether it's an appropriate 
time in the day, or whether you're busy, or whether it 
gets done at all if you're understaffed, or whether you do 
it properly because you've got enough time. All these 
sort of things happen. Then there are certain things that 
need doing, but then something else might crop up and 
you get a new admission, or something, and everything 
else just goes out of the window.
time as an aspect of 
nursing practice
time is related to  
how nurses carry out 
their practice [? an 
aspect of practical 
time]
many things need to  
be considered 
simultaneously in 
practice
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EXTRACT FROM IDEAS DIARY
1 3 .5 .9 5
cf. Smith (1 9 8 7 ) - there is a theme of time in feminist 
literature: women involved in domestic chores conceive 
time differently: the pacing is different, sometimes 
things drag (as when a baby is sleeping), or all happens 
at once (preparing meals while at the same time minding 
the children, supervising homework)- see Davies & 
Thompson as well. Does this relate to how nurses see 
time in practice - doing many things simultaneously 
depending on the demand?
conceptions of time 
(?attributes) change 
according to the 
particular practice 
related to  particular 
practice
EXTRACT FROM CLINICAL DIARY
3 0 .9 .9 5
Theme for "Practice ": Nursing practice is concerned 
with short-time based practices, e.g.. at one level 
fetching another blanket /  analgesia etc. for a patient, 
doing a dressing for that day which needs to be repeated 
again the next day, and at another level, the timespan of a 
shift (hours), as opposed to the doctor's longer timespan 
of the whole course of treatment (weeks or months).
time can be short­
term (?how short, 
Timmediate) in 
nursing practice
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EXTRACTS FROM INTERVIEWS (SEPT. - OCT. 95 )
17.3 .K .139
Sometimes you can't tell how long things are going to take. 
You think they are going to be really quick and then you 
start doing it - like a dressing. You don't know what it 
looks like underneath , you don't know how much it's 
going to need cleaning, you don't know how co-operative 
the patient is going to be, or you don't know what 
dressings you're going to put on but you might need extra 
things, you might need to wait for somebody to come and 
help you.
1.1.E 64.
When we were doing dressing technique in lectures we 
talked about privacy and dignity, but when you're 
actually doing a dressing on a patient, you have to think of 
a whole load of stuff together when you're actually doing 
it - keeping a sterile field, maintaining their dignity, the 
other patients around you and all that sort of stuff.
time important
unpredictability /  
variab ility  of time 
needed for practice 
activities
? immediacy of time 
in some practice 
activities 
? simultaneity
EXTRACT FROM CLINICAL DIARY
2 2 .3 .9 6
Incident regarding clinical experiences of time: While I 
was busy with something else in the patient's room, the 
patient felt nauseated and started being sick. Had to stop 
immediately what I was doing and attend to patient. Then 
went off and got an anti-emetic - waited for that to take 
effect - not doing anything specific, just being with the 
patient - passivity.
immediacy
waiting
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EXTRACTS FROM INTERVIEWS (MAY 96 )
W .3 .B .3 0 0
You'd be trying to spend some time with a particular 
patient, getting them washed, doing a dressing or 
whatever, and you're guaranteed that someone in the 
room will say 'Oh, can you get me a commode' or 'my 
venflon's just come out and I'm bleeding everywhere' or 
'I'm being sick everywhere', and so, I mean, that happens 
all the time.
2 6 .7 .L  52
There was a lady who had a little boy in [as a patient] the 
other day, and she wanted to go and get a coffee, so I 
literally just presenced myself in the room for the time 
that she was away, so that the little boy knew I was there.
I wasn't actually doing something for him, but just [being 
there] so that he knew I was there, and the mum knew I 
was there as well, so I was helping her.
10.5 .B .275
You take your time with them, you let the patient set the 
pace ... They can take as long as they like, for instance if 
someone is having a bath and they want to  have a slosh 
around and a soak in the bath, then you have to wait, or go 
away or come back or whatever.
interrupted  time 
sequence
immediacy of some 
things in practice
passivity or waiting 
as part of practice
flex ib ility  of 
practice time 
waiting
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EXTRACT FROM IDEAS DIARY
15 .5 .9 6
cf. being able to  give care to patients in hospital: can only 
do this because of the nature of the temporality of the 
situation. Short term relationships lends a sense of 
immediacy to the situation which allows a more 
concentrated from of caring to be shown which might not 
be the case if the relationship were more permanent. 
Temporality crucial to  practice.
immediacy
time as overarching 
concept
EXTRACT FROM CLINICAL DIARY
2 2 .6 .9 6
Confirmation of aspects of Time: cardiac arrest on the 
ward today. Rush to get everyone and everything to the 
bedside -strong sense of immediacy and all action. Every 
other ward activity came to a standstill for those involved 
in the arrest. During the proceedings there were periods 
of passivity when we all just waited to see if the shot of 
IVs were going to  take effect, and also after shocking, 
whether sinus rhythm could be established. Concepts of 
'immediacy' and 'passivity' were obvious parts of the 
Time' concept in this experience.
immediacy
passivity
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APPENDIX 6
COMPENDIUM OF CONCEPTS OF THE FRAMEWORK OF PRACTICE
AWARENESS
1 holistic
2 indefinitely bounded
3 transparent
4 multi-existent
5 beyond reflection
6 patterned
7 open
8 relational
KNOWLEDGE
1 subjective
2 expressive
3 relational
4 intuitive
5 uncodifiable
6 constructed
7 organic
8 practical
9 dynamic
TEMPORALITY
1 cyclic
2 process oriented
3 flexible
4 passive
5 simultaneous
6 intersubjective
7 collectively controlled
8 rhythmic
9 intrinsically bounded
NATURE
1 heterogeneous
2 responsive
3 haphazard
4 unstable
5 value-driven
6 routinised
7 self utilising
SCALE
CONTEXTUALITY
1 concrete
2 situated
3 indivisible
4 connected
5 socially constructed
6 diverse
MODALITY
1 fluid
2 undifferentiated
3 enabling
4 common-sensical
1 everyday
2 little
3 ordinary
4 particular
REASONING
1 intuitive
2 intersubjective
3 iterative
4 non-syllogistic
5 heterogeneous
6 context responsive
POWER
INTENTIONALITY
1 reactive
2 multi-layered
3 indeterminate
1 institutional
2 knowledge-based
3 temporal
4 practical
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